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Despite still being in its infancy, artificial intelligence (AI) has already shown enormous potential to advance humanity towards new frontiers of prosperity 
and growth. Due to its powerful force, however, AI can also pose significant risks, 
which should be handled with the utmost care, but not with fear. The world’s 
top political leaders have understood AI’s disruptive potential and are rushing 
to secure a competitive advantage in this crucial emerging domain, even at the 
price of reviving old-fashioned industrial policy. At the same time, academia 
and civil society are calling for widely shared ethical principles to avoid negative 
repercussions. In this fast-changing context, Europe is struggling to keep pace 
with superpowers like the United States and China. 
This report summarises the work of the CEPS Task Force on Artificial Intelligence, 
which met throughout 2018. Arguing that the EU and its member states 
are uniquely positioned to lead the global community towards responsible, 
sustainable AI development, its members call upon European leaders to focus 
on leveraging AI’s potential to foster sustainable development, in line with the 
future 2030 Agenda. The report puts forward 44 recommendations on how 
to design and promote lawful, responsible and sustainable AI and how to 
approach future policy and investment decisions with the aim of positioning 
Europe in the driver’s seat to address the most disruptive technology transition 
of our times.
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROMISE OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Like an unannounced guest, artificial intelligence (AI) has suddenly emerged 
from nerdy discussions in university labs and begun to infiltrate larger venues 
and policy circles around the globe. Everywhere, and particularly in Europe, the 
debate has been tainted by much noise and fear, as evidenced in the European 
Parliament’s resounding report on civil law rules for robotics, in which Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein is evoked on the opening page (European Parliament, 
2016). At countless seminars, workshops and conferences, self-proclaimed 
“experts” voice concerns about robots taking our jobs, disrupting our social 
interactions, manipulating public opinion and political elections, and ultimately 
taking over the world by dismissing human beings, once and for all, as 
redundant and inefficient legacies of the past.  
Part of this discussion comes with an underlying mantra: “AI is different”: 
it is not like the Internet, not like electricity, not like the industrial revolution, 
not like oil and not like the invention of the wheel. Accordingly, so the gospel 
goes, we need new laws, new rules of conduct, new criteria for interacting with 
machines and a lifeline in case they decide to take over. Through the AI looking 
glass, the world suddenly seems a more dangerous place, and the Eldorado of 
today’s society melts under the heat wave of smart autonomous robots. The neo-
Luddites merge with those who are simply fearful, and the glass inevitably 
appears half empty.  
Is this view justified? A first look suggests that the promise and challenges 
of artificial intelligence are perhaps less disruptive and probably more boring 
than talking about singularity, cyborgs and “robo-cene”. But a closer look shows 
enormous promise, as will be shown in this report. The promise of AI is easy to 
spot if one considers two fundamental starting points. First, as AI arrives on our 
planet, it finds a society that is making progress in terms of life expectancy and 
the eradication of poverty and famine, but one that is also fraught with 
contradictions and inequality, with unsustainable production and consumption 
patterns as well as deteriorating social relationships. And while digital 
technology has evolved over the last half century, most of these trends are 
largely independent of the Internet, let alone artificial intelligence.  
2 | INTRODUCTION 
The question then becomes: Will the growth of AI exacerbate the 
contradictions of modern society? Or, can AI help us build a better world? 
Second, and in a related vein, our comprehension of what AI is and what 
it can do is still in its infancy, even if AI has already become pervasive in sectors 
such as digital platforms, banking, e-commerce, insurance, healthcare, energy, 
defence and cybersecurity. As we take our first steps in this blossoming new 
world, we can still decide how AI can help us promote a better society and a 
more sustainable future. In other words, we have the chance to approach policy 
choices in the best possible way: by asking the right questions, at the right time 
and in the right sequence. This is indeed what we attempt to do with this report, 
which synthesizes six months of work by the members of the CEPS Task Force 
on Artificial Intelligence. We have called upon (real) experts from academia, 
industry and policy-making, entrepreneurs and civil society representatives to 
present their views in the course of four highly interactive meetings. This 
allowed the Task Force to collect an extraordinarily rich blend of views on where 
AI can lead Europe and the world, and what we can do about it today.  
This report, which attempts to consolidate in one single document all 
these ideas and discussions, is accordingly structured as described below.  
Part I is dedicated to sharpening our definition of AI, understanding its 
level of development and possible future evolution, and placing it in context by 
defining the whole evolving stack of technologies and applications that are 
surrounding AI, such as high-performance computing, big data analytics and 
the Internet of Things. We present the main findings of the Task Force in terms 
of the need for responsible, trustworthy AI, as well as the imperative to link AI 
to the global debate on building a more sustainable future.  
Part II focuses on the EU perspective and defines a vision for AI, rooted in 
the complementarity between man and machine, by asking “what can AI do for 
Europe?”, rather than “what can Europe do for AI?” This gives us an 
opportunity to reflect on the tensions that AI is likely to bring into the legal 
system, as well as into the overall architecture of EU policy; and leads us to 
propose that AI develops in a way that fits the thrust and direction of Europe’s 
2030 Agenda. We then turn to the current debate on the Draft Ethics Guidelines 
on AI, presented in December 2018, and propose that the European Commission 
publishes guidance for AI developers, vendors and distributors, as well as 
organizations deploying AI, explaining and collecting good and bad practices in 
areas such as the selection, sampling, curation and cleaning of data; the design 
of algorithms; machine training and feedback; as well as the release of 
algorithmic outputs and responding to undesirable outcomes and impacts. This 
part also discusses whether policy changes will be needed in order to create 
more legal certainty in Europe as AI gradually becomes more pervasive.  
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Rather than advocating radical change, this section looks at existing 
legislation to spot cases in which rules may become obsolete as a result of the 
emergence of AI-enabled systems and environments. Finally, we discuss 
possible industrial and innovation policy scenarios that Europe could consider 
in order to boost its competitiveness in the AI domain. These include a 
discussion of a possible “CERN for AI” and the launch of a “Mission IT”, which 
orchestrates various streams of education, research and innovation with a view 
to nesting AI in a more sustainable vision of Europe’s future. 
At the end of the report, in Part III, we summarize our main policy 
recommendations. A full list of Task Force members and guest speakers can be 
found in the Annex.  
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PART I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 
DEFINITION, LIMITS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
he expression “artificial intelligence” implies the use of man-made 
techniques (Latin meaning of artificialis) to replicate the ability to “read 
inside” (intus legere) reality. This initial definition is technology-neutral, 
but it may be of little use if not further qualified. As a matter of fact, existing 
applications of AI mostly focus on three main functions: optimization, 
search/recommendation and diagnosis/prediction. AI is helping humans to 
optimise logistics and supply chains, better diagnose diseases, predict and 
prevent epidemics and fully tailor recommendations to the peculiar tastes and 
needs of end users. More generally, together with other digital technologies, AI 
is helping humans build a “fifth element” after air, earth, water and fire1: a data 
layer that increasingly surrounds us, gradually virtualizing our environment 
and multiplying our possibilities as mankind. All current applications belong to 
the specific domain of “narrow” AI. Nothing in current AI developments 
suggests that AI will move towards developing human-like perception and 
awareness, or sentience, thus leading towards so-called “artificial general 
intelligence” in the immediate future. Our discussions with experts in this field 
confirmed this finding: hence, the words “artificial intelligence” should not be 
taken literally: in most cases, what we call AI has nothing to do with general 
human intelligence and awareness. 
This observation, of course, does not lead to a capitis diminutio. Artificial 
intelligence can be extremely disruptive, empowering, challenging and 
unpredictable, as is elaborated below.  
                                                        
1 The four elements, as proposed by Empedocles – earth, water, air and fire – frequently occur 
in classical thought; Aristotle added a fifth element: aether. 
T
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x AI can be disruptive since it is at the core of an emerging new stack, 
composed of big data and often also the Internet of Things (IoT), which is 
pervading many markets sweeping away or profoundly affecting incumbent 
business models. This development is leading humans towards new ways 
of working, interacting and building social relationships. AI’s impact on 
productivity, as will be explained below, is still disputed, but is largely seen 
as more than simply a promise in the medium term: scholars are gradually 
abandoning gloomy prophecies of a replica of the “Solow Paradox” to 
embrace a vision in which AI becomes a game changer for total factor 
productivity and growth, by gradually rising as a third pillar of production, 
together with labour and capital.  
x AI is empowering since it provides human beings with extremely powerful 
tools that, if properly used, can augment human intelligence and lead us 
onto more sustainable and desirable paths. AI can also gradually expand our 
“soft ethics” space, enabling more widespread education, better self-
awareness, overall better health and life expectancy, and the possibility to 
navigate more sensibly through the “information envelope” that 
increasingly characterises society.  
x Some AI developments can also pose challenges, as in any powerful general-
purpose, dual-use technology, since they can exacerbate existing societal 
biases and create new ones, deepen inequality, weaken competition and 
democracy, discriminate against minorities and entire social groups, and 
generally contribute to the ongoing deterioration of trust in modern 
societies. AI is also leading to a whole new generation of autonomous 
weapons and countless variants of extremely dangerous cyberattack tactics, 
including “deep fakes”. This of course does not mean that AI is evil per se, 
but that humans could rely on AI to realise both virtuous and malicious 
goals, including building more deadly weapons and breaking security walls.  
x Finally, AI can be unpredictable since existing algorithms can use 
unsupervised deep learning and neural networks in ways that generate 
outcomes that surprise even the original developers. This does not imply 
that AI is developing its own intelligence that departs from the goals and 
tools given to it by developers: however, these techniques instil an element 
of randomness and uncertainty in the way machines use data to reach 
optimising decisions. 
Against this background, AI developers themselves, and increasingly also 
corporations and governments around the world, have been looking for ways to 
ensure that the positive disruption and empowerment effects of AI prevail over 
the potential negative effects. A global dialogue on AI has emerged, which 
revolves around countless ethical codes and declarations, from the “Asilomar 
principles” to the “Declaration of Toronto” and the “AI for Good” initiative; 
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corporate ethical principles developed by companies like Google, SAP, IBM, 
Microsoft, Deutsche Telekom, Telefonica referring to similar terms such as 
“responsible AI”, “trusted AI”, “trustworthy AI”; guidance for corporate 
practices developed e.g. by Accenture on tools such as algorithmic impact 
assessment, or by IBM with its AI Fairness 360 tool; government manifestos such 
as the Villani report, the Declaration of Montreal, the European Group on Ethics 
in Science and New Technologies (EGE) statement and the current draft ethical 
guidelines on Artificial Intelligence, the Chinese strategy on AI, the UAE 
strategy, the Indian strategy, etc. and full-fledged regulatory initiatives such as 
the EU GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), the EU proposed Platform-
to-Business regulation, etc. See Figure 1 for a timeline showing the adoption of 
national AI strategies by major countries across the globe in the period 2017-18. 
Some of these documents aim at setting global principles or global 
standards governing AI; others at shaping corporate practices to enable 
compliance with established principles; and others at achieving industrial 
competitiveness, or sustainable development. Before we venture into this 
crowded space, it is important to take a step back and provide some basic 
information on, and definitions of, AI as we know it today.  
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1. A BASIC DEFINITION OF AI AND 
RELATED AI SYSTEMS 
There are countless definitions of AI, and members of the CEPS Task Force have 
entertained a number of variants in the course of their meetings over the past 
year. For example, Mark Nitzberg AI Research Director at UC Berkeley, adopted 
a very simple definition: “narrow AI” gives the appearance of intelligent 
behaviour, while “general AI” matches human performance in all tasks. Czech 
Technical University Professor Michal Pěchouček defined AI as a family of 
technologies and scientific fields that allows/studies i) automation, ii) 
acceleration and iii) extreme scalability of human perception, decision making 
and reasoning. Niels J. Nilsson (2010) defined AI as “that activity devoted to 
making machines intelligent, and intelligence is that quality that enables an 
entity to function appropriately and with foresight in its environment”. IBM’s 
Francesca Rossi presented at CEPS an articulate, systemic position by defining 
AI as a family of techniques aimed at building machines that can gather input 
from the external environment, process it based on a given set of instructions 
and find ways to pursue the given goal through actuators. Finally, the European 
Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG) 
created a sub-group tasked with reaching a definition of AI, chaired by 
Francesca Rossi. The group refers to AI as “systems that display intelligent 
behaviour by analysing their environment and taking actions – with some 
degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals. AI-based systems can be purely 
software-based, acting in the virtual world (e.g. voice assistants, image analysis 
software, search engines, speech and face recognition systems) or AI can be 
embedded in hardware devices (e.g. advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones 
or Internet of Things applications).”2 
What this latter definition correctly captures is that AI never appears in 
isolation, but as part of an IT system, in which AI features as a “complementor” 
(Shapiro and Varian 1998). Sometimes this system is dedicated to a specific 
function, as in the case of robotics; in other cases, AI works as part of a more 
general-purpose system, as is the case of recommendation algorithms nested in 
services like Netflix, marketplaces like Amazon, Zalando or eBay, or search 
engines like Google. In any event, AI needs some form of hardware, in particular 
                                                        
2 See “A definition of AI: Main capabilities and scientific disciplines”, AI HLEG, 18 December 
2018 (https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/files/ged/ai_hleg_definition_of_ai_18_ 
december.pdf).  
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computing capacity, as well as data storage hardware and connectivity, for data 
acquisition (e.g. through sensors, or through direct typing of instructions, or 
communication with other machines) and for supporting actions through 
specific actuators, where appropriate. Moreover, AI needs software for the 
elaboration of data, their interpretation through data libraries, various types of 
algorithmic processing and decision-making, and for achieving interoperability 
with other systems, whether AI-enabled or not, and with humans.  
These elements can be easily portrayed as a layered “stack”, in which the 
hardware and connectivity components support the software, applications and 
service layers.3 Figure 2 shows an example of “AI stack”. As shown in the 
picture, the infrastructure requirement depends significantly on whether the AI-
enabled system is used on premise, or in various “aaS” (as a Service) variants, 
which include different levels of combinations of hardware and software, as well 
as of what is used remotely and what is run locally. In many cases AI is used as 
an added functionality to existing cloud-based platforms, used “as a service” by 
customers through cloud-based access. AI is, thus, simply another feature at the 
application layer of the evolving layered stack used in all computer science. In 
other cases, AI uses dedicated hardware to perform its functions, and as such 
becomes the central “brain” of an ad-hoc, layered system that has dedicated 
hardware, such as specific computing power and specific “actuators”, which 
enable the software to interact with its environment. 
An intuitive example is that of the self-driving car, which requires a 
significant amount of hardware – including the mechanical components, the 
Lidar sensors, the cameras, sensors for cross-traffic alert, sensors for parking 
assistance – and a significant amount of software, including a general operating 
system, as well as dedicated software that enables ad-hoc functions such as 
parking assist, emergency braking, rear collision warning, blind spot detection, 
etc. In that environment, the AI system chiefly depends on its ability to collect 
data from the environment (through sensors and cameras), but also from 
available information infrastructure, e.g. vehicle-to-vehicle connectivity or V2V; 
vehicle to environment connectivity, or V2E; or vehicle to infrastructure 
connectivity, V2I). Data collected through existing maps, or directly from the 
environment including direct observation or V2X communication are elaborated 
by the system, and the car then decides on the best course of action given its 
underlying instructions and overall goals. The car then uses hardware to interact 
with the environment (so-called “actuators”). 
                                                        
3 Russell and Norwig (2009) observe that “AI-based systems can be purely software-based, 
acting in the virtual world (e.g. voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, 
speech and face recognition systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices (e.g. 
advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones or Internet of Things applications).” 
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Figure 2. Exam
ples of A
I stack 
 
Source: M
edium
 (https://m
edium
.com
). 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: ETHICS, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHALLENGES | 11 
 
 
Often these abilities are grouped in the term PEAS, which stands for 
Performance, Environment, Actuators and Sensors. Figure 3 offers a diagram of 
the complex set of radars and sensors that are enabling self-driving cars to 
appear on our roads today. 
More generally, complex information systems are normally built as layers 
of so-called “complementors”, which incorporate hardware, middleware and 
software components aimed at achieving both interaction with the external 
environment and elaboration of information. The typical properties of these 
system goods, as recognised in the academic literature, are: i) modularity, i.e. 
made of separate complementors that can be replaced as individual modules, 
provided that compatibility with the whole system, and in particular with the 
operating system that governs the device, is satisfied; ii) interoperability, i.e. the 
operating system that runs the whole system works with modules that are 
compatible with its application programming interfaces (APIs); and iii) 
scalability, indicating the capability of information systems to handle a growing 
amount of work or the potential to be enlarged to accommodate that growth.  
That said, the representation of AI as a component in more complex 
information systems is useful for the purposes of our report, as well as for 
designing policy around AI. As a matter of fact, AI today is mostly used as an 
add-on to previous layered information systems, adding more “intelligence” to 
the application and service layers of the pre-existing stacks. Such intelligence is 
often very data-hungry, and as such requires powerful hardware, both for data 
collection and for data processing. In this respect, both the Internet of Things 
(IoT) and High-Performance Computing (HPC) are important components of 
AI-enabled systems. Without adequate hardware to sense the environment and 
interact with it, and without sufficient computing capacity, introducing 
sophisticated AI algorithms would be akin to driving a Ferrari to go to the 
supermarket or installing a smart grid in a “dumb” electricity network. 
Similarly, advances in nano-technologies and in the miniaturization of chips are 
essential to enable AI to be embedded in robots and other devices, including for 
example medical devices. It is very important to keep this in mind, since the 
promotion of AI in Europe through policy measures cannot ignore the relevance 
of the complementors that enable the full realisation of AI’s potential. 
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Figure 3. Radars and sensors in a self-driving car 
 
 Source: Texas Instrum
ents. 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: ETHICS, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHALLENGES | 13 
 
Box 1. Does an AI agent need to be rational? 
Current AI systems mostly embed so-called “simple reﬂex agents”, which select an action 
based on the current state only, ignoring historical data or past experience. Model-based 
reflex agents differ as they can act in partially observable environments by constantly 
updating their (static) representation of the world. A further evolution is represented by 
goal-based agents, used in cases where knowing the current state of the environment is not 
enough: the agents can combine the provided goal information with the environment 
model, to choose those actions that can achieve the given goal. Utility-based agents are an 
improvement over goal-based agents. These agents choose the action that maximizes the 
expected utility, after weighing both benefits and costs: they are thus very similar to the 
homo oeconomicus in economic theory. But the state of the art in AI goes beyond all these 
types of agents and implies the development of so-called “learning agents”, which are 
based on the original definition given by Alan Turing. As agents become more complex, so 
does their internal structure, allowing for various forms of internal state representation.  
Within the context of information systems, AI enables more complex decision-
making, based on criteria that are, at least initially, provided to the machine by human 
beings. Russell and Norwig (2009) observe that AI “refers to systems that display 
intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking actions – with some 
degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals”. For example, rational decision-making, 
e.g., could be a goal for the AI developer, and as such the calculation of expected benefits 
and costs associated with a given action can be embedded in the system.  
However, full rationality does not seem to be an essential element of an AI system: 
an AI developer could also try to replicate rational biases, such as impulsiveness, framing 
or hyperbolic discounting, to enable better interaction with human beings.4 An AI system 
can also be taught to act in conditions of imperfect information, and as such can be trained 
to act with “rational ignorance” or in a more risk-averse way. Accordingly, the requirement 
of rationality does not seem to be needed in a definition of AI, even if ensuring that AI-
enabled machines behave rationally will often be a clear goal of the developer.5  
Also, rationality should not be intended as a process but rather as an outcome. There 
is no need for an AI system to replicate the same process followed by the human brain, 
based, i.a., on neurons and synapses. While neural networks are being used in deep 
learning processes, they are only one out of several possible ways to develop AI (see Silver 
et al. 2016). Postulating that AI should seek to mimic the functioning of the human brain 
would be also complicated if one considers that our brain functions are still relatively 
obscure for neuro-scientists (Adolphs 2015). At the same time, pretending that AI replicates 
or mimics the outcome of human decision-making would also imply that all the biases and 
imperfections of our decisions would be replicated in the AI system, and this, too, would 
be undesirable in many circumstances.  
                                                        
4 Some scholars have proposed incorporating that quality into self-driving cars; see Renda 
(2018a). 
5 Within artificial intelligence, a rational agent is typically one that maximises its expected 
utility, given its current knowledge.  
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1.1 What AI can do: Main techniques and use cases 
AI is already being massively used in a number of areas and can be broken 
down in many sub-domains and techniques. These include search and 
planning; knowledge representation and reasoning;6 machine learning, which 
has led to AI breakthroughs in fields such as search and product 
recommendation engines, speech recognition, fraud detection, image 
understanding, etc.; multi-agent systems; robotics; machine perception, 
including computer vision and natural language processing; and more.7  
In particular, machine learning accounts for approximately 60% of current 
investment in AI-related R&D: it extracts patterns from unlabelled data 
(unsupervised learning), or efficiently categorizes data according to pre-existing 
definitions embodied in a labelled data set (supervised learning).8 Developers 
feed machine-learning systems large amounts of data, then the system finds the 
hidden relationships and uses reinforcement to improve its performance 
automatically. Machine learning is used in Google’s search algorithm, digital 
advertising and online personalization tools (e.g. the Amazon and Netflix 
recommendation engines; or the Facebook newsfeed). Machine learning also 
extends into quantitative processes such as supply-chain operations, financial 
analysis, product pricing, and procurement-bid predictions. Today, nearly every 
industry is exploring or utilizing machine-learning applications.  
Within this domain, deep learning uses additional, hierarchical layers of 
processing (loosely analogous to neuron structures in the brain) and large data 
sets to model high-level abstractions and recognize patterns in extremely 
complex data. Deep learning has made speech understanding a reality on our 
phones and in our kitchens, and its algorithms can be applied to a wide array of 
applications that rely on pattern recognition. These tools are made available 
today by large corporations (Google’s TensorFlow, Microsoft’s Control Toolkit, 
and many other AI tools are indeed released on a free and open-source basis) 
and operate on common computer hardware. See Figure 4 on the following page 
for a classification of AI approaches and domains.
                                                        
6 The IBM Watson program, which beat human contenders to win the Jeopardy challenge in 
2011, was largely based on an efficient scheme for organising, indexing and retrieving large 
amounts of information gathered from various sources. See 
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/ibm-watson-the-inside-story-of-how-the-jeopardy-
winning-supercomputer-was-born-and-what-it-wants-to-do-next/  
7 Some of the most sophisticated AI systems use a combination of these techniques. For 
example, the AlphaGo programme that defeated the human champion at the game of Go used 
multiple machine learning algorithms for training itself, and also used a sophisticated search 
procedure while playing the game. 
8 Presentation to the CEPS Task Force by Michal Pěchouček (Czech Technology University).  
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Combinations of these techniques have already shaken entire sectors, 
starting with industrial applications (e.g. for predictive maintenance) and online 
platforms, from e-commerce to online search, the collaborative economy and 
interactive online advertising. A good example is Google search, which 
introduced innumerable new AI-enabled functions in its first 20 years of 
existence (Renda 2015). Similarly, Netflix today reportedly earns as much as $1 
billion thanks to its recommendation engine, which shows users movies they 
could be interested in, based on previous choices (Gomez-Uribe and Hunt 2016). 
And Amazon invests enormous amounts of money in AI R&D to sharpen its 
business model and provide a more effective service to its customers. Apple, 
Amazon, Microsoft and Google also compete for the future of search, through 
their vocal assistants that make the most of recent breakthroughs in natural 
language processing. All these developments are shaping a world in which 
information is potentially easier to find, cheaper and more abundant. In an 
information-rich society, as Herbert Simon (1971) used to say, a “wealth of 
information creates a poverty of attention”: AI can help us navigate through this 
over-abundance of information, leading us to find what is most relevant.  
That said, use cases are quickly emerging in many specific sectors, 
beyond the Internet economy. These include autonomous transportation, which 
will soon be commonplace and, as most people’s first experience with 
physically-embodied AI systems, will strongly influence the public’s perception 
of AI; home/service robots, which have already entered people’s homes, primarily 
in the form of vacuum cleaners such as Roomba; healthcare, where there has been 
an immense forward leap in collecting useful data from personal monitoring 
devices and mobile apps, from electronic health records in clinical settings and, 
to a lesser extent, from surgical robots designed to assist with medical 
procedures and service robots supporting hospital operations; entertainment, 
with a huge industry investing in new exciting interactive videogame 
experiences; and education, with considerable progress expected in online 
learning, conversational chatbots and interactive machine tutors. AI can also 
potentially help development and cooperation by empowering low-resource 
communities, and by enabling more effective policing and, more generally, 
public safety.  
 
Box 2. A Knowledge Map of AI 
Another way of mapping AI developments is provided by Francesco Corea (2018), 
who identifies a number of AI paradigms: logic-based tools, used for knowledge 
representation and problem-solving; knowledge-based tools, on ontologies and huge 
databases of notions, information, and rules; probabilistic methods, i.e. tools that allow 
agents to act in incomplete information scenarios; machine learning, which allows 
computers to learn from data; embodied intelligence, an engineering toolbox that 
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assumes that a body (or at least a partial set of functions such as movement, 
perception, interaction and visualization) is required for higher intelligence; and 
search and optimization, i.e. tools that allow intelligent search with many possible 
solutions. He classifies these six paradigms into three different macro-approaches: 
the symbolic approach, which states that human intelligence could be reduced to 
symbol manipulation; the sub-symbolic approach, in which no specific representation 
of knowledge is provided ex ante; and the statistical approach, based on mathematical 
tools to solve specific sub-problems. 
Figure 5 (on the next page) presents Corea’s mapping of AI knowledge, with 
the vertical axis representing the problems AI is used for. A distinction is drawn 
between reasoning (the capability to solve problems), knowledge (ability to 
represent and understand the world), planning (capability of setting and achieving 
goals), communication (ability to understand language and communicate) and 
perception (ability to transform raw sensorial inputs such as images or sounds into 
usable information). The patterns of the boxes divide the technologies into two 
groups, i.e., narrow applications and general applications. Rather than hinting at 
Artificial General Intelligence, which remains a pure speculation today, the 
difference refers to technologies that can only solve a specific task (narrow 
applications) and others that solve multiple tasks today or in the future and interact 
with the world (better than many humans — general applications). 
1.2 Winter is not coming (at least for AI) 
While there seems to be widespread consensus that AI has the potential to 
revolutionize the economy, many consider the current hype to be exaggerated. 
In the past, artificial intelligence inspired many moments of enthusiasm and 
optimism, which were then followed by an “AI winter” due to lack of practical 
successes and a gradual loss of momentum.9 Some commentators also mention 
other factors that may jeopardise the rise of AI as announced by the more 
enthusiastic commentators: such factors include the possible slowdown of 
Moore’s law, which would deprive AI of the computing capacity needed to 
develop its most promising applications; and also the possible negative impact 
of AI on employment and equality, which would lead to a lack of market 
demand if not corrected by policy interventions.  
                                                        
9 The onset of the AI winter can be traced to the US government’s decision to pull back on AI 
research. The decisions were often attributed to a couple of infamous reports, specifically the 
Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee (ALPAC) report by US government in 
1966 and the Lighthill report for the British government in 1973. 
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This time round, however, there are several reasons to believe that the 
AI winter will not come. First, concerns on the end of Moore’s Law appear 
exaggerated at best. Simply counting the number of transistors in integrated 
circuits does not capture the architecture and performance of modern computer 
processors, e.g. GPUs (graphics processing units) or TPUs (tensor processing 
units). Rather than focusing strictly on increasing transistor counts and clock 
speeds, companies now focus on performance, including power efficiency and 
component integration. The explosion of specialised processors for handling AI 
and deep-learning workloads is partly a reaction to the fact that CPUs (central 
processing units) do not scale the way they used to. Moreover, the current trend 
in designing processors is to move away from general-purpose machines to the 
tailoring of machines to specific applications, such as graphics and machine 
learning. Today, CPUs co-exist with GPUs (which improve performance by a 
factor of 10 over CPUs, (see i.a. Chen et al. 2013) and TPUs (which improve 
performance by a factor of at least 10 over GPUs10). CPUs perform the main 
tasks, GPUs do the graphics, TPUs the AI. in a related vein, the emerging trend 
in IT is ‘parallel computing’, which achieves exponential growth in throughput 
by using a multitude of processors at the same time, regardless of the fact that 
the growth of transistors in integrated circuits is slowing down. The bottom line 
is that even if Moore’s law slows down, computing will continue to progress at 
a very fast pace, thanks to parallel computing, neural network structures and 
quantum technologies. As Moore’s law becomes obsolete, technologies will find 
new ways to support the growth of applications, content and other hardware.  
Together with stronger computation capacity, the amount of data 
available today is immensely greater than that available in the 1980s. Before the 
mid-1990s, during the pre-internet age, the availability of large datasets was an 
insurmountable problem: today, the volume of data available for analytics 
reportedly doubles each year. In addition, algorithms have significantly 
improved. And both public and private investment has reached unprecedented 
levels, in particular in the United States and China. 
Participants in the CEPS Task Force agreed that AI can lead to important 
progress in our society, and the narrative around that view should therefore 
convey hope and optimism, rather than dystopian fears. As a matter of fact, as 
noted by Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson (2017), the most impressive 
capabilities of AI, particularly those based on machine learning, have not yet 
spread widely. More importantly, like other general-purpose technologies, their 
full effects will not be realised until waves of complementary innovations are 
developed and implemented. The discussion around recent patterns in 
                                                        
10 https://www.zdnet.com/article/tpu-is-15x-to-30x-faster-than-gpus-and-cpus-google-
says/  
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aggregate productivity growth highlights a similar contradiction. On the one 
hand, there are astonishing examples of potentially transformative new 
technologies that could greatly increase productivity and economic welfare (see 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). There are some early concrete signs of the 
promise of these technologies, recent leaps in AI performance being the most 
prominent example. At the same time, however, measured productivity growth 
over the past decade has slowed significantly. This deceleration is large, having 
cut productivity growth by one-half or more in the decade preceding the 
slowdown. It is also widespread, having occurred throughout the OECD and, 
more recently, among many large emerging economies as well (Syverson, 2017).  
Recently, several papers analysing the impact of automation in Europe 
mostly find a positive contribution of robots to productivity. Among others, 
Graetz and Michaels (2017, 2018) use the industrial robots database and estimate 
that in the 17 countries of their sample, the increased use of robots per hour 
worked from 1993-2007 raised the annual growth of labour productivity by 
about 0.37 percentage points.11 By considering an industry-country panel 
specification, they found that robots appear to reduce the share of hours worked 
by low-skilled workers relative to middle-skilled and high-skilled workers; they 
do not polarise the labour market, but appear to hurt the relative position of low-
skilled workers rather than middle-skilled ones. Nevertheless, the use of robots 
per hour worked appears to boost total factor productivity and average wages. 
Chiacchio et al. (2018) find that the use of robots per hour worked appears to 
boost total factor productivity (TFP) and average wages: however, they also find 
that the displacement effect (labour to capital) offsets the productivity effect, 
leading to job losses (see section 4.6.1 below). 
Recent reports by Accenture/Frontier Economics (Purdy and Daugherty 
2017), McKinsey (2017) and PWC (2017) conclude that AI will be a game 
changer for total factor productivity and growth, by gradually rising as a third 
pillar of production, together with labour and capital. Other research has shown 
similar, although often less optimistic, predictions. For example, Chen et al. 
(2016) estimate the cumulative economic impact of AI from 2016 to 2026 as lying 
between $1.5 and $3 trillion (representing 0.15 to 0.3% of global GDP). Furman 
and Seamans (2018) review some of the most interesting literature on the impact 
of AI on the economy, which mostly finds that AI and robotics have the potential 
to increase productivity, but they may have mixed effects on labour, particularly 
in the short run. They also conclude that many economists believe that “AI and 
                                                        
11 The authors use data from the International Federation of Robotics and EUKLEMS to 
estimate robot density (the stock of robots per million hours worked) in 14 industries in 17 
countries from 1993-2007. 
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other forms of advanced automation, including robots and sensors, can be 
thought of as a general purpose technology (GPT) that enable lots of follow-on 
innovation that ultimately leads to productivity growth”.12 The fact that AI has 
not (yet) translated into large productivity gains, according to Brynjolfsson, 
Rock and Syverson (2017), is due to a “lag between technological progress and 
the commercialization of new innovative ideas building on this progress which 
often rely on complementary investments”: such a lag, these authors claim, is 
particularly notable in the case of GPT.  
This, of course, does not mean that AI is guaranteed to succeed overnight. 
The CEPS Task Force members largely agreed that AI will emerge as a gradual 
process. As a general-purpose family of technologies, AI will pervade all sectors 
of the economy and all aspects of professional and daily life. At the same time, 
it will have to be used responsibly: if not, winter will come for society, not for 
AI. 
1.3 Handle with care, not with fear 
Beyond its outstanding promise, many commentators also argue that AI, if badly 
governed, can represent an existential risk for our society; whereas others 
observed that AI can make catastrophic events such as a nuclear war more likely 
(Geist and Lohn 2018). While this threatening narrative should not overshadow 
the positive disruption that AI will bring to our society, it is important to map 
possible risks, which will be as essential as opportunities in forming the basis 
for future AI policy and governance. Below, we distinguish between intentional, 
pernicious use of AI and unintentional damage caused by the use of AI. 
1.3.1 Malicious uses of AI 
Some of the emerging risks caused by the malicious use of artificial intelligence 
appear as the natural continuation of existing trends. Fake news will become 
“deep fakes” facilitated by Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs); phishing 
scams will become more sophisticated; and AI-enabled cyberattacks may 
become more difficult to anticipate due to the enhanced use of (unsupervised) 
machine learning (Renda 2018c). An authoritative report collectively published 
by several institutes in February 2018 argued that “the costs of attacks may be 
lowered by the scalable use of AI systems to complete tasks that would 
ordinarily require human labour, intelligence and expertise. A natural effect 
would be to expand the set of actors who can carry out particular attacks, the 
                                                        
12 Quoting Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern (2017). 
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rate at which they can carry out these attacks and the set of potential targets”.13 
Max Tegmark’s 2017 book Life 3.0 notes the concern of UC Berkeley computer 
scientist Stuart Russell, who worries that the biggest winners from an AI arms 
race would be “small rogue states and non-state actors such as terrorists” who 
can access these weapons through the black market. Tegmark further writes that 
after they are “mass-produced, small AI-powered killer drones are likely to cost 
little more than a smartphone”. Would-be assassins could simply “upload their 
target’s photo and address into the killer drone: it can then fly to the destination, 
identify and eliminate the person, and self-destruct to ensure that nobody knows 
who was responsible”. 
These risks are already sufficient to generate reactions from the 
government side, such as the restructuring of cybersecurity and cyber-resilience 
plans, with the creation of pervasive, diffuse networks of data collection points, 
coupled with the centralization of processing power into high performance 
computers. However, new risks will also emerge. For example, the explosion 
in the number of connected devices and progress on miniaturization will lead to 
possible body hacking, which may concentrate on wearables and implants. 
Evidence brought to court could be manipulated just as news stories are in so-
called “deep fakes”, which will have implications for parties in trials, insurers 
(possibly leading to higher premiums) and the outcome of litigation.14 And the 
use of self-driving cars may make road traffic a favourite target for cyber-
attackers; and so-called “swarming attacks” by distributed networks of 
autonomous robotic systems cooperating at machine speed will become 
possible. At the same time, as a dual-use technology, AI is also a response to 
other emerging risks, such as pandemics and bioterrorism. For example, 
companies like AIME (AI in Medical Epidemiology) have created a Dengue 
Outbreak Prediction platform; and scientists in South Korea have been able to 
train AI to detect the presence of anthrax at high speeds.15 
Ongoing calls for a widespread global governance agreement on the use 
of AI and related standards appears likely to be frustrated by the emerging AI 
race. Certain uses of AI, however, could be subject to a global moratorium or 
outright ban, in order to prevent countries from engaging in a dangerous 
                                                        
13 https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/3d82daa4-97fe-4096-9c6b-376b92c619de/ 
downloads/1c6q2kc4v_50335.pdf 
14 For more on this issue, see the work by the European Commission on Connected and 
Autonomous Mobility (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/connected-and-
automated-mobility-europe).  
15 See https://www.newsweek.com/ai-vs-bioterrorism-artificial-intelligence-trained-detect-
anthrax-scientists-647856  
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competitive race, with possible destructive consequences for all. This is a 
possible outcome for the ongoing discussions on banning autonomous weapons 
(see also section 4.2.2 below). Academics like Toby Walsh and initiatives like the 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots have denounced the escalation of this 
potentially destructive race, with prototype autonomous weapons under 
development “in every theatre of war – in the air, on the sea, under the sea and 
on the land”.16 Even in this case, however, difficulties in reaching agreement 
over the definition of autonomous weapons, and on patterns of attribution in 
case of distributed (e.g. swarming) attacks may lead the proposed agreement to 
collapse. Accordingly, while there would certainly be room for fruitful 
agreement in the international community, the chances that such an agreement 
will end up being comprehensive and effectively implemented are tiny. 
At the domestic level, stability will be undermined by two other trends. 
The first is the threat of massive automation of work, which risks leaving parts 
of the population in a permanent state of unemployment or lacking the needed 
skills to re-enter the job market. The Global Commission on the Future of Work 
set up by the International Labour Organisation (ILO 2019) recently called for a 
universal labour guarantee, a universal entitlement to lifelong learning and the 
establishment of an effective lifelong learning system to face this threat.17 
Independently of what the net impact of automation will be in the end (all sorts 
of predictions are being made), an insistence that there will be no disruption is 
either naïve or false.  
Governments initially tried to address this issue by considering increased 
reliance on universal basic income schemes, “robo-taxes” or similar policies.18 
But it is unclear whether individual well-being (typically fostered by the fact of 
being employed, not just by economic security, see Stam et al. 2015) and social 
cohesion will be materially helped by these initiatives. Accordingly, the debate 
has gradually moved on to a reflection on how to reskill the workforce. 
Inequality will increasingly go beyond the simple availability of money: unequal 
access to education, to political life, to high-quality services will create a risk of 
political disruption at home. The enormous potential of AI to reduce the cost of 
delivering public services may lead the more disadvantaged parts of the 
population to be served by “junk AI”. For example, for poorer people, cheap 
                                                        
16 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/09/killer-robots-pressure-builds-
for-ban-as-governments-meet 
17 For an analysis of the jobs that will be replaced and the skills that will be needed in the 
future, see Accenture (2018), An Inclusive Future of Work: A Call to Action, at 
https://www.accenture.com/t20181114T030204Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-
90/Accenture-Inclusive-Future-Of-Work-Full-Report.pdf#zoom=50  
18 For an analysis, see Furman and Seamans (2018). 
24 | PART I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: DEFINITION, LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
bots may replace general practitioners, small claims judges, insurance brokers, 
etc., with insufficient levels of accuracy and possible ensuing discrimination or 
exclusion. This is why public administrations should be held to the highest 
standards in delivering services, including criteria of universal access and 
inclusive, sustainable AI (see Part II of this report). 
The second development is related to the manipulation of public opinion 
through so-called “deep fakes” and new forms of disinformation campaigns, 
which make AI a threat to democracy. More specifically, while it can be expected 
that AI-powered, real-time fact-checking will dilute the possibility for post-truth 
political narratives, the power of AI-enabled disinformation will equally 
increase. Much of this prospective impact depends on the choices 
governments will make to enable the diffusion of responsible, ethical and 
trustworthy AI; on their efforts to create a global AI community and 
governance, with common rules; and on national policies aimed at 
accompanying job automation with the gradual reskilling of the workforce. 
In this respect, the efforts made by the European Union, the UK, France and sub-
national governments such as Québec are to be observed with cautious 
optimism. Needless to say, such developments will only be sustainable if 
coupled with measures aimed at supporting end users in distinguishing services 
backed by ethically aligned AI from less ethically oriented products and 
services. 
1.3.2 Unintentional bias and discrimination 
AI can also cause harm to society and individuals unintentionally, and this is the 
policy issue that creates the most challenging problems for policy-makers, as 
well as for developers. In particular, there is widespread agreement that the use 
of AI can create unintentional, undesirable bias, thus violating fundamental 
rights and/or leading to outcomes and impacts that are perceived to be unfair. 
However, this statement already shows how intractable the policy problem is.  
Consider again the following statement:  
The use of AI can create undesirable bias, thus violating 
fundamental rights and/or leading to outcomes and impacts that 
are perceived to be unfair. 
The statement contains several elements that are controversial or difficult 
to interpret. First, what is undesirable bias? The problem here is that our 
societies are already deeply biased. For example, African-Americans in the 
United States are much more likely to be pulled over by the police and 
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interrogated than are Caucasians.19 Richer people receive higher damage awards 
for personal injury in courts, since damages are based on foregone earnings. 
Women are generally paid less than men in many sectors of the economy, other 
conditions e.g. level of seniority, experience and evaluations being equal.20 
Training a machine with data from the real world will in most cases incorporate 
these societal biases. Not surprisingly, the Google search engine was accused of 
showing ads for executive jobs more often to what it perceives as white males, 
compared to African-American women. Is this Google’s fault, society’s fault or 
simply a fact of life?  
As a matter of fact, while biases already exist, the use of algorithms may 
in some cases exacerbate bias, amplify it or create it de novo. A recent article by 
ProPublica compared two stories of prisoners awaiting parole, showing how 
machines may end up incorporating bias from the very outset.21 In much the 
same vein, the use of big data and predictive policing techniques in a number of 
cities around the world has led to concerns over racial biases (Ferguson 2017). 
In 2016, many commentators argued that “AI is racist”, since a beauty contest 
that was to be decided by an algorithm, supposedly using “objective” factors 
such as facial symmetry and wrinkles, led to the almost total exclusion of dark-
skinned contestants.22 Similarly, problems emerged also in large tech 
companies, for example when Microsoft released Tay, a chatbot that quickly 
began using racist language and promoting neo-Nazi views on Twitter; and 
when Facebook eliminated human editors who had curated “trending” news 
stories, to discover that the algorithm immediately promoted fake and vulgar 
stories on news feeds.23 See Figure 6 for an illustration of machine bias in 
criminal sentencing. 
What makes the issue almost intractable is that there is no such thing as a 
neutral algorithm: and even if it was possible to generate one, a neutral 
algorithm would in many cases be useless, whereas “excessively” biased 
algorithms can be dangerous and harmful. Accordingly, it is important to define 
which biases are to be considered acceptable, and which are not. There is also a 
potential trade-off between accuracy and privacy. In some cases, more accurate 
algorithms can eliminate bias by not treating people on the basis of average 
calculations. For example, an algorithm may decide not to grant credit to an 
                                                        
19 https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/04/the-stop-race-police-traffic/ 
20 https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/why-women-earn-less-than-men 
21 Presentation by Rumman Chowdhury (Accenture) to the CEPS Task Force. 
22 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/08/artificial-intelligence-beauty-
contest-doesnt-like-black-people 
23 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/29/facebook-fires-trending-
topics-team-algorithm 
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individual since he or she belongs to an ethnic group that on average repays 
debts less often. 
Figure 6. Machine bias in criminal sentencing 
 
Source: ProPublica 2016 (https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing). 
1.4 Main findings 
This section introduced the reader to the concept of artificial intelligence and its 
many definitions and families of methods. Sometimes confused with big data 
analytics or equated with machine learning, AI is in fact a much broader, 
constantly evolving family of methods and approaches. All in all, AI is also a 
general-purpose technology, which is expected to permeate most, if not all 
aspects of our economy, as well as our social interactions. Finally, AI is also part 
of a broader emerging “technology stack”, which features enhanced 
connectivity, high-performance computing and the Internet of Things. 
Given the pace of current AI development and the maturity of 
complementary technologies, it is fair to assume that an “AI winter” will not 
come this time round. That said, the development and rise of AI can represent 
an extremely positive force for the well-being and prosperity of mankind in the 
future; however, such an extremely powerful technological development can 
also cause intentional as well as unintentional damage. It is therefore extremely 
important to mitigating the possible risks, and this is why many countries, as 
well as corporations and civil society, are taking action to promote responsible 
and trustworthy uses of AI.  
Vernon Prater Brisha Borden
3 Low Risk 8 High Risk
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2. A WAY FORWARD FOR DEVELOPING AI: 
COMPLEMENTARITY, RESPONSIBILITY 
AND SUSTAINABILITY  
2.1 Complementarity 
The first possible way to mitigate negative consequences, while at the same time 
harnessing the huge potential of AI is to approach it as complementary, and not 
as an alternative, to human intelligence. There are several reasons to argue that 
AI can reach its full potential, with a minimum of associated risks, if it is 
coupled with a human being. For example, trained AI has proven to be better 
than humans at identifying tumours from medical images: however, it often errs 
in very awkward ways, as shown in Figure 7, without recognising the 
implausibility of its results, and this requires the intervention of a human 
being.24 Similarly, AI was found to significantly reduce error rates in the 
identification of metastatic breast cancer from sentinel lymph node biopsies, but 
only when coupled with an expert pathologist (see Figure 8 below). 
As a matter of fact, complementarity entails that AI is used to augment human 
intelligence, rather than replacing it. Humans are indeed better equipped than 
today’s trained AI machines at setting goals, using common sense and 
formulating value judgments; machines, on the contrary, may be better at 
pattern discovery, large-scale math and performing statistical reasoning. All in 
all, the combination of human and machine wins in most applications. 
                                                        
24 Presentations by Mark Nitzberg (UC Berkeley) and Francesca Rossi (IBM) to the Task Force.  
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Figure 7. AI in tumour mapping 
 
Source. June-Goo Lee, Sanghoon Jun, Young-Won Cho, Hyunna Lee, Guk Bae Kim, Joon Beom 
Seo and Namkug Kim (2017), “Deep Learning in Medical Imaging: General Overview”, 
Korean Journal of Radiology, 18. 570. 10.3348/kjr.2017.18.4.570. 
 
A growing number of attempts to achieve full automation have 
backfired. One of the most famous cases is that of Tesla, whose robot-only 
factory producing the new Model 3 ran into trouble, as admitted by Elon Musk 
himself, due to the absence of human beings.25 And the same could be said of 
the tragic accident that occurred in Tempe, Arizona in March 2018, when an 
Uber-operated Type 4 autonomous Volvo SUV killed a woman when it failed to 
identify her  as she crossed the street due to an accidental de-activation of Lidar 
sensors and the lack of operation of the camera at night. The car failed to 
ascertain that someone (a 49-year old woman) was in its way, and the fact that 
the lady was walking a bike possibly presented an unprecedented situation. The 
unfortunate incident left the impression that self-driving cars are not yet 
equipped to handle all possible contingencies, let alone use common sense. The 
collision led Uber to suspend testing in Tempe as well as in Pittsburgh, San 
Francisco and Toronto.  
                                                        
25 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/16/elon-musk-humans-robots-
slow-down-tesla-model-3-production 
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Figure 8. AI improves error rates in cancer detection, but only working in tandem with 
a pathologist 
 
Source: US White House report, “Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence”, 2016. 
Similarly, even when full autonomy is advertised, the underlying reality 
is sometimes different. For example, the announced opening of Amazon’s 
check-out-free stores gives an allure of full autonomy, but hides the fact that, 
according to a presentation hosted by the CEPS Task Force, human beings are 
employed in remote locations to manually correct the many mistakes due to the 
current inaccuracy of AI observations. Similarly, companies that claim to bring 
full vehicle automation to US cities indeed employ teams of individuals that 
remotely intervene whenever a confusing situation presents itself.26  
More generally, complementarity has to be accompanied by a suitable 
legal system. For example, tort regimes that expose human beings to liability in 
the event they decide to override the decision of the algorithm are not ideally 
designed to make the most of man-machine augmented intelligence. A “human 
in the loop”, knowing that no action means no liability, would not have any 
incentive to override the machine, even when it would patently make sense to 
do so. The requirement of the presence of a “responsible human” is, on the 
contrary, more human-centric, and likely to avoid cases in which injured 
individuals end up having no redress.27 
                                                        
26 Presentation of Mark Nitzberg (UC Berkeley) to the CEPS Task Force. 
27 See, i.a., remarks by Giampiero Lotito, Founder and CEO of FacilityLive, and President of 
the European Tech Alliance, at the presentation of the European Internet Forum report, 
"Digital World in 2030”, at the European Parliament in Brussels, 18 March 2014. Lotito argued 
against "an algorithmic society where a machine decides which information is more relevant 
to [end users]. This is a human capability and we must build technologies that use the human 
way to organize, retrieve and use information”. 
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2.2 Responsibility and trust: Bias and value alignment 
With great power comes great responsibility. Ensuring that AI develops in line 
with the public interest and that the enumerated risks are minimised implies 
that AI developers and vendors act responsibly. Responsibility can be defined 
in several ways and can be seen as spontaneously originating in developers and 
technology companies, or it can be promoted or even imposed by government. 
Generally, advocating responsibility implies acknowledging the potential risks 
of AI, and accordingly acting to mitigate them in the design, development and 
use of AI. Over the past two years, “responsible AI” has moved from a mere 
commitment to awareness-raising and educating end users to the proactive 
deployment of concrete tools and assets, and to the focus on enterprise 
applications to enable its diffusion and ultimate democratisation. Essentially, the 
idea of responsible AI stems from the acknowledgment of possible unintended 
consequences of AI development and its use, acting on essential aspects of AI 
such as fairness, accountability, transparency and explainability.  
In his presentation to the Task Force members, Rumman Chowdhury28 
explained that unintended consequences could be tackled by addressing the 
following questions: 
x On fairness: Are there factors influencing model outcomes that should not 
be there? For example, does the model discriminate between specific social 
groups or classes? Do we have an expectation of similar outcomes for 
different subgroups? 
x In terms of accountability: Within a given organization, what is the chain of 
command for deciding what to do with a potentially biased outcome?  
x In terms of transparency: Do we understand how the model works? And on 
the related aspect of explainability, does the model allow for identifying 
why and how an output was arrived at? 
There are indeed many ways in which bias may creep in, when using AI-
enabled algorithms. For example, the data fed into the algorithm can be biased 
in and of itself. This, in turn, can lead to a “garbage in, garbage out” problem, 
which inevitably affects the output of the algorithm, unless measures can be 
taken to eliminate the bias in the output ex post (Mittelstadt et al. 2016). Cases of 
data bias may take various forms, including selection or sampling bias and 
measurement bias, in which the measuring instruments or their 
operationalization are faulty. There may also be response or reporting biases, 
                                                        
28 Rumman Chowdhury, Global Lead Responsible AI, Accenture Applied Intelligence. 
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which depend on how data are being collected, and on whether the data used 
are sensitive in nature, and as such likely to misrepresent the truth. It is also 
important to check whether the individuals that will report the data have the 
same metrics of reporting (e.g. so-called “yelp effect”29). 
Moreover, it is important that designers of experiments take into account 
possible design biases, by checking the assumptions made in designing the 
model and its applicability to the overarching research question. Also, it is 
important to avoid engineering feedback loops, which occur when the results of 
the model are somehow fed back into the model (sometimes intentionally, 
sometimes not). And it is equally important to prevent players from “gaming” 
the system by exploiting feedback loops. For example, students who know that 
the system considers the fact that students who have taken advanced calculus 
have an increased chance of performing well in college, will take calculus simply 
to increase their chances of being admitted to college. Avoiding feedback loops 
that allow gaming the system may require periodic retraining or retooling of the 
system itself.  
Another category of bias that should be brought to the attention of AI 
developers is societal bias, which is reflected and exacerbated by algorithms 
(Future of Privacy Forum 2017). For example, filtering candidates by work 
proximity can lead to economic loss: in 2012, Xerox reportedly caught a possible 
bias in a recruiting algorithm before implementing it: even though proximity 
was a sign of retention, it also excluded minorities who tended not to live close 
to Xerox due to housing prices. Economic loss due to the narrowing of choice 
emerges also when career recommendation engines constrain concept of career 
prospects due to historical data of what a successful path looks like: or when 
internal job search results are based on who you know. Mitigation strategies 
include understanding what proxies are used and are they directed towards 
protected classes; thinking through reasonable alternatives to get at the 
outcome; reinforcing strong data hygiene practices; building explainability and 
understandability into systems. Disparate impact occurs when a company 
employs facially neutral policies or practices that have a disproportionate 
adverse effect or impact on a protected class, unless those practices or policies 
further a legitimate business need that cannot reasonably be achieved by means 
that are less disparate in their impact (Federal Trade Commission 2016). 
Besides bias, another area that is closely linked to responsible and 
trustworthy AI is the so-called “value alignment” problem, according to which 
autonomous AI systems should be designed to ensure that their goals and 
behaviour can be aligned with human values throughout their operation. There 
was consensus in the presentations hosted by the CEPS Task Force on the fact 
                                                        
29 https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/the-yelp-factor-are-consumer-reviews-good-for-business 
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that value alignment should also apply to current AI systems, not just to 
future, highly autonomous systems, as the corresponding Asilomar principle 
suggests.30 At the same time, ensuring value alignment is far from easy, for 
many reasons.  
2.2.1 Which values should AI be aligned with?  
Recent research by Freedman et al. (2018) on kidney exchanges and research by 
Awad et al. (2018) on the MIT Moral Machine, which simulates the trolley 
problem on self-driving cars, has shown stark differences in the decision-making 
criteria that individuals would consider acceptable in case of “life or death” 
decisions. The scholarly field of ethics provides an interesting framework, but 
certainly no ultimate conclusion. For example, machines could be trained to be 
utilitarian (Bentham, Mill), and thus focus on the ultimate result of their action 
and the rationality of their behaviour. Alternatively, a deontology-focused 
approach (Kantian) would focus on the law, as well as on moral imperatives and 
actions that are considered to be ethical or unethical, regardless of the result. 
Finally, virtue ethics, as explained by Dignum et al. (2018) and by Berberich and 
Diepold (2018) and rooted in the work of Aristotle, focus on motives and are 
relational rather than rational, in that they focus on following virtuous examples. 
Deontology and virtue ethics focus on individual decision-makers, while 
teleology considers all affected parties. None of these approaches provides 
uncontroversial, definitive ways to resolve conflicts.  
2.2.2 How can value alignment be achieved from a technical standpoint?  
Scholars and experts have listed several activities that can be said to broadly 
belong to value alignment. In her presentation to the Task Force, for example, 
Francesca Rossi pointed out different techniques that can lead to value 
alignment in reward systems, including reward-based personalization policies, 
which can however lead to unethical recommendations; exogenous ethical 
policies that cannot be modified by user’s response to recommendations, which 
are learnt offline and cannot be modified during online usage of the system; or 
combinations of ethical and reward policies. Other authors point to the 
differences between imitation learning, apprenticeship learning and inverse 
reinforcement learning. The latter is proposed by Russell, Dewey and Tegmark 
(2015) as a particular machine-learning approach to ethically training 
autonomous systems: in this technique, instead of rendering rules, laws or 
utilities from the start, the system learns from modelled behaviour what an actor 
is trying to do and what kinds of behaviour are being sought (Arnold, Kasenberg 
and Schutz 2017).  
                                                        
30 https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/ 
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More generally, as observed by Virginia Dignum, the challenge of 
merging AI with ethics can be solved through a holistic approach, aimed at 
promoting ethics “in” design, “by” design and “for” designers. More 
specifically: 
x Ethics “in” design requires ensuring that development processes are 
aligned with ethical principles. This, in turn, implies that the ethical 
implications are taken into account as AI permeates our society, 
integrating and replacing traditional systems and social structures. This 
branch of ethics in AI is closely linked to accountability, transparency 
and responsibility in designing AI. It increasingly makes use of data 
science concepts, especially when it comes to embedding fairness 
considerations in a step-by-step analysis of the AI development process. 
Scholars from several disciplines have contributed to the 
conceptualization of “quantitative fairness” (Hutchison and Mitchell 
2019), a process that resulted in a variety of possible definitions (Verma 
and Rubin 2018; Naranyan 2018). These metrics are now being 
embedded in machine learning (Barocas et al. 2018) with the aim of 
tracing the causes of bias in machine learning, e.g. skewed samples 
(initial bias that compounds over time), “tainted examples” (basing the 
machine learning process on a non-representative example), limited or 
wrongly chosen features and sample size disparity or misuse of proxies 
(Barocas and Selbst 2015). The observance of ethical principles “in 
design” is facilitated by emerging interactive software tools such as 
Accenture’s Algorithmic Fairness Tool (Chowdhury 2018); and IBM’s AI 
Fairness 360 toolkit, Factsheets for AI services and support for Supplier 
Declarations of Conformity (Hind et al. 2018).  
x Ethics “by” design requires the integration of ethical reasoning abilities 
as part of the behaviour of artificial autonomous systems (such as agents 
and robots). This domain includes “methods, algorithms and tools 
needed to endow autonomous agents with the capability to reason about 
the ethical aspects of their decisions, and the methods, tools and 
formalisms to guarantee that an agent’s behaviour remains within given 
moral bounds” (Dignum et al. 2018). Such techniques include Inverse 
Reinforcement Learning, Apprenticeship and others. The limitation of 
(relying exclusively on) this approach is that it is still uncertain whether 
we will ever succeed in building fully ethically aware agents, able to 
tailor their decisions to the context in which they operate.  
x Ethics “for” design(ers) refers to the need for integrity of researchers 
and manufacturers as they design, construct, use and manage AI 
systems. This approach to AI ethics implies reliance on deontological 
approaches (e.g. Codes of Conduct), which may also come with 
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enforcement possibilities (e.g. algorithmic inspections and verification, 
certification and mandatory explainability). 
It clearly appears that none of these approaches can and should be seen in 
isolation; a sound policy for ethically aligned AI is likely to rely on a combination 
of these approaches and should be designed with due attention to the principle 
of proportionality. Several attempts have been made at building a 
comprehensive framework for responsible, trustworthy AI so far. Some of them 
limit themselves to declarations of principles (e.g. Asilomar principles), whereas 
others effectively provide a framework for implementing AI and aligning it with 
agreed-upon values. None of them provides a final answer to the achievement 
of responsible AI. 
2.3 Sustainability 
A key element of future AI development is sustainability, intended in particular 
from an economic, social and environmental perspective.  
Social sustainability is particularly important when it comes to AI. 
Looking at the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), several social 
elements are potentially affected by AI development. In particular, the SDGs 
pursue full and decent employment and enhancement of human capital as key 
objectives, which seems to be hardly consistent with evidence of accelerating job 
replacement due to automation. Also, regardless of whether jobs will be 
replaced, goals related to eradicating hunger and poverty and reducing 
inequality inevitably constrain AI development, for good.31  
Environmental sustainability is an often-neglected aspect of AI 
development, and can be approached from several angles. One of them relates 
to AI’s carbon footprint, which seems to be controversial. The global energy 
consumption of data centres has been estimated at 194 TWh in 2014, which is 
around 1% of annual global electricity consumption, i.e. more than the electricity 
consumption of several EU member states. Data centre consolidation, 
outsourcing and cloud computing are helping to keep energy consumption in 
data centres flat, notwithstanding the increase of data and processing, as larger 
data centres tend to be more efficiently designed and managed. The solution to 
this problem seems to be rooted in technological developments, and in 
particular in AI. GPUs, TPUs, new protocols and AI solutions can dramatically 
improve energy efficiency. 
                                                        
31 “First, to ensure that the development of AI technology does not cause an increase in social 
and economic inequality. Second to call on AI in order to reduce this” (Mission Villani, 2018: 
133). 
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The sustainability dimension has been captured in particular by the “AI 
for good” initiative, championed by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) and more generally by the United Nations. The Mission Villani report also 
set the goal in France to develop AI as a tool for a sustainable and ecological 
economy, providing a vision for a “greener” AI enabling an ecological transition 
(Mission Villani 2018). And a recent report for the World Economic Forum, co-
authored by PwC and the Woods Institute at Stanford, advocates AI for the 
Earth as a form of Value Alignment.  
2.4 Conclusion: An enormous potential, in need of 
direction 
We are increasingly discovering the potential of AI – and its risks. Both are huge. 
The more we see AI getting out of the labs and permeating society, the more we 
need to get ready to make it compatible with our values and our needs. In this 
respect, it is AI that must be adapted to our legal systems, rather than the other 
way around. In some cases, however, the legal system will need to be changed 
to contemplate new, AI-enabled ways of providing goods and services, 
organising production and social interaction.  
In this section, we have identified three main directions in which AI 
should move in order to remain aligned with the interests of mankind: 
complementary, responsibility and sustainability. All three require sustained 
attention by the public as well as the private sector and are being targeted by 
various initiatives, declarations and manifestos around the world. The next step 
is to make them actionable in terms of policy.  
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PART II. EUROPE IN THE GLOBAL RACE 
FOR AI 
The European Commission has stated its intention to lead the way in developing 
and using AI “for good and for all” and is taking concerted action to this end. 
Good intentions alone, however, are not sufficient to achieve the intended 
results, and many scholars and experts have expressed scepticism about 
Europe’s ability to set rules and actively compete in the AI domain. Such doubts 
are related to both prongs of Europe’s current AI strategy: its ability to be a 
global norm leader and standard-setter, which possibly stems from the 
recognised strength of its legal system and emphasis on values and norms; and 
its alleged leadership in academic research as well as in specific industrial 
applications. We briefly summarise below the current global competition for AI, 
and Europe’s current efforts in terms of spending programmes, law-making and 
multi-stakeholder consensus-building. We then turn to the two main fronts on 
which the European Commission is focusing, with the help of the AI High-Level 
Expert Group (AI HLEG)32 and the European AI Alliance33: i) drafting ethical 
guidelines on AI and ii) defining a policy and innovation strategy to build 
competitiveness in this key domain.  
  
                                                        
32 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-
intelligence 
33 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-ai-alliance 
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3. GLOBAL AI COMPETITION:  
WHY GLOBAL STANDARDS WILL NOT 
EMERGE WITHOUT CONCERTED ACTION 
overnments at all levels of development have realized that AI, and more 
generally the whole emerging “technology stack” (as defined in section 
1 above) can have important repercussions on the global order and its 
balance of powers. At the lower layer of the ecosystem, the race for 
supercomputers is leading to important breakthroughs, such as the evolution of 
computing capacity into parallel computing, in which different processing units 
perform different functions (CPUs the main tasks, GPUs the graphics and TPUs 
machine learning and other forms of AI). An even bigger breakthrough is 
expected when quantum computers will reach a suitable capacity (i.e. number 
of qubits).34 Quantum and other forms of chips (e.g. biological, neuromorphic) 
are expected to reach the capacity of the human brain (approximately 85 billion 
neurons) by 2025, and then skyrocket afterwards to unknown frontiers. The 
country that wins this race will achieve key advantages, especially in 
cryptography, with applications mostly in scientific research, complex 
optimization issues and, inevitably, cyberwarfare.35  
The geopolitical relevance of this race cannot be overstated. Suffice it to 
recall what Vladimir Putin recently said in a speech: AI “is the future, not only 
for Russia but for all humankind. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere 
will become the ruler of the world”.36  
                                                        
34 Google’s recent decision to open-source its quantum computing platform Cirq is a good 
demonstration of the importance of securing competitive advantage early on in this rising 
domain. (See https://ai.googleblog.com/2018/07/announcing-cirq-open-source-
framework.html). 
35 It should therefore come as no surprise that China has intensified its efforts to file patent 
applications for quantum cryptography, an area in which it massively dwarfs other countries 
today. See “Quantum technology is beginning to come into its own”, The Economist 
Technology Quarterly – Here, There and Everywhere, 2017 
(https://www.economist.com/news/essays/21717782-quantum-technology-beginning-
come-its-own) and Purdy and Dougherty (2017). 
36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHd7s3I3Zb4 
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Indeed, China has stated its ambition to become the global leader in AI 
innovation by 2030. The superpower is coupling very ambitious plans on AI 
with a rising position in research and innovation in all aspects of the technology 
stack, including in particular supercomputing, 5G connectivity and IoT 
development. President Xi Jinping (2014) publicly stated that China “should 
unswervingly follow an independent innovation path featuring Chinese 
characteristics, stick to the guiding principles of independent innovation, leap-
frogging development in key sectors, with development supported by science 
and technology and oriented towards the future”. Over the past five years, the 
country has launched several initiatives with a view to realising a €13 billion AI 
market in China by 2018 and making China the world leader in AI by 2030. These 
include the “Made in China 2025” campaign launched in 2015, which focused 
on precision and agile manufacturing; the “Internet +” Action focused on smart 
manufacturing and innovation; the Robot Industry Development Plan (2016-
2020) launched in 2016 to foster the development of intelligent industrial and 
service robots; and most notably the “New Generation AI Development Plan” 
launched in 2017 to achieve well defined milestones such as placing China on a 
par with other leading economies by 2020; attaining key breakthroughs in AI 
theory by 2025 and start conquering the world market with them; and 
ultimately becoming the world leader in 2030. The Chinese plan is sharp and 
complete, covering both military and civilian applications of AI, and is fraught 
with ubiquitous technological developments, which bring the promise of an 
extremely efficient society, powered by massive and pervasive use of 
technology. Feijoo et al. (2019), as reported in JRC (2018), consider the Chinese 
plan to be ambitious but achievable, and their judgment is supported by other 
analysts.  
On the other hand, the United States seem to be adopting a much more 
“hands-off” approach to Artificial Intelligence, also thanks to the large R&D 
expenditure of its tech giants and leading universities. In May 2018, the White 
House announced its broad intention to maintain American leadership in AI, 
support the American worker, promote public R&D and remove barriers to 
innovation (JRC 2018). More recently, the US government’s Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced the so-called “AI Next” 
programme, a $2 billion investment plan aimed at addressing the perceived 
limitations of current AI technologies, including excessive data-dependency, 
lack of explainability and lack of contextual reasoning. But the US federal 
government as a whole does not seem likely to adopt a strategy for responsible 
AI any time soon. 
Other countries that have adopted dedicated AI strategies include Japan 
(2015), South Korea (2016), Canada (2017) and India (2018). Among these 
countries, Japan seems the most advanced in proposing the integration of AI and 
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robotics with society, in what the government calls “Society 5.0”. In 2017 Japan 
published a new strategy aimed at increasing productivity through user-driven 
hyper-customisation of services, medical health care and welfare to support an 
increasingly ageing population, mobility to support safe and environmentally 
friendly travel for all, and information security (JRC 2018). This strategy comes 
with a pathway to 2030, built on four steps and on three main centres of 
excellence in charge of complementary actions.  
Such bold initiatives have triggered plans in many European countries, 
including the UK, Finland, France, Sweden and most recently Germany.37 These 
and other national strategies have motivated the European Union to take action, 
in part to avoid the implementation of widely diverging national plans, which 
would most likely be counter-productive given the size of Europe’s global 
competitors. The EU institutions have also worked to promote more 
coordination between member states through the so-called “Digitising 
European Industry” group, which contributed to the EU coordinated plan 
published in December 2018 (see below). 
All in all, while China and the US appear determined to invest in 
industrial applications to boost their global competitiveness, Europe seems to be 
more concerned with the need for responsible, trustworthy AI, which falls in 
line with key ethical and legal principles, thus avoiding a race to the bottom in 
AI development. Countries like China and Russia now aim at increasing the 
speed of AI development by securing massive data availability for machine 
training: such data are often collected through very intrusive technological 
means, such as facial and body recognition, or even “social credit scores”. With 
a projected one trillion connected devices by 2035, the unconstrained collection 
of data may lead to unpredictable changes in the way governments relate to 
citizens and how the latter organize their social lives. To be sure, in these 
countries the AI race may end up sacrificing the protection of personal data on 
the altar of faster, more capable machines: an “unintended” outcome that some 
of these governments may not regret after all. The risks are inevitably high: not 
surprisingly, AI was recently portrayed as likely to increase the likelihood of a 
nuclear war in the coming two decades (Geist and Lohn 2018). Making the right 
choices is indeed essential for the harmonious development of AI at the domestic 
and international level. We address specific issues below, related to both 
domestic and international aspects. 
                                                        
37 The European Commission reported in its Coordinated Plan for AI, adopted on 11 
December 2018, that Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland and Norway include 
AI-related actions in their broader digitization strategies; whereas Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Spain are in the process of developing strategies.  
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3.1 Where is AI going? Between global good and the 
temptation of sovereignty 
It is difficult to disentangle the emerging trends in global governance from the 
additional effects that will be generated by the evolution and diffusion of AI 
technologies. Already now, China is on its way to becoming the most powerful 
global economy, with the United States currently stepping back from the 
proactive, almost uncontested leadership that it has enjoyed over the past few 
decades. This is reflected in many domains of global governance, including 
climate policy, trade policy and to some extent even the G7/G20. China is rising 
as a would-be global leader even in environmental policy, and possibly also as 
a contributor to global peace and stability (at least in the neighbouring regions), 
and as a would-be leader in general-purpose new technological developments 
such as AI. This, coupled with the booming demography of countries like India 
and Nigeria, provides a first idea of the terrain on which AI will develop. 
The international political order will be heavily affected by this 
transition. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that due to the data-hungry 
nature of current AI applications (mostly based on machine learning), and the 
pervasive nature of such applications, the emerging technology stack will be 
considered as “critical infrastructure”, i.e. essential to national stability in the 
near future, most likely within the next ten years in many developed countries. 
The explosion of the Internet of Things and the massive generation of data-
driven, AI-powered applications that run key critical infrastructure such as 
energy grids, internet pipelines, the food chain, the ATM network, hospital 
logistics and care delivery will gradually lead countries to try to protect the IT 
stack as a domestic asset. The risk of foreign “intrusion” into the data 
architecture, already existing today (suffice it to think about Russia’s meddling 
in US elections), will gradually become an existential risk for governments. 
Thus, a temptation to invoke so-called “AI sovereignty” or “AI autarchy” may 
emerge, just like sovereignty-related sentiments and reactions were elicited by 
the Snowden revelation related to NSA mass surveillance, especially in 
countries like Germany and France; and the threat of Russian or Chinese 
meddling into elections triggered reactions in the US, Italy, the UK and also 
recently in Australia.38 “AI sovereignty” will be even more loudly invoked in 
the age of quantum supremacy, given the need to avoid that advances in 
cryptography provide hostile nations with important strategic advantages in 
global intelligence. Despite the inherently global nature of technologies like the 
                                                        
38 See i.a. C. Hamilton, “Australia's Fight Against Chinese Political Interference”, Foreign 
Affairs, 26 July 2018.  
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: ETHICS, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHALLENGES | 41 
internet and AI, such a tendency may emerge both in non-democratic countries 
and in democratic ones. 
The most obvious response to this potential trend would be to develop 
deeper cooperation on the relationship between AI and international human 
rights. In this respect, the Toronto Declaration prepared by Amnesty 
international and Access Now proposed a framework for reconciling AI 
development with the International Human Rights framework. However, 
despite alarming findings on the misuse of AI and, more generally, big data 
analytics as “weapons of math destruction” (O’Neil 2016), or as tools liable to 
“automate inequality” and exacerbate lack of accessibility; and despite the 
mounting evidence of use of AI systems to manipulate public opinion and 
meddle through domestic elections, let alone score and rank citizens based on 
very intrusive personal data mining, the global community does not seem 
likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards of responsible use of AI: 
the stakes are simply too high. This also implies that autonomous weapons, 
cyberwarfare and possible negative effects of AI on jobs, social equality and 
cohesion, and the environment may not be subject to a global governance effort 
in the next few years.  
A different angle to the interface between global governance and AI, 
which might hold more promise in the international community, is the 
incorporation of AI in the overall discussion on the Sustainable Development 
Goals. This approach, represented in ongoing initiatives such as the ITU’s “AI 
for Good Global Summit”, focuses on the uses of AI that can help the global 
community achieve the SDGs. This focus was also shared and echoed by several 
large private companies and foundations, which profess their commitment to 
achieving the 2030 Agenda goals through enhanced use of AI. However, looking 
at current trends – such as the resurgence of nationalism in politics, deteriorating 
rule of law in some European countries, new protectionist stances and tariff wars 
in trade, short-termism in social policy and reiterated denial on climate change 
– the agreement reached in September 2015 by 193 countries on the SDGs seems 
to belong to a very distant era in human history. Indeed, today the United States 
has reached a record low in its commitment to SDGs, Brazil is entering a new 
era of populism and China struggles to show leadership on environmental, and 
even more social, achievements. Recent reports confirmed that, with the 
exception of Scandinavian countries, all high-income countries are far from a 
trajectory that would lead them to achieve the 17 SDGs and are struggling in 
particular with four objectives related to sustainable consumption and 
production patterns, climate action, aquatic life and life on land.39  
                                                        
39 https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/  
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In general, the current landscape seems to highlight the existence of a 
huge gap in leadership on AI global governance: a gap that the US and China 
are probably unwilling to deal with, and that only the European Union, 
working as a collective, would have the strength to fill. The EU could become 
a leading voice in a new global governance setting where technical standards 
are otherwise being shaped only through voluntary, multi-stakeholder, 
transnational private regulation (e.g. through private technical standardization 
bodies such as IEEE or ISO).  
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4. THE EU’S EMERGING STRATEGY FOR AI 
For more than a decade now, the EU institutions have been adopting policy 
initiatives and expenditure programmes in fields related to AI. Looking at the 
whole technology stack of AI, it is important to recall the extensive funding of 
research and innovation in the domains of high-performance computing (HPC), 
including a decade-long flagship initiative that has led to the emergence of a 
vibrant research community in this field. Let us also not forget the many 
initiatives on the platform economy, including the proposed regulation on 
platform-to-business, the regulation on the free flow of data, the ongoing debate 
on the role of online intermediaries in countering copyright infringements, hate 
speech and disinformation, and of course the GDPR (General Data Processing 
Regulation) with its provisions on profiling and explainability. Looking more 
specifically at Artificial Intelligence and robotics, the EU has laid more concrete 
foundations of its AI policy since 2016, when the European Parliament adopted 
its first draft resolution on “Civil Law Rules for Robotics”. That initiative, then 
adopted in 2017, portrayed a rather dystopian view of AI, by evoking Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein on its first page, and calling for attributing both “rights 
and duties” to smart autonomous robots, an idea that was firmly rejected by 
several academics.40 It also called on the European Commission to reflect on the 
creation of a possible Agency for AI in Europe, a step that the European 
Commission rightly found to be premature. However, despite some 
exaggeration and an overall negative narrative, the initiative adopted by the 
Parliament paved the way for a more organic approach to AI policy in the 
European Commission.  
One year later, in the mid-term review of the Digital Single Market 
strategy, the European Commission highlighted the importance of securing a 
leading position in the development of AI technologies, platforms, and 
applications. In October 2017, the Council invited the Commission to put 
forward a European approach to artificial intelligence. Other EU institutions, 
such as the European Economic and Social Committee, also published 
                                                        
40 See the Open Letter to the European Commission on Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, at 
https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/RoboticsOpenLetter.pdf  
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communications on Artificial Intelligence, and Member States started to develop 
their own strategies (EESC 2016). In April 2018, following a political agreement 
between 24 member states and Norway on cooperation in AI, the European 
Commission Communication on “Artificial Intelligence for Europe” saw the 
light.41 The Communication, issued in parallel to the Commission 
Communication “Towards a common European data space”, adopted a more 
positive narrative on AI compared to the European Parliament’s initial 
resolution, and laid the foundations for a comprehensive AI strategy, by 
clarifying the main elements of the intended EU “secret sauce” on AI. The main 
assumption behind the strategy is that Europe “can lead the way in developing 
and using AI for good and for all, building on its values and its strengths”, and 
that in so doing it can capitalise on good fundamentals, in particular world-class 
researchers, labs and start-ups; strength in robotics and world-leading industries 
(transport, healthcare, manufacturing); the Digital Single Market; and a “wealth 
of industrial, research and public sector data which can be unlocked to feed AI 
systems”.42 
The main assumption, i.e. that “Europe can lead”, came with three 
separate, but complementary commitments: i) to increase investment up to a 
level that matches Europe’s economic weight; ii) to leave no one behind, in 
particular when it comes to education and ensuring a smooth transition towards 
the AI age in the workplace; and iii) to base new technologies on “values”. With 
respect to latter commitment, the Commission made explicit reference to the 
GDPR, at the time still not in force, as well as to Article 2 of the Treaty on EU, 
which mentions explicitly “human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities”; and a “society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”.  
The Communication also announced the adoption of a series of initiatives 
on AI, including the creation of a High-Level Expert Group on AI (AI HLEG), as 
well as the launch of an AI Alliance, which quickly attracted many adherents 
(2,656 participants had registered as of 4 February 2019). The AI HLEG, counting 
52 experts, was tasked with the definition of ethical guidelines, a first draft of 
which was published in December 2018; as well as the formulation of policy and 
investment recommendations, which should see the light in mid-2019. This 
report is aimed i.a. at contributing to the work of the High-Level Expert Group: 
as such, our main findings below follow a similar structure to the one that is 
                                                        
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
– Artificial Intelligence for Europe, COM(2018) 237 final. 
42 Ibid., p. 2. 
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currently being adopted by the Group. This section comments on the content 
and scope of the future ethical guidelines; whereas section 5 contains our 
analysis of the possible content of the policy and investment recommendations.  
4.1 Towards ethical guidelines: The EU’s “secret sauce” for 
AI 
The world is already inundated with guidelines, manifestos, statements and lists 
of principles. At the EU level, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies (EGE), an independent advisory body of the President of the 
European Commission, produced a statement in March 2018 on “Artificial 
Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems”,43 which laid down a number 
of core values for AI in Europe, elaborated below:  
x Human dignity, understood as the recognition of the inherent human 
state of being worthy of respect. This implies i.a. limits to the profiling 
of individuals on the basis of algorithms and ‘autonomous’ systems, 
especially without their explicit consent; but it also extends to the right 
to be informed of the non-human nature of interfaces with which users 
are interacting. A similar provision was adopted at the end of September 
2018 in California.44 
x Autonomy, implying that AI-enabled systems must not impair the 
“freedom of human beings to set their own standards and norms and be 
able to live according to them”, a principle that potentially extends to 
the need to preserve control over the predictability of the outcomes of 
algorithmic decision-making. 
x Responsibility, in particular when it comes to the alignment of AI-enabled 
systems with the global social and environmental good.  
x Justice, equity, and solidarity, which entails that AI-enabled systems 
contribute to global justice and equal access; and accordingly prevent or, 
                                                        
43 See the EGE Statement on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european_group_on_ethics_ege/ege_ai_statem
ent_2018.pdf). 
44 It is unlawful for any person to use a bot to communicate or interact with another person in 
California online, with the intent to mislead the other person about its artificial identity for 
the purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about the content of the communication in 
order to encourage a purchase or sale of goods or services in a commercial transaction or to 
influence a vote in an election. A person using a bot shall not be liable under this section if the 
person discloses that it is a bot. 
See https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1001. 
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where appropriate, timely detect and/or report “discriminatory biases 
in data sets used to train and run AI systems”.45  
x Democracy, which implies that key policy decisions are taken with the 
strong involvement of civil society; and that AI is not used to disrupt the 
functioning of our political systems and manipulate public opinion.  
x Rule of law and accountability, including the clear attribution of liability in 
case AI systems cause damage to third parties, or infringe human rights 
such as safety and privacy.  
x Security, safety, bodily and mental integrity: This, according to the EGE 
group, requires a broad notion of safety, encompassing the “external” 
safety of AI for its environment and users; the “internal safety” in terms 
of reliability and robustness; and so-called “emotional safety” with 
respect to human-machine interaction. This principle of course extends 
to the use of AI to develop lethal autonomous weapons, which the 
European Parliament has officially proposed to ban in a recent 
resolution.46  
x Data protection and privacy, which the EGE proposes to extend beyond 
privacy stricto sensu, to possibly encompass “the right to meaningful 
human contact and the right to not be profiled, measured, analysed, 
coached or nudged”.47 
x Sustainability, intended by the EGE group essentially in its 
environmental dimension, but possibly extended also to the economic 
and social dimensions.  
Of course, this is not the only list. For example, Floridi et al. (2018) 
compare the EGE statement with five other documents: the Asilomar AI 
principles; the Montréal Declaration for Responsible AI; the General Principles 
offered in the second version of the IEEE “Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision 
for Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems”; 
the five overarching principles for an AI code developed by the UK House of 
Lords (2018); and the Tenets of the Partnership on AI (2018). Already these 
documents lead to a total of 47 different principles, although with significant 
overlaps: if one adds that there are other documents circulating, including i.a. 
                                                        
45 See the EGE statement on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european_group_on_ethics_ege/ege_ai_statem
ent_2018.pdf). 
46 European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems, 
2018/2752(RSP).  
47 See the EGE statement on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european_group_on_ethics_ege/ege_ai_statem
ent_2018.pdf). 
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the “Toronto Declaration on protecting the rights to equality and non-
discrimination in machine learning systems”, the identification of values and 
principles for AI development already looks like a quagmire.  
It is therefore important that the European Commission, backed by the 
AI High Level Expert Group, does not limit itself to the adoption of another 
list of principles, but develops a list that represents the EU approach to AI, and 
offers concrete guidance to stakeholders on the “what” and “how” of selected 
principles to be followed and implemented. It addresses, for example, which 
applications or business models are potentially problematic and which ones are 
to be prohibited; what are concrete implications for AI development, both 
overall and in different fields of application; and how could developers ensure 
that their practices are aligned with the guidelines. In this respect, the fact that 
the AI HLEG is oriented towards adopting principles that were originally 
developed for bioethics does not seem to be the most promising approach. On 
the contrary, as will be discussed in more detail below, principles of bioethics 
can impose excessive burdens on AI systems if applied without paying heed to 
the principle of proportionality or giving guidance on how principles will be 
endorsed or enforced (Nabi 2018). 
4.1.1 To “whom” should the ethical guidelines be addressed? 
The future EU Ethics Guidelines on AI should be essentially addressed to the 
“supply side”, including AI developers, vendors, and distributors; and also to 
organisations using or deploying AI, and public administrations, which should 
decide whether and how to use AI in their daily activities, and how to procure 
AI products in a way that is aligned with EU values and existing legislation. In 
order to maximise their effectiveness and the consistency of application across 
users, the Guidelines should not contain separate sections for different types of 
actors. Rather, the Guidelines should include a definition of values and 
principles that developers, vendors and distributors of AI, as well as 
organisations deploying AI can adopt as reference when placing AI systems on 
the market – whether B2B (business to business), B2C (business to consumer) or 
G2C (government to citizen) – or using AI systems in-house to improve their 
back-office operations.  
This, of course, does not mean that no initiative should be taken on the 
“demand side”. Those on the receiving end should be able, whenever possible, 
to discern when the AI system that is being used is not compliant with the 
fundamental principles, and those subset of cases in which this would lead them 
to the possibility of seeking redress since the system in use violated their rights 
as protected by the EU legal system (see next section). Moreover, the European 
Commission should work with member states to launch awareness-raising and 
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educational campaigns that would enable end users to become more responsible 
and empowered individuals when dealing with AI systems and interfaces.48  
In this respect, while developers, distributors and vendors will be directly 
addressed by the guidelines, public authorities and end users should also be 
considered as indirect addressees of the forthcoming document and future 
associated initiatives. As will be specified in more detail below, this also has 
important consequences for the content of the guidelines, as well as their 
relationship with enforcement activities.  
4.2 “What” should be included in the Ethical Guidelines 
Based on the work of the CEPS Task Force on Artificial Intelligence, we propose 
that the forthcoming EU guidelines consist of four main sections containing: i) 
an enumeration of EU values and principles of responsible, accountable and 
sustainable Artificial Intelligence (REACH); ii) a listing of AI applications and 
use cases that appear to be problematic from the standpoint of the application 
of the identified principles, as well as use cases in which there is no specific 
ethical problem raised by the AI system; iii) guidance on possible measures that 
could be adopted by AI developers, vendors and distributors to check that their 
AI-enabled applications and systems are aligned with the ethical guidelines; and 
iv) users’ rights and possible enforcement measures and channels for redress in 
case of infringement of those principles outlined in the guidelines that are 
mandatory based on EU law. These guidelines should be available as an online, 
living document, so that good and bad practices can be regularly updated and 
kept in line with technological developments.  
4.2.1 First section: A taxonomy of principles 
In terms of the principles to be identified, it would be important that the 
European Commission identifies different layers of principles, in line with our 
observations in section 1.4 above: 
- Level 1. Fundamental principles (Lawful AI). One first definition of those 
principles that, being rooted in the EU core values, are in any event 
mandatory for AI developers, vendors and distributors. Some of these 
principles are clearly defined in existing legislation, as is the case for data 
protection under the GDPR. Others are less clearly interpretable by market 
players, especially when they are rooted in the EU Treaties: this implies that 
any AI system that fails to respect these principles could be brought before 
                                                        
48 An initiative that moves in this direction is the AlgoAware website funded by the European 
Commission (https://www.algoaware.eu/). 
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a court and be declared unlawful. As a preliminary list, these principles 
should include: 
o The “non-maleficence principle” (“do no harm”). This principle, commonly 
applied in bioethics and technology policy, should be subject to 
interpretive guidance, and be tightly related to the subjective element of 
“intent” behind the development of an AI system. Based on the non-
maleficence principle, AI systems should not be designed with the intent 
to harm human beings. That said, beyond the intentional element, the 
fact that an AI system causes damage should not automatically imply 
that the system is unlawful per se. Much in the same vein, there should 
be explicit treatment of those cases in which “life or death” decisions are 
pre-programmed (as may be the case for future automated vehicles in 
case of a “trolley problem”): while these types of situations should be 
considered as the exception rather than the rule, it should be explicitly 
stated that the “life or death” context should be avoided by AI 
developers even if this comes at a cost (e.g. developing separate ad hoc 
infrastructure for automated vehicles, or for pedestrians; or multiplying 
the sources of information to avoid that the vehicle fails to spot a human 
being, even if this is not the most economically efficient solution) (Renda 
2018a). 
o Protection of human integrity, security and privacy. This general principle 
encompasses various element of the protection of the individual. In 
particular, the requirement to protect human integrity and security 
implies that AI systems are not developed without exercising special 
care in checking that they do not have the potential to cause harm to 
individuals. And the protection of privacy is rooted in the GDPR and 
should extend to the application of safeguards against the circulation of 
personally identifiable data to third parties without the explicit consent 
of the data subject. The GDPR also gives rise to a selected number of user 
rights, which should be considered as inalienable and thus part of the 
“level 1” principles of AI development: these include the “right not to be 
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing”, which 
establishes a number of safeguards designed to ensure the “fair and 
transparent processing” of personal data, including an obligation that 
entities provide “meaningful information about the logic involved” in 
certain types of highly automated decision-making systems; and the so-
called “right to be informed,” or, most commonly, a “right to 
explanation.” The GDPR, in its recitals, also clarifies that when dealing 
with personally identifiable data, companies should ensure fair and 
transparent processing by adopting a variety of procedural and 
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organisational measures, which would not otherwise be mandatory by 
law.49  
o Principle of respecting human dignity, including the right not to be 
discriminated against. This entails that AI systems are not designed with 
embedded discrimination based on criteria such as gender, ethnicity, or 
membership in a minority or protected group. They should also avoid 
violating solidarity principles (e.g. in insurance), such as making it 
impossible for certain groups of individuals to access services at a 
reasonable price. Note that the application of this principle as a core, 
fundamental principle should be limited to the design of the system, not 
to its effects. In other words, a system that embeds bias and 
discrimination “by design” should be considered unlawful in the 
European Union: a system that is not designed to be discriminatory, but 
ends up unlawfully discriminating, should trigger liability on the side of 
the developer, vendor, or distributor. The distinction between the design 
and the effects of a given AI system is essential in order not to stifle 
incentives to innovate: the core, inalienable rights to be respected by AI 
in this first layer are related to the teleological, subjective element of 
intent, reflected in the design of systems meant to harm or discriminate.  
o Protection of agency, freedom and the democratic process. Here again, the 
design of AI systems that have as a final objective, or as an inevitable or 
easily foreseeable collateral impact, the disruption of individual freedom 
and self-determination, or the formation of political opinions, should be 
considered as incompatible with the EU approach to AI. As clarified 
above, this does not mean that social media like Facebook or search 
engines like Google should be outlawed since they can be used by third 
parties to pollute the political debate or generate disinformation (as in 
the case of Cambridge Analytica, or in the daily practice of “black hat 
SEO” for search engine optimization). Rather, the interpretation of this 
principle would point in the direction of introducing a requirement of 
                                                        
49 Recital 71 of the GDPR states: “In order to ensure fair and transparent processing in respect 
of the data subject, taking into account the specific circumstances and context in which the 
personal data are processed, the controller should use appropriate mathematical or statistical 
procedures for the profiling, implement technical and organisational measures appropriate to 
ensure, in particular, that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are corrected 
and the risk of errors is minimised, secure personal data in a manner that takes account of the 
potential risks involved for the interests and rights of the data subject and that prevents, inter 
alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual 
orientation, or that result in measures having such an effect.” 
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“enhanced diligence” (compared to the diligence of the ordinary 
individual or pater familias) in managing AI-enabled systems such as 
online platforms and social media.50 In short, designing a system to 
cause harm to individual self-determination or freedom, or even to 
censor political opinions a priori or generate disinformation, should be 
considered as utterly incompatible with the EU legal system. A different 
form of protection, based on liability, should be introduced for those 
systems that, despite not being designed to cause harm, end up 
infringing these core principles in their concrete implementation, and/or 
in interacting with other algorithms.  
- Level 2. Good practices in AI development (Responsible AI). This second set 
would include some of the principles that have been agreed upon by AI 
developers in documents such as the Asilomar principles. Some of these 
principles may not be universally applicable, but necessary or desirable in 
specific applications. For example, the requirement of “human control” over 
AI (the first of the Asilomar principles), should be included here and 
explained to developers, vendors and distributors and in the deployment of 
AI. The extension of the transparency and explainability principles 
introduced by the GDPR beyond the remit of data protection would also be 
naturally included in this set of principles. As a preliminary list, level 2 
should include the following principles: 
o Principle of complementarity with humans (“human-centric AI”). This 
principle has been defined in many ways over the past few decades: a 
“human in the loop” principle would require that a human is always 
involved in the chain of command that leads to the final output of the AI 
system; a “human in control” would denote the possibility for human 
beings to intervene in a timely manner to correct and steer the decision-
making process and output of the AI system; and finally, the 
requirement that there be a “responsible human being” for every act of 
the AI system is aimed at providing end users with redress in case AI 
systems cause damage. Of these three possible interpretations, the latter 
seems to be preferable, although in some specific sectors the need to have 
a human being in the loop, or in control, may well emerge. For example, 
in medical diagnostics the need to have a doctor in the loop is essential; 
                                                        
50 The Asilomar Principles are quite specific on this point, citing the threats of an AI arms race 
and of the recursive self-improvement of AI, as well as the need for “caution” around “upper 
limits on future AI capabilities”. The Partnership similarly asserts the importance of AI 
operating “within secure constraints”. The IEEE document meanwhile cites the need to 
“avoid misuse”, while the Montréal Declaration argues that those developing AI “should 
assume their responsibility by working against the risks arising from their technological 
innovations”, echoed by the EGE’s similar need for responsibility. 
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a similar argument can be made for the use of AI-enabled algorithms in 
court, or by police forces. In self-driving cars, the human in the loop 
makes very little sense even when it is provided for: not surprisingly, 
some companies still believe that a lower degree of autonomy, with 
humans still needed at the steering wheel, is the best approach for the 
near future. In B2B (business to business) settings, the high level of 
automation and the amount of data processing may make it difficult to 
involve a human being in all steps of the supply chain: requiring that 
this condition be fulfilled may stifle innovation in these B2B settings, 
thereby frustrating their actual purpose. That said, in most 
circumstances it should be possible to use AI to augment, rather than 
replace, human intelligence: this approach to AI should be encouraged 
to the extent possible, in particular as a “level-3” type of principle (see 
below). Determining the degree of human involvement in the loop could 
form part of a preliminary risk assessment, which could be integrated 
into the overall assessment of liability.  
o Responsible governance: monitoring, control and feedback. Adequate 
governance and safeguards in the development of AI systems should be 
encouraged. This issue is extremely important for Europe, where ex-ante 
controls and enhanced care in developing new technologies are justified 
also by the lack of a strong litigation culture, which typically constitutes 
a deterrent from exercising insufficient care in the US in fields such as 
product liability. Principles of responsible AI for Europe should require 
(as a non-mandatory element) the implementation of a step-by-step 
approach to AI development, which checks against undesirable biases in 
the initial dataset, the curation or cleaning of data, the design of the 
algorithm, as well as the control of the output, outcomes and impacts of 
the AI system. This is similar to the so-called “from farm to fork” 
approach used in agriculture, which aims at providing control points at 
all stages of the AI development and implementation process.51 This also 
helps in tracing responsibility, and collecting feedback, which allows for 
continuous improvement of the system as well as the responsiveness to 
user requests and complaints, and making available mitigation 
measures and remedies.52 
                                                        
51 See https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/fs_infograph_from-farm-to-
fork_en.pdf 
52 In some cases, this is indeed (or will soon be) mandated by law, for example, under the 
proposed P2B Regulation (see https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ 
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o Principle of AI transparency and explainability. AI systems should be 
transparent when it comes to the data used, the fact that a user interface 
is not human (so-called counter-CAPTCHA), as well as to the identity of 
those that trained the system, and basic information on how the system 
was trained. This, however, does not necessarily extend to all aspects of 
an AI system, including  the intellectual property behind the algorithm, 
which could well be proprietary.53 Similarly, AI must be generally 
explainable, even if the ultimate level of explainability required depends 
on the expected end users, as well as on the specific use case. For 
example, in most cases, knowing the identity of the engineer that trained 
the system would not be a very actionable insight for consumers. While 
the GDPR introduces a right to an explanation on the side of data 
subjects, limited to “the existence of automated decision-making, 
including profiling” and “the logic involved, as well as the significance 
and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject”, 
this does not automatically imply that all AI systems should be designed 
as explainable. B2B systems, industrial AI systems, even 
recommendation systems do not necessarily have to be fully explainable 
to their users, provided that they do not process personal data without 
explicit user consent, and that an adequate, well explained liability 
regime is in place in case they cause harm. In this respect, the GDPR 
actually creates an island of “level 1” principles within an otherwise 
“level 2” setting.  
- Level 3. Principles of sustainable AI (Sustainable AI). This set of principles 
marks the difference between AI that is simply “admissible” in the EU space 
and AI that is fully aligned with EU policy goals. This space would be mostly 
occupied by principles of benevolence and alignment with the Sustainable 
Development Goals, as embedded in the EU 2030 Agenda. They include, as 
a preliminary list, the following:  
o “Do good” or benevolence principle. There should be no mandatory 
requirement for AI to be designed to foster the global good: as with all 
products and services, and with the due caveats, the “invisible hand” 
applies, and the selfish pursuit of profit can provide benefits to society 
unless proven to do otherwise. This is why the benevolence principle 
should not be included in the core level 1 principles in the future Ethics 
Guidelines. This would otherwise rule out the overwhelming majority 
                                                        
regulation-promoting-fairness-and-transparency-business-users-online-intermediation-
services).  
53 The EU could then decide to procure only open source AI, but this would then become a 
level 3 requirement. 
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of the AI systems used today, which, as explained in section 1 above, are 
embedded in modular information systems, and not necessarily as a 
contribution to human development and prosperity. That said, level 3 
principles could include a requirement of benevolence, i.e. of AI design 
to effectively address key societal challenges. This is a general 
requirement compared to the principles spelled out below, which refer 
to individual sustainable development goals.54  
o Limited or zero carbon footprint (SDGs 7 and 13). As advocated by some 
scholars and experts, AI can provide a significant contribution to climate 
change mitigation, both through the design of specific AI applications 
that can improve key carbon-emitting technologies; and through the 
design of systems that have a limited or even zero carbon footprint. The 
use of renewables to support the energy-hungry activities of data centres 
should be promoted by EU institutions, and this in turn will provide 
companies with adequate incentives to develop sustainable hardware 
and data storage. Benchmarks expressed in the form of data 
centre power usage effectiveness (the ratio of total power required to run 
an entire facility versus the direct power involved in computing and 
storage) could be useful in this respect, coupled with the already-existing 
European Code of Conduct for Data Centre Energy Efficiency.55 
o Inclusive growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all 
(SDG 8). While AI is generally credited with positive impacts on growth, 
the jury is out as to whether such growth will be inclusive. As a matter 
of fact, several authors have flagged the possible problem of market 
concentration and a future “AI divide”, if technology will not be 
accessible and affordable to everyone. While non-inclusive AI should 
not, generally speaking, be illegal, the EU may want to encourage the 
development and implementation of AI products that promote 
inclusion. Even more controversial would be the development of AI that 
is compatible with full and productive employment, since it does not 
lead to the replacement of humans, but rather to their productivity and 
enhancement in the workplace. Similarly, AI could promote the decency 
of the jobs to be performed, by liberating individuals from repetitive 
tasks and fuelling their creativity. But job decency also depends on 
                                                        
54 A relevant example is the use of AI in advertising, whose purpose is not always aligned 
with the beneficence principle (although advertising also has an informational component 
and can have an awareness-raising impact). Restricting the use of AI for marketing purposes 
based on the “Do Good” principle would have an unintentional constraining effect on AI: 
advertising, of course, would still have to adhere to Level 1 principles, which include 
compliance with the GDPR.  
55 See https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/energy-efficiency/code-conduct/datacentres.  
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stability: AI has led to the transformation of many stable jobs into 
temporary jobs, leading to the emergence of what some scholars call the 
new “precariat”. AI designed with full and decent work in mind could 
be encouraged and endorsed by the EU in light of its 2030 strategy. In 
more concrete terms, the following presumptions appear meaningful: 
fully explainable and transparent AI can be presumed to be more 
inclusive than less transparent and explainable AI And human-
augmenting, rather than human-replacing AI is certainly more 
compatible with the goal of promoting full and decent employment. 
o Quality education (SDG 4). AI can substantially improve access to 
education and can be designed to this end. For example, breakthroughs 
in natural language processing and translation, coupled with enhanced 
connectivity and conversational bots can reduce the cost of accessing 
top-quality education for all, regardless of the geographical location. It 
can also improve the accessibility of education for all, including for 
persons with disabilities. Personalised learning and automated grading 
will make online education much more compelling and empowering 
than it is today. The EU could encourage the development of AI systems 
that help European and global citizens advance towards promoting 
access to high quality education for all.  
o Promotion of women empowerment (SDG 5). Outright discrimination based 
on gender is illegal in the European Union and would thus be a violation 
of level 1 principles. But AI can unintentionally reinforce gender 
inequality,56 thereby making it important to ensure that AI systems are 
explicitly tested to empower women and control for possible gender 
biases.57  
o Industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG 9). AI systems can lay the 
foundations for further innovation, especially through open data and 
open IP arrangements. For example, Cockburn et al. (2017) argue that 
“policies which encourage transparency and sharing of core datasets 
across both public and private actors can stimulate a higher level of 
innovation-oriented competition, and a higher level of research 
productivity going forward”.  
                                                        
56 See Bettina Buchel, “AI could reinforce gender inequality”, blog post, at 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/03/artificial-intelligence-could-reinforce-our-
gender-equality-issues.  
57 See also Katica Roy, “The Economic Case for Using AI to Close the Gender Equity Gap”, 
blog post, July 2018, at https://medium.com/inside-the-salesforce-ecosystem/the-economic-
case-for-using-ai-to-close-the-gender-equity-gap-9ba6ac2d4eb6  
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4.2.2 Second section: Examples and definition of problematic use cases 
and “no go’s” 
The second part of the Ethics Guidelines could include a list of use cases 
that are considered to be representative, borderline or problematic by the 
European Commission. Such use cases could be divided into two sections: 
x A section with “prohibited” use cases. This would include examples of AI that 
are incompatible with the fundamental principles listed in the Ethics 
Guidelines. A relatively well-known one is that of Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons (LAWs), which have been also the subject of a recent resolution of 
the European Parliament aiming to ban their uncontrolled use.58 Their 
incompatibility with “Level 1 principles” would be a good basis for 
declaring them unlawful with the EU legal system, unless human 
accountability is foreseen. The claim that autonomous weapons should 
remain under human control is almost an oxymoron. A more balanced and 
credible argument holds that LAWs remain under human responsibility, 
and thus humans remain accountable for whatever autonomous weapons 
do. Another example of a “no go” could be the delegation of certain “life or 
death” decisions to algorithms, without human involvement and control: 
this could be exemplified by a kidney exchange run exclusively by an 
algorithm, without human intervention before a decision is made.  
x A section with “problematic” or “borderline” use cases. As clarified above, the 
bulk of expected uses of AI poses no outstanding ethical problems. It would 
indeed be important to maintain a living collection of use cases that are 
considered to be “problematic” from the standpoint of the European 
Commission. These use cases could usefully be crowdsourced thanks to the 
AI Alliance, and then analysed by the European Commission before being 
included in the living section of the Guidelines. Examples of potentially 
problematic use cases include the following:59 
o Predictive policing. Using software such as PredPol requires enhanced 
attention in collecting, curating and using data and avoiding the 
amplification of bias at all levels of the process.60 Explaining how bias 
can creep in while using predictive policing could help clarify the 
boundaries of their use in police stations, as well as in regulatory 
                                                        
58 See supra note 47.  
59 A good example of a repository is the AI Now Toolkit for Algorithmic Accountability, 
which contains a list of existing algorithms being used and distributed in various fields, and 
for various use cases (see https://ainowinstitute.org/aap-toolkit.pdf). 
60  See https://www.predpol.com/ 
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agencies (e.g. for data-based inspections). Likewise, explaining how 
predictive policing can lead to violations of an individual’s privacy and 
how to adopt mitigating strategies would help clarify possible actions to 
be adopted in all similar cases of use of advanced AI-powered data 
analytics to predict future events (e.g. the likelihood of a child being 
abused).61  
o Social credit scores. The use of personal data from various sources, in 
particular from social media, to build and implement a system of social 
credit scoring should be analysed and ruled out as too intrusive and 
discriminatory based on EU fundamental rights. The explanation of why 
social credit scoring is incompatible with the EU legal framework may 
seem a futile exercise, but it can provide useful guidance in all those 
cases that already widespread in Europe, in which data from social 
media are being used to discriminate between end users, for example in 
insurance services. To what extent should it be possible to use available 
public information to this end? How should trade-offs be solved when 
algorithmic accuracy is enhanced by the intrusive use of data from social 
media? Would it be possible in Europe to entice users into more 
attractive products or services in exchange for (explicit consent to) access 
to their personal data, as in emerging markets such as those for direct-
to-consumer genetic tests?  
o Facial and body recognition. It goes without saying that the use of facial 
and/or body recognition can increase the effectiveness of police 
enforcement. Recent cases have shown that AI can spot criminals among 
thousands of people, e.g. in a stadium. Advanced image recognition and 
rendering techniques can also lead to identifying criminals starting from 
very blurred images. In a time of constant risk of terrorist attacks, 
massive use of facial recognition is too attractive to be discarded all at 
once. That said, what are the limits to the use of this technique in the 
                                                        
61 Automating Inequality includes a discussion of the Allegheny Family Screening Tool 
(AFST), a predictive risk model deployed by the County Office of Children, Youth, and 
Families to forecast child abuse and neglect. While the AFST is only one step in a process that 
includes human decision-makers, Virginia Eubanks argues that it makes workers in the 
agency question their own judgment and “is already subtly changing how some intake 
screeners do their jobs”. Moreover, the system can override its human co-workers to 
automatically trigger investigations into reports. The model has inherent flaws: it only 
contains information about families who use public services, making it more effective at 
targeting poor residents. Such discriminatory effects cause harm in other human rights areas, 
such as education, housing, family and work. See Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality, 
London: St. Martin’s Press, 2018 and also Safiya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression: How 
Search Engines Reinforce Racism, New York, NY: New York University Press, 2018.  
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public and private sectors? Could a private corporation use the same 
facial recognition technique used to spot criminals to enable new 
services in social media, such as matching people with places and 
advertisers? Could facial recognition be used in combination with other 
datasets to determine a person’s likelihood to repay a debt, and 
accordingly reach a decision on a user’s creditworthiness? 
o Content filtering. Increasingly, regulators are relying on online 
intermediaries to enforce legal rules, including those on hate speech, 
disinformation, and copyright. Algorithmic take-down of online content 
can potentially undermine freedom of expression. In the absence of a 
strong legal framework on this fundamental right, however, online 
intermediaries inevitably err on the side of “Type 1 errors” or “false 
positives” (i.e. if there is any doubt, they take down content even if it 
does not infringe the law, in order to avoid the risk of incurring liability). 
Digging deeper into this use case of AI would provide more certainty to 
online intermediaries in many similar settings, when they have to ensure 
algorithmic compliance with the law by adopting best-practice 
behaviour.  
o Conversational bots. Using conversational bots can increase the efficiency 
of specific services and even improve user experience in most cases. At 
the same time, however, there is a risk of discrimination and 
deteriorating quality of service, which should be mitigated through 
specific actions. Describing this use case, clarifying which actions are 
lawful and recommended, would improve legal certainty for a large 
number of future applications. It would also provide the European 
Commission with the opportunity to clarify the circumstances in which 
end users should be given a clear explanation of the non-human nature 
of the interface and the possibility to interact with a human being rather 
than with a bot.  
4.2.3 Third section: Guidance on mitigating strategies (good practice) 
Rather than simply flagging problematic cases, the Ethics Guidelines could also 
point at possible arrangements that would significantly mitigate the risks posed 
by a specific use of AI. This section, too, could start with a collection of good 
practices, and be then open to ongoing submissions through the AI Alliance, of 
examples of remedies that have successfully mitigated the problem at hand.  
In the case of personal data, this has already occurred in many ways, 
mostly through private regulation, certification and the adoption of Privacy 
Impact Assessment practices. In addition, there is reason to believe that the first 
strongholds against bias creeping into corporate algorithms come with 
embedding good practice into companies’ daily risk management activities. 
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In this respect, this section of the guidelines could incorporate a tripartite 
analysis of companies’ lines of defence: i) operational management; ii) risk 
management and compliance functions; and iii) internal audits. Consultancy 
firms like Accenture have already developed a full “AI fairness tool”, based on 
the work of data scientists on quantitative fairness, which can be incorporated 
into this framework, leading to a more effective and agile governance of risk in 
the corporate environment. Similarly, IBM developed tools such as AI Fairness 
360 and the Everyday Ethics Guide for AI, which provide concrete solutions for 
developers and users. While these systems do not necessarily solve all problems 
when it comes to de-biasing and value alignment, their application to AI design 
and distribution could mitigate the risks associated with the infringement of 
Level 1 and Level 2 principles. 
Moreover, guidance could be offered to developers, vendors and SMEs as 
to when techniques such as unsupervised deep learning and reinforcement 
learning are appropriate, and what are the consequences in terms of 
explainability of AI. Figure 9 sketches the trade-off that companies face between 
explainability and accuracy of algorithms. In this field, private-sector guidance 
is already advancing rapidly and is expected to further improve and expand in 
the near future. For example, Google’s Tensorflow recently released a “what-if” 
tool to visually inspect machine-learning models, within the People + AI 
Research initiative (PAIR).62 These systems are able to show the behaviour of the 
model (as black box), and should gradually move towards a full explanation of 
how the system reaches decisions, and even more importantly, how the system 
reached a given decision, for which an end user awaits explanation. 
Finally, guidance could also be offered with respect to making algorithms 
GDPR-proof by using specific cryptographic techniques. While most of these 
arrangements may already be embedded in pre-trained algorithms sold by IT 
companies on the market, developers should constantly engage in discovering 
and testing new techniques to promote the protection of users’ personal data in 
AI systems. Current, widely tested techniques include zero-knowledge proof 
systems, in which a prover convinces a verifier via an interactive protocol that 
some statement is true, i.e. a given word x is in some given language L; and 
homomorphic encryption, which allows computation on ciphertexts, generating 
an encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches the result of the operations 
as if they had been performed on the plain text.
                                                        
62 https://pair-code.github.io/what-if-tool/ 
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Figure 9. The explainability-accuracy trade-off 
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4.2.4 Fourth section: What to do in case of… 
The fourth and last section of the Ethics Guidelines could include guidance for 
the end users, integrated with existing projects (e.g. AlgoAware) and with online 
tools to educate end users about their rights and what to expect when dealing 
with AI-enabled systems. This section, too, could be usefully fed by the 
contributions from end users and other stakeholders (e.g. SMEs, developers) 
thanks to the AI Alliance and future AI Observatory. A useful way to provide 
guidance to end users would be to include interactive materials on how to react 
in specific circumstances, e.g. in case a given AI system has not given them 
enough information or has come to a questionable decision without leaving the 
possibility to obtain clarification.  
4.3 An analysis of the current Draft Ethics Guidelines 
In a working document released on 18 December 2018, the European 
Commission presented the first draft of the AI Ethics Guidelines prepared by 
the AI HLEG. The working document does not represent the final position of the 
HLEG, and it was clarified that “a number of themes still need to be elaborated 
in more detail”. The European Commission also explained that the final version 
of the Ethics Guidelines will feature a mechanism for stakeholders to voluntarily 
endorse the Guidelines; and that only at a later stage will it examine whether to 
formally adopt the Guidelines in an official document, and/or whether 
additional measures may be needed to deal with the ethical challenges of AI.  
That said, the published document already presents a relatively clear 
picture of where the HLEG is directing its efforts in advising the European 
Commission. The HLEG aims at maximising the benefits of AI while 
minimising the risks; and chooses “trustworthy AI” as the goal for Europe’s 
approach and policy. Trustworthy AI has two components: i) its development, 
deployment and use should respect fundamental rights and applicable 
regulation, as well as core principles and values, ensuring an “ethical purpose”, 
and ii) it should be technically robust and reliable. 
The CEPS Task Force on AI believes that the future Ethics Guidelines 
could represent a very welcome development at the EU level and could also 
structure its work and discussion with a view to contributing to this ambitious 
and highly deserving endeavour. Accordingly, we offer some observations in 
the following pages on the first draft of the Guidelines published on 18 
December 2018.  
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4.3.1 Values and principles: The need for a hierarchy  
The Draft Guidelines observe that AI should be human-centric, and thus be 
“developed, deployed and used with an ‘ethical purpose’, grounded in, and 
reflective of, fundamental rights, societal values and the ethical principles of 
Beneficence (do good), Non-Maleficence (do no harm), Autonomy of humans, 
Justice, and Explicability”.63 AI developers should also rely on fundamental 
rights, ethical principles and values to prospectively evaluate possible effects of 
AI on human beings and the common good; and pay particular attention to 
situations involving more vulnerable groups such as children, persons with 
disabilities or minorities, or to situations with asymmetries of power or 
information, such as between employers and employees, or businesses and 
consumers. They should also be aware of the fact that AI can have a negative 
impact and remain vigilant to avoid it.  
Compared to the ethical guidelines proposed in section 4.1 above, the 
current list lacks hierarchy between principles and values that should always 
be complied with as they constitute the core constitutional principles of the 
EU and those that correspond to good practices in AI development or are 
aligned with EU medium-term policy goals. This differentiation would add 
considerable value to the Guidelines, which otherwise would end up re-
proposing the same structure and rather vague list of principles already 
endorsed by the EGE group, and also by many other governmental and non-
governmental documents over the past few years. Developers, vendors, 
distributors and users would not be able to learn from the list of values and 
principles which forms of AI are to be considered lawful, and which are not. In 
particular, including the beneficence principle among the core ones, as in 
bioethics, appears to be disproportionate, and simply observing that developers 
should be aware of the fact that AI can also have a negative impact also seems a 
very difficult principle to verify and enforce.64 The Draft Guidelines end up 
explaining that “AI systems should be designed and developed to improve 
individual and collective well-being”. But whether this should be a mandatory 
intent of AI designers and developers is highly questionable, and any alternative 
explanation based on the pursuit of profit would fall short of complying with 
the “ethical purpose” requirement.65  
                                                        
63 See the Draft Guidelines, Chapter 4  (https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/node/6044).  
64 The Draft Guidelines explicitly refer to the Council of Europe “Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine” (the Oviedo Convention). 
65 As a matter of fact, the Draft Ethics Guidelines propose that AI development, deployment 
and use should serve an “ethical purpose”, while defining ethics as a field of study that centres 
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Also, the principle of non-maleficence, which this report also listed 
among the “level 1” principles, is currently defined in a way that is hardly 
actionable for developers, distributors, users and policy-makers. More 
specifically, the Draft Guidelines observe that “AI systems should not harm 
human beings”, and that “At the very least, AI systems should not be designed 
in a way that enhances existing harms or creates new harms for individuals”. If 
further clarifies that harms can be physical, psychological, financial or social, 
and can also constitute the unlawful treatment of personal data. However, more 
clarity would be needed for all those borderline cases in which an AI system 
ends up in a “life or death” situation or even more likely in a “death or death” 
type of dilemma (as in the trolley problem). Would this constitute a new harm, 
a greater harm or an old harm? Would the use of a conversational bot that 
changes children’s way of interacting with machines and even their accent when 
they talk violate this principle, by creating psychological harm (Yi Cheng et al. 
2018)? What will be the boundaries between harm that is pre-existing, and new 
harm? And between harm that is “lawful” and harm that infringes one’s rights? 
The same principle (do no harm) also contains environmental-friendliness 
as a principle that echoes that of sustainability, which this report included as a 
main “level 3” principle. However, there are two potential issues with the choice 
made in the Draft Ethics Guidelines. First, sustainability not only has an 
environmental dimension, but it also features important social and economic 
aspects that are not fully covered in the Guidelines. Second, including 
environmental sustainability under the “do no harm” or non-maleficence 
principle does not necessarily mean enforcing these principles in practice. 
More specifically, stating that AI systems should comply with environmental 
sustainability could either result in the introduction of a new minimum standard 
(i.e. non-compliant AI systems would be illegal once the principle is translated 
into bunding legislation); or in the simple description of what constitutes 
“ethical” AI, with no real enforcement solution attached. Based on the current 
text of the draft Guidelines, the latter solution seems most likely.  
In the section dedicated to the preservation of human agency, or self-
determination, the Draft Guidelines mention that “if one is a consumer or user 
of an AI system this entails a right to decide to be subject to direct or indirect AI 
decision making, a right to knowledge of direct or indirect interaction with AI 
systems, a right to opt out and a right of withdrawal”. This is said to include a 
right to “individually and collectively decide on how AI systems operate in a 
working environment”, and relatedly, “provisions designed to ensure that 
                                                        
on questions such as: ”What is a good action?”, ”What is right?”, and in some instances “What 
is the good life?”. 
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anyone using AI as part of his/her employment enjoys protection for 
maintaining their own decision-making capabilities and is not constrained by 
the use of an AI system”.66 Here, too, the boundaries and enforceability of these 
provisions should be clarified.  
On the one hand, the right to opt out from a system that uses AI as support 
to decision-making can be very far-reaching. For example, while the right to 
refuse direct interaction with AI is more commonly invoked, the right to refuse 
indirect interaction could mean that border control officers, tax enforcement 
agencies or medical doctors could be asked to refrain from using specific 
software when interacting with a specific customer. It may also imply that 
employers have to comply with specific standards when setting up human-
machine cooperation in the workplace, if they do not want to infringe 
occupational safety and health legislation. These are just examples, but the 
bottom line again is that these provisions read like “all or nothing”: either they 
are fully enforced, leading to massive over-regulation (standards, 
certification, safety at the workplace, obligation to train personnel to provide 
services with and without AI support) or they are not made enforceable and 
they might simply remain “wishful thinking”, like many other declarations 
of principles and values.  
Similar issues emerge with the principles of fairness and justice. The draft 
text implies that the development, use and regulation of AI systems must be 
“fair”, and this entails that the “positives and negatives resulting from AI should 
be evenly distributed”. While the remainder of the text is highly aligned with 
the analysis proposed in this report (i.e., justice implies providing users with 
effective redress and being held to high standards of accountability), the idea 
that all AI systems should be gauged against fairness standards should be 
accompanied by extensive explanations on key aspects of AI development and 
commercialization, such as what is acceptable bias, when does it become 
unacceptable (see above, section 1) and ultimately, what is a fair outcome 
depending on the specific use case? 
This section is followed by a very useful section (no. 5) on critical 
concerns raised by AI, which – despite lack of consensus among experts on 
certain issues – are meaningfully explained and presented. That said, the CEPS 
Task Force proposes that the HLEG looks at our section 4.2.2 above for 
additional insights on issues that can be representative of common issues that 
are raised by use of AI systems in various settings.  
                                                        
66 Footnote 13 of the Draft Ethical Guidelines and associated text. 
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4.3.2 Implementing trustworthy AI: Giving more “teeth” to the 
Guidelines 
The Draft Guidelines contain a section on implementing trustworthy AI, which 
in principle should address some of other concerns raised in the previous section 
about the lack of enforceability of the core values and principles identified by 
the HLEG. The Group itself observes that “achieving trustworthy AI means that 
the general and abstract principles need to be mapped into concrete 
requirements for AI systems and applications”. The first step chosen by the 
HLEG is the mapping of the values and principles into ten “requirements”, 
presented as non-exhaustive and in alphabetical order.67 
1. Accountability mechanisms are briefly presented, mostly in the form of 
legal liability (e.g. being responsible to compensate for damages or to 
offer apologies). There is no mention of the relationship between 
accountability and liability, and no discussion of the type of legal 
liability that is required for AI systems. The treatment of compensation 
of moral damages is absent and is briefly replaced by a statement 
according to which “in a case of discrimination, however, an explanation 
and apology might be at least as important”.  
2. Data governance refers to good practice in the collection, division, 
curation and integrity of data used in AI. 
3. Design for all implies, in the interpretation of the HLEG, the 
“accessibility and usability of technologies by anyone at any place and 
at any time, ensuring their inclusion in any living context, thus enabling 
equitable access and active participation of potentially all people in 
existing and emerging computer-mediated human activities”. However, 
AI systems are often designed for specific users, in particular 
professional users, e.g. AI used in support of medical doctors for better 
diagnoses or used in industrial B2B settings. Requiring AI to be always 
designed for all users appears to be disproportionate at best, and 
likely to impose unnecessary costs to all developers of professional AI 
systems, or even AI design to augment humans in specific professions.  
4. Governance of AI autonomy (human oversight). This requirement 
broadly implies that the greater the degree of autonomy left to the AI 
system, the stricter should be the governance built around it, and the 
requirement that users, especially in a work or decision-making 
environment, are “allowed to deviate from a path or decision chosen or 
recommended by the AI system”. The relationship between this 
                                                        
67 Some members of the CEPS Task Force are of the opinion that the list of requirements is at 
once too long, and redundant, given the many overlaps between principles such as 
transparency and accountability, as well as robustness and safety. 
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requirement and the issue of human-centricity is not clear and raises 
doubts as to whether ethical AI could operate in the absence of a human 
in the loop (but still in the presence of a human responsible).  
5. The requirement of non-discrimination echoes a concern that is widely 
shared among experts and should possibly be coupled with an 
explanation of what constitutes acceptable discrimination and what 
forms of discrimination are unacceptable. For example, in economic 
theory, discrimination is normally considered to be welfare-enhancing, 
as it can lead to enhanced market access and a reduction of the 
deadweight loss to society associated with -imperfectly-competitive 
markets (Armstrong 2005). Is AI that achieves perfect price 
discrimination unethical? For example, would an auction system that 
leads bidders to offer a price as close as possible to their willingness and 
ability to pay be considered unethical? What about an e-commerce 
platform that engages in personalized pricing based on observable 
information (e.g. how long has the user been surfing)?68 Clarifying those 
aspects is exactly what the Draft Ethics Guidelines should do to increase 
the level of certainty and trust in the way AI interacts with society and 
the economy. 
6. Respect for (and Enhancement of) Human Autonomy. This 
requirement, deeply linked with no. 4 above, is illustrated with respect 
to so-called “extreme” personalisation approaches, such as 
“recommender systems, search engines, navigation systems, virtual 
coaches and personal assistants”; these systems should, according to the 
Draft Guidelines, prioritise the overall wellbeing of the user. In this case 
as well, however, the exact definition of user well-being and the cases 
in which the system excessively nudges the user are not clear. 
7. Respect for privacy is very briefly described as a requirement for 
organisations to be “mindful of how data is used and might impact users 
and ensure full compliance with the GDPR as well as other applicable 
regulation dealing with privacy and data protection”. This is already a 
legal obligation, which makes it even more important to couple it with 
an indication of best practices and a description of specific use cases 
that could improve the awareness of AI designers, developers, 
vendors and distributors when it comes to specific forms of privacy 
protection, especially “by design” solutions. 
8. Robustness is related mostly to security, resilience but also to 
transparency and replicability of results. The latter is the most 
                                                        
68 On the pros and cons of personalized pricing, see also the proceedings of the meeting of the 
OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee  (http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/ 
personalised-pricing-in-the-digital-era.htm).  
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interesting and controversial, since the HLEG argues, in the current 
draft, that trustworthy AI requires that “the accuracy of results can be 
confirmed and reproduced by independent evaluation”. This obviously 
raises the issue of so-called “black boxes”, which can reach high levels 
of accuracy through deep neural networks, but at the price of 
explainability. The draft Guidelines seem to imply that trustworthy AI 
can be reproduced and that “lack of reproducibility can lead to 
unintended discrimination in AI decisions”. Again, it is not clear how 
far-reaching this requirement is. Should, for example, AI systems used 
in B2B settings lead to fully reproducible results as a requirement for 
trustworthy AI?  
9. Safety refers to the protection of human integrity and seems to hint at 
similar provisions to the ones already in force under the EU on Products 
Liability. However, given that trade-offs may emerge between, i.a. 
explainability and effectiveness of AI, it would be essential to provide 
guidance on how to strike the right balance in given use cases. As such, 
any assessment of AI safety should be sufficiently nuanced to reflect this 
issue.69  
10. Transparency introduces the principle of explainability as an element of 
trustworthiness. In particular, in case the AI system “uses human data” 
or “affects human beings” or have “other morally significant impacts”, 
this requirement entails that the system be explicit and open about 
choices and decisions concerning data sources, development processes 
and stakeholders. Here too, the main message of the HLEG is that only 
explainable AI is trustworthy AI: but it remains unclear what happens 
to non-explainable AI under EU law. Is it lawful and unethical? Or 
unethical, but still lawful?  
4.3.3 Guidance for ensuring and assessing trustworthy AI  
The remainder of the AI HLEG’s Draft Ethics Guidelines is dedicated to 
illustrating good practice to ensure trustworthy AI; as well as providing key 
guidance on assessing AI trustworthiness. The main content of these sections 
focuses on the need to incorporate trustworthiness early on in the design of AI 
and to consider both technical and non-technical methods to ensure the 
implementation of the aforementioned ten requirements in AI systems. The ten 
                                                        
69 Andrew Tutt (2017) notes that “…when and why machine-learning algorithms fail is 
difficult to predict and explain because what they do is probabilistic and emergent by design”. 
He also notes AI’s similarity with drugs, in that “…the precise mechanisms by which they 
produce their benefits and harms are not well understood…” As such, he proposes a Federal 
Regulatory Agency that oversees AI in much the same way as the US Food and Drug 
Administration oversees pharmaceuticals. 
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requirements should also be kept in mind when training teams that will work 
on the system, the system itself, the testing environment and the potential 
applications of the system. AI designers and developers are also asked to 
provide, in a clear and proactive manner, information to stakeholders 
(customers, employees, etc.) about the AI system’s capabilities and limitations, 
including trade-offs, in order to allow them to set realistic expectations.  
AI designers and developers are also advised to “adopt an assessment list 
for Trustworthy AI” and to adapt it to the specific use case in which the system 
is being used. Such a list may not be exhaustive, and in any case,  trustworthiness 
should be subject to a cycle of assessment, monitoring, learning and updating. 
Such a governance cycle should be coupled with a “human-centric approach to 
Artificial Intelligence, which will enable Europe to become a globally leading 
innovator in ethical, secure and cutting-edge AI”. It should also strive to 
facilitate and enable “Trustworthy AI made in Europe”, which will enhance the 
well-being of European citizens.  
The Guidelines end with a relatively long list of assessment questions on 
trustworthy AI. These are based on the “ten requirements”, which effectively 
take the lion’s share of the Guidelines. This is why it is of the utmost importance 
that an in-depth discussion takes place on how to deepen guidance on these 
requirements, as well as on the “elephant in the room”: What happens if a 
given AI system fails to meet the specified requirements? 
4.4 “How” to promote the Ethics Guidelines? 
The four-section structure we propose for the future Ethics Guidelines in section 
4.2 above differs from the current structure proposed by the HLEG in the first 
draft published in December 2018. In what follows, we argue that the four-
section structure we propose would significantly improve on the current draft, 
as it would mark a significant departure from existing documents, including AI 
principles; and it would also make the guidelines future-proof, due to the 
following characteristics: 
x Scalability. The structure of the proposed Ethics Guidelines as 
integrated in an online, interactive tool would give the European 
Commission the possibility to add and update content under the 
different sections, and crowdsource content from the AI Alliance, 
maintaining it as a constant source of information and guidance.  
x Flexibility. The three-level structure of the principles allows for 
clarification of the “red zones” or “no-go’s”, which correspond to the 
Level 1 area, plus the general or sectoral legislation that directly 
prohibits specific conduct (e.g. the GDPR for cases of processing of 
personal data); and at the same time allows for the promotion of more 
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responsible AI practices, to put the first in line with generally 
acknowledged principles of responsible AI, and then in line with the EU 
2030 Agenda. Moreover, the guidelines are also very flexible since they 
allow for the reclassification of specific principles across levels, 
following the entry into force of new legislation.  
x Modularity. The modular structure, with four sections and a three-
tiered list of principles, allows for a gradual upgrade and innovation 
without disrupting legal and regulatory certainty.  
That said, even if the Commission will not decide to amend the structure 
of the Guidelines, it should at least introduce a hierarchy across the ten 
requirements and provide additional information on how to respond in case 
trade-offs arise between the principles on which they are based. Apart from the 
design and content of the Guidelines, a very important separate issue is 
ensuring that they have an effective and positive impact on the AI market in 
Europe. In this respect, there are several options that could be followed by the 
European Commission. These include the following: i) making specific 
principles mandatory, and subject to per se rules in adjudication (i.e. there would 
be no need to prove the effect, but only the existence of the practice); ii) 
establishing rebuttable presumptions of unlawfulness in case of failure to 
comply with specific principles; iii) reserving specific procurement markets for 
AI systems that comply with Level 2 and/or Level 3 principles; iv) requiring 
specific Algorithmic Impact Assessments in specific sectors, based on the use 
cases thought to be problematic; v) creating an “EU AI mark” that certifies the 
compliance with some or all the principles contained in the Guidelines; vi) 
establishing a co-regulatory regime that delegates to industry the development 
of means to achieve compliance with the principles over time; or vii) leave the 
issue to self-regulation, encouraging industry players to align with EU values 
through soft law and moral suasion.  
Another important means of promoting the guidelines would be to 
propose the adoption of some of its principles in global for a, such as the 
OECD and the G20. The scalable and modular structure proposed above could 
also provide a very flexible scheme for non-EU countries wishing to align their 
AI strategies and rules with the EU’s approach. Access to the EU market would 
be guaranteed via compliance with level 1 principles, but full alignment with 
EU values and goals (and possibly, access to certain procurement markets) 
would occur only after full compliance with level 3 principles was 
demonstrated. 
In reality, the European Commission will not be in a position to adopt only 
one strategy. A combination of actions will be required to fully achieve the 
goals stated in the Communication on AI adopted in April, and the 
Coordinated Plan announced in December.  The most frequently recurring 
70 | PART II. EUROPE IN THE GLOBAL RACE FOR AI 
proposals are discussed below, based on the reflections of the Task Force 
members. 
4.4.1 Is AI the “new GDPR”? 
One of the most frequently heard statements in the European debate on AI is 
that Europe could become a leader in this domain if it manages to make its 
approach to AI mandatory, applied to all entities that want to operate in the 
European market, regardless of where they are from. This is based on the alleged 
success of the General Data Protection Regulation, which effectively introduced 
a novelty to the world of internet policy by presenting a systematic, well-
structured legal framework for the protection of personal data in the European 
Union, inducing many companies around the world to consider measures to 
comply with its provisions. Since the GDPR only recently entered into force (25 
May 2018), it is too early to judge whether its relatively strict provisions will 
become a global standard, or even whether they will be fully and 
homogeneously complied with in the member states. As a result, invoking AI as 
the new GDPR can only convey a general message: that the EU is entertaining  
the introduction of heightened mandatory standards on AI to establish a 
minimum level of protection for end users in the AI age, and will leverage the 
sheer size of its internal market, as well as the current lack of comprehensive 
regulation in other large countries, as a way to impose its principles as global 
“golden rules” on AI.  
While the “AI as the new GDPR” vision is interesting, it is not 
necessarily compelling. After all, it is too early to conclude that the GDPR has 
become a global standard, and it is also too early to assess the impact of GDPR 
on Europe’s competitiveness in the digital sphere. A proportionate approach 
would be needed, aimed at steering AI towards the common good when needed, 
but also careful not to overburden innovators and entrepreneurs with 
procedural requirements and compliance costs. Already providing guidance to 
AI developers, vendors and distributors on how to ensure that AI is compatible 
with the GDPR would be a major step forward (Kingston 2017): in this respect, 
rather than presenting AI as the new GDPR, it would be important to ensure 
that AI and GDPR go hand in hand in Europe. 
4.4.2 Should an “AI seal” and related mandatory certification system be 
introduced? 
One important aspect of the current debate on the EU approach to Artificial 
Intelligence revolves around the possibility that the Ethics Guidelines would 
become a benchmark for certification. Such certification could either be binary 
(i.e. compliant or not compliant) or layered, in line with existing certifications 
that provide more granular information as regards the degree of alignment of a 
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specific AI system with the Ethics Guidelines. In addition, such certification 
could be introduced by the European Commission, similar to recent 
developments in the field of cybersecurity;70 or developed by the private sector 
(in the same vein as the EU Data Protection Code of Conduct for Cloud Service 
Providers71) as a way to build user trust in AI, and therefore signal what would 
otherwise remain as a so-called “credence” quality in AI.72 Either way, 
certification could help reduce the existing informational asymmetry between 
the suppliers and the users of AI, signalling the existence of ethics “by”, “in”, 
and “for” design in given products and services. Certification could also be 
usefully coupled with standards, in particular emerging IEEE (Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers) standards on how to align Artificial 
Intelligence systems with ethical values; and possibly, future ETSI (European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute) standards on how to align AI systems 
with EU “level 3” principles.  
However, there are disadvantages in imposing standards at a very early 
stage in the development of a given industry or family of technologies: early 
standardization can create a straight-jacket effect, forcing technological 
development into a pre-determined direction, which is then self-reinforced 
through path-dependency; this, in turn, creates a lock-in effect, which may lead 
the AI community into sub-optimal standards.73 Accordingly, the decision 
whether to impose early standards on AI, rather than public or private 
certification, must be approached with extreme care.  
At this stage, the CEPS Task Force did not find sufficient grounds to 
suggest the adoption of public certification, or even mandatory standards on 
AI in Europe. This finding is based on three main observations. First, the market 
seems to be generating self-certification frameworks and packages, mostly 
through large consultancy firms and tech companies, some of which are 
extremely active in producing step-by-step guidance and solutions for firms that 
adopt AI-enabled systems. Second, one would expect that the adoption of the 
EU Ethics Guidelines will provide this blossoming market with an additional 
benchmark, leading consultants and intermediaries to signal to their customers 
                                                        
70 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-cybersecurity-certification-framework 
71 https://eucoc.cloud/en/about/about-eu-cloud-coc.html 
72 Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni (1973) have introduced the term “credence good” and 
added this type of good to Phillip Nelson’s (1970) classification of ordinary, search and 
experience goods. See, i.a., Dulleck et al. (2011) for a comprehensive economic analysis. 
73 The concept of lock-in was originally developed by Arthur (1994), who discussed the 
outcome of competition among technologies in the presence of increasing returns to adoption, 
as we would expect the case of AI would feature, thanks to network externalities and the 
modular nature of AI systems.  
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the alignment of their product with most if not all of the principles put forward 
by the HLEG in the Draft Ethics Guidelines. Importantly, relying on 
intermediaries would also have the advantage of guiding companies adopting 
AI through a double process: the value alignment of their AI products, and the 
alignment of their whole organization with ethical principles, which appears 
necessary especially for data protection purposes. Already companies like SAP, 
Deutsche Telekom, Google, Telefonica and IBM are signalling to the market their 
willingness to go beyond existing ethical principles in dealing with AI solutions: 
for example, some of them have already officially committed to adopt a full 
value chain approach, by working with vendors, suppliers and other players 
along the value chain on the condition that they, too, are aligned with the 
Guidelines. This “viral” nature of Ethical AI is potentially a very promising 
avenue for spreading good practice across the industry.  
Third, it is still too early to anticipate with reasonable certainty how the 
AI market will develop over time, and in various domains and sectors. One 
possibility is that IT firms and consultancies will end up supplying most of the 
AI solutions in the form of pre-trained algorithms, for use by SMEs. Should this 
be the case, then the burden of value alignment of AI systems would probably 
be less significant, since these firms would be able to exploit economies of scale 
in the design of their systems, and it will not be up to SMEs to perform this rather 
complex set of activities. Similarly, “ready-made” AI products foreseen by the 
European Commission in the AI-for-demand platform could also usefully 
include fully compliant AI solutions, and this in turn may further boost the 
impact of the Ethics Guidelines on the whole AI community.  
All in all, the preferred solution at this stage seems to be the imposition 
of ethically aligned AI (“level 3” AI) only in very specific contexts, such as the 
AI-on-demand platform, public procurement of AI solutions for public 
administrations and the delivery of public services; and the use of AI 
solutions in research, innovation and investment policy (e.g. in Horizon 
Europe, in the future InvestEU and in cohesion funds). The European 
Commission could also consider imposing fully ethically aligned AI in specific 
sectors, such as healthcare, but only after performing a careful impact 
assessment. The European Commission should also promote the Ethics 
Guidelines by mobilizing the AI alliance, coordinating with member states and 
raising the awareness of the end users through examples and use cases that 
explain the importance of ethically aligned AI. Together with these activities, the 
European Commission should also monitor the market to ascertain whether the 
Guidelines are having the expected impact. Only if the Commission realizes that 
these measures are insufficient to steer the market towards accountable and 
sustainable uses of AI, should more intrusive measures such as co-regulation be 
considered.  
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4.4.3 Monitored self-regulation, experimentation and private 
governance: Let ideas flourish  
In a constantly and rapidly changing environment, the reversibility and 
adaptive nature of policy approaches are of the utmost importance. As explained 
above, the creation of lock-in and sub-optimally path-dependent policy 
solutions can create long-lasting, often irremediable problems for an industry as 
well as related foregone opportunities for society. In the case of AI, the cross-
cutting nature of this industry, coupled with the fact that most of the existing 
applications present no significant ethical dilemmas (even if they still need to 
comply with EU law), warrants a very cautious approach in deciding what to 
regulate, and how. As a result, regulating to impose full alignment with the 
future Ethics Guidelines appears disproportionate at this stage, and likely to 
impose significant administrative burdens and enforcement costs, and thereby 
placing the whole EU industry at a disadvantage. As already explained, the “AI 
as the new GDPR” appears far from compelling to the members of the CEPS 
Task Force: rather there was general agreement that the GDPR and other 
broad existing legislation, such as the Network and Information Security 
(NIS) Directive, should remain the only mandatory, strictly enforced part of 
AI, in addition, of course, to “level 1” Ethics Principles. Other policy measures 
that may be needed, which are not necessarily related to the Ethics Guidelines, 
are discussed in the next section, particularly concerning liability rules.  
Therefore, for purposes of promoting the Ethics Guidelines, the CEPS 
Task Force supports the so-called “monitored self-regulation” option. The 
European Commission should first evaluate the services offered to EU citizens 
today and their likely evolution over time. And only if it emerges that those 
services are unlikely to comply with the Guidelines, should the Commission 
consider more policy actions. This does not mean, however, that the EU should 
not take any policy measures, for example, to clarify the issue of liability for 
damages caused by AI systems or to encourage data-sharing in specific sectors. 
These measures, notably, should imply adequate room for experimentation, in 
the form of “regulatory sandboxes” or randomized controlled trials to ensure 
that AI-enabled solutions that potentially pose ethical concerns prove their 
potential in terms of user protection before being admitted to the market. 
Experimentation should also be given a very prominent role in testing the 
Guidelines and in particular the assessment checklist it contains.  
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5. POLICY CHANGES:  
REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION? 
The second deliverable of the EU High-Level Expert Group on AI will be 
dedicated to the formulation of recommendations in terms of policy and 
investment. This section briefly looks at policy changes needed to promote and 
implement the European approach to AI, starting from general considerations 
about the EU Better Regulation agenda (section 5.1); and then digging more in-
depth into the issue of reforming the Product Liability Directive and the 
Machinery Directive (section 5.2); intervening to facilitate data sharing as a 
horizontal policy (section 5.3); and with sector-specific policies (section 5.4). The 
section ends with a brief reflection on governance issues, particularly the merit 
of existing proposals to create a regulatory agency for AI, data or machine 
learning (section 5.5).  
As a preliminary statement, the CEPS Task Force did not find strong 
evidence that would favour a massive revision of existing horizontal 
regulations in fields such as product liability and machinery. On the contrary, 
the members identified a need to strengthen the experimental dimension of EU 
regulation, and reconcile three apparently incompatible stances: the need for 
precaution when allowing the commercialization of certain new technological 
solutions; the fact that most AI does not pose ethical or regulatory concerns that 
are significantly different from those posed by existing IT solutions; and the 
need to test new solutions that have the potential to positively contribute to 
societal welfare and sustainable development. Accordingly, the answer to the 
question in the title of this section appears to point in the direction of an 
evolution, rather than a revolution. It must be recognised, however, that 
technology is also bringing important changes in the way governments 
approach regulation, and this will affect the way in which AI policy is likely to 
evolve over time.  
5.1 The Better Regulation agenda and AI 
The EU can rely on a very well-structured, sophisticated Better Regulation 
agenda, which also includes ad hoc tools on measuring impacts on innovation, 
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as well as assessing issues related to the Digital Economy and ICT.74 The Better 
Regulation Guidelines provide an almost complete tool box that the European 
Commission and other EU institutions can safely rely upon in deciding what 
policy approach to adopt in the face of emerging digital technologies, such as 
AI. The only areas that seem to be partly absent in the Better Regulation toolbox 
are behavioural economics (including “nudging”) and experimental policy-
making. Guidance would be needed for European Commission services to take 
into account the behavioural reactions of end users, and how to ensure that 
regulation, when needed, is adaptive, flexible and innovation-friendly.  
That said, it would be important that when reviewing existing legislation, 
and even more importantly when preparing the ex-ante impact assessment of 
new policies, the European Commission takes into account the following: 
- The problem definition should be increasingly based on foresight and risk 
analysis, as well as the result of fact-finding with a large group of 
stakeholders. This could be, in the future, the role of the AI Alliance and 
Observatory. The latter could complement the role of the REFIT platform in 
signalling cases of legislation in need of revision. 
- The Commission should remain open to a new form of “innovation deals”, 
in which AI developers challenge existing regulation by showing that they 
can achieve more significant benefits and higher levels of user protection 
with alternative business models than the ones on which the original 
Regulation was based. This could be done in a more effective way if a 
mission on AI (or a “mission IT”, see below section 5.4.4) were launched; and 
even more if the Commission will strengthen the experimental dimension in 
the Better Regulation agenda: as a matter of fact, innovation deals can easily 
lead to the launch of an experimental phase. 
- An experimental phase should be foreseen, in which new co-regulatory 
solutions and/or new business models are tested in a secure space such as 
a sandbox, before they are admitted to the market. The sandbox should be 
designed in a way that does not entail excessive administrative burdens for 
the entrepreneurs willing to enter the market with innovative solutions. At 
the same time, the sandbox should not compromise the safety and 
fundamental rights of the end users, and as such should not violate “level 1” 
principles.  
- In terms of methodology, the Commission should analyse possible changes 
in the AI-related policy framework by avoiding exclusive reliance on cost-
                                                        
74 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/better-regulation-toolbox-
27_en_0.pdf 
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benefit analysis.75 Rather, a multi-criteria analysis would be more 
appropriate: regulatory options should lead to a high level of protection of 
basic and fundamental rights, as defined above under Level 1, as well as 
additional policy objectives, such as user empowerment, and the 2030 
Agenda sustainability goals.  
- Concerns alternative policy options, it is very important that the 
Commission respects the so-called “Treaty-based principle of 
proportionality”, which dictates that any proposed means of intervention 
should be proportionate to the stated goals, and thus avoid being overly 
prescriptive or invasive. In particular, the Commission should consider the 
following alternatives when deciding on possible policies in AI-intensive 
fields:  
o Awareness raising campaigns. These should be designed in order to 
reach and empower end users, at the same time exploiting 
behavioural science in order to maximise their effectiveness.  
o Self-regulatory schemes. these include codes of conduct for algorithm 
developers (e.g. the Asilomar principles), corporate privacy/data 
protection policies, privately managed complaint handling and 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g. take-down policies, policies on the 
right to be forgotten). In early phases of policy-making, this option is 
often to be preferred. However, it is of the utmost importance that 
any form of self-regulation is assessed with special care and is 
verifiable, transparent to public authorities and subject to periodic 
reviews and evaluations. Very often, in the AI-enabled environment, 
this option can be coupled with automatic data exchanges, similar to 
the ones implemented under RegTech and SupTech.  
o Bottom-up (civil society-driven) options. Rather than relying on self-
regulation, one slightly different set of alternatives could be, to rely on 
third party regulatory schemes, privately developed by civil society 
organizations or NGOs, and use them as private standards. For 
example, the ISEAL alliance acts as a private meta-regulatory scheme, 
which defines rules and criteria that private regulators should follow 
in order to be credible interlocutors of public policy-makers (Cafaggi 
and Renda 2014); in the internet environment, an NGO (or public 
authority when feasible) could define or adopt criteria for algorithmic 
accountability, transparency and non-discrimination, and translate 
them into an auditing and certification scheme, which ultimately 
                                                        
75 On the use of cost-benefit analysis in EU Better Regulation and possible shortcomings of 
this method, particularly when it comes to non-market impacts (including impacts on 
fundamental rights) and distributional impacts, see Renda (2018b). 
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leads to a trust-enhancing tool for end users. A specific logo/label 
could be used for those platforms whose algorithms have been 
checked and are constantly monitored by public authorities or NGOs, 
so that compliance is ensured over time.  
o Co-regulation. Co-regulation couples the delegation of specific 
phases of the policy cycle to the private sector, with a legal backstop. 
In the case of AI, co-regulatory schemes could be used whenever 
monitored self-regulation is (or has already proven to be) ineffective 
in securing an adequate level of protection of users’ rights, or any 
other lack of effectiveness in achieving policy objectives.  
o Principles-based and outcome-based regulation. Very often, the 
performance of specific phases of the policy cycle by private entities 
can be coupled with the identification of the main overarching 
principles of the regulatory intervention, and/or the ultimate goals 
the policy intends to pursue. These forms of regulation often achieve 
greater flexibility compared to traditional, “command and control” 
regulation, since they can be coupled with the adoption of more agile 
secondary legislation, such as implementing or delegated acts, or 
measures taken by a regulatory agency; or with private regulatory 
solutions. In either case, the resulting policy framework can be 
adapted more easily to the fast-changing technological evolution. 
The most evident case of flexible regulation in this respect is the EU’s 
“new approach to standardisation”, in which principles and 
objectives are set in primary legislation, but all implementing 
measures are then achieved through standards and conformity 
assessment. For example, recent laws on net neutrality and on 
copyright infringement mandate that internet service provider (ISPs) 
act as controllers of the behaviour of their subscribers. Online 
advertising, child protection and privacy are still subject to a 
combination of general legislation and private standards in many 
parts of the world. The internet itself is subject mostly to private 
regulation. Table 1 below shows Chris Marsden’s “Beaufort scale” of 
the many hybrids that exist in the ICT ecosystem between pure self-
regulation and full-fledged co-regulation.76  
 
                                                        
76 A Beaufort scale is originally a scale for measuring wind speeds: Chris Marsden used this 
denomination to show a taxonomy of forms of self- and co-regulation ordered from the least 
managed, to the most government-imposed form. 
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Table 1. Marsden’s “Beaufort scale” of self- and co-regulation 
Scale Regulatory scheme Self-Co Government involvement 
0 ‘Pure’ unenforced self-regulation Second Life 
Informal interchange only – evolving 
partial industry forum building on players’ 
own terms 
1 Acknowledged self-regulation ATVOD 
Discussion but not formal 
recognition/approval 
2 
Post-facto 
standardized self-
regulation 
W3C# Later approval of standards 
3 Standardised self-regulation IETF Formal approval of standards 
4 Discussed self-regulation IMCB 
Prior principled informal discussion, but 
no sanction/approval/process audit 
5 Recognised self-regulation ISPA Recognition of body – informal policy role 
6 Co-founded self-regulation FOSI# 
Prior negotiation of body – no outcome 
role 
7 Sanctioned self-regulation 
PEGI# 
Euro mobile 
Recognition of body – formal policy role 
(contact committee/process) 
8 Approved self-regulation Hotline 
Prior principled less formal discussion 
with government – with recognition/ 
approval 
9 
Approved 
compulsory co-
regulation 
KJM# 
ICANN 
Prior principled discussion with 
government – with sanction/ 
approval/process audit 
10 Scrutinised co-regulation NICAM# 
As 9, with annual budget/ process 
approval 
11 
Independent 
body (with 
stakeholder 
forum) 
ICSTIS# Government imposed and co-regulated with taxation/compulsory levy 
Note: # denotes ‘soft power’ of government/European Commission funding. 
Source: Marsden (2011). 
As mentioned also in Cafaggi and Renda (2012), regulators could find it 
useful to break down the phases of the regulatory intervention (e.g. into agenda-
setting, standard-setting, implementing acts, monitoring and evaluation, 
enforcement) and decide which phases would be more effectively dealt with by 
private actors, as opposed to others that should remain within the remit of public 
authorities. In the case of algorithmic awareness, co-regulation could mostly 
take the form of either: i) principles-based regulation, in which public legislation 
sets the principles that have to be followed by online platforms in using 
algorithms, and then platforms complement the rules by developing compliant 
business models and algorithms and forms of reporting to public authorities that 
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enable monitoring and evaluation over time; or ii) outcome-based regulation, in 
which public authorities directly specify outcomes and performance indicators 
that should be complied with by the regulated platforms (e.g. using KPIs (key 
performance indicators) and coupling them with a successful monitoring 
strategy). 
o Behavioural (choice architecture, hyper-nudge) options. These options 
factor behavioural biases into the analysis and seek to preserve the 
choice of the end user by, at the same time, gently pushing them to 
adopt solutions that are considered more sustainable, or more in line 
with end-user rights. There is still a lively debate on the merits of 
nudging as a truly libertarian approach (Cass Sunstein speaks of 
“libertarian paternalism” claiming that it is not an oxymoron); in the 
context of cyberspace, and even more in the case of algorithms used 
by online platforms, mandating the use of certain default options (e.g. 
opt-in schemes for personal data collection), or the use of specific 
colours or other graphical tools to increase the likelihood that users 
will choose more conservative or sustainable options. Issues such as 
the endowment effect, over-optimism bias, short-termism, anchoring 
and framing are essential to assessing ex ante the likelihood that a 
policy approach will be effective in tackling the issue.  
o Design-based (code-based, architectural) options. Some policy approaches 
entail the partial avoidance of awareness-raising, and instead focus on 
mandating that the overall architecture of the platform is not 
conducive to infringing conduct or undue discrimination. This 
approach dates back to the early literature on cyberspace, when 
Lawrence Lessig (1999) spoke of “the perfect technology of justice”; 
more recently, Yeung and Dixon-Woods (2010) stated that “design-
based regulation … works ex ante: it uses technical constraints to stop, 
or significantly inhibit, action at the moment it is attempted”. Hence, 
this approach avoids the risks, uncertainties and inefficiencies 
generated by ex post remedies, as well as the risks of behavioural 
regulation (such as nudges, see below), by avoiding the emergence of 
specific discriminatory outcomes. 
o RegTech and SupTech solutions, currently confined to the financial 
services sector, but potentially applicable also to many other sectors. 
Technology can be used in any regulated sector to conduct risk 
assessments, monitor, report and comply with regulatory 
obligations at reduced cost. In addition to digitalisation of reporting, 
technology can carry out automated compliance processes and 
checks, it can reduce operational risk, increase cybersecurity, and 
provide real-time analysis and compliance (“Compliance as a 
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Service”), which in turn can be used to combat fraud and other 
crimes, as well as to provide warnings on a range of other issues. 
Technology can include digital labour, robotic process automation, 
machine leaning, cognitive learning, big and smart data analysis, 
biometric technology, and natural language processing. RegTech 
does not necessarily clash with the need for human input to update 
regulations and also to buy-in to the culture of regulatory 
compliance. 
o Adaptive, experimental regulatory options (experimental policy-making). 
The speed at which technology progresses and the disruptive nature 
of new business models in many sectors led regulators around the 
world to seek more experimental approaches to regulation, which in 
turn enable better monitoring and evaluation over time. Possible ways 
to make policy more flexible and adaptive include: i) the use of 
regulatory sandboxes and other experimental approaches to allow for 
the ongoing monitoring of the market and social impacts of innovative 
techniques; ii) the incorporation of technology roadmaps and the opinion 
of multi-stakeholder platforms as input into the policy-making 
process, to ensure that innovative, welfare-enhancing technologies are 
adequately represented in policy processes and outcomes; and iii) the 
ongoing monitoring of policy impacts, including through open 
government technique.77 This leads to an enhanced role of certain 
better regulation tools, such as the use of sunset clauses and forms of 
experimental policymaking, to trigger learning on the side of 
government (Listokin 2008; Ranchordás 2013). The “adaptive 
regulator” would then be guided by a number of principles, 
including: an incremental approach, meaning that small steps should 
be taken and social change should be based on experience; an 
experimental approach, justified by the “combination of uncertainty 
and constraints on predictability [which] create … the necessity for 
policymakers to experiment;” and a flexible approach, required by the 
existence of deep uncertainty. This is where this literature stops, and 
where new insights would be urgently needed. Yeung (2017b) 
                                                        
77 In academia, very few commentators have directly addressed the issue of flexible, adaptive 
policy-making in the layered ICT ecosystem. In their attempt to propose an adaptive framework 
for the internet, Clark and Claffy (2015) argue that the following requirements are essential: 
agreeing on policy goals; measuring progress towards those goals; designing regulatory options 
intended to move towards those goals; being able to determine that policy changes indeed 
caused observed outcomes; and dealing with the potential destabilization of ecosystem, due to 
rapid policy and technology adjustments. Likewise, policy-makers should possess the flexibility 
to revise and adapt the structure of policies and programmes to changing circumstances. 
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provides a classification of so-called “fixed” and “adaptive” 
regulatory approaches to algorithms, as shown in Table 2 below.  
Table 2. A taxonomy of algorithmic regulatory systems 
 Standard 
setting 
Monitoring Enforcement/ 
Sanction 
Description 
1. Fixed Real time reactive 
violation detection 
Automated Simple real-time 
sanction administration 
systems 
2. Fixed Real time reactive 
violation detection 
Recommender  
system 
Simple real-time 
warning systems 
3. Fixed Pre-emptive 
violation 
prediction 
Automated Simple pre-emptive 
sanction administration 
systems 
4. Fixed Pre-emptive 
violation 
prediction 
Recommender  
system 
Simple predictive 
recommender systems 
5. Adaptive Real time reactive 
violation detection 
Automated Complex sanction 
administration systems 
6. Adaptive Real time reactive 
violation detection 
Recommender  
system 
Complex real-time 
prioritization systems 
7. Adaptive Pre-emptive 
violation 
prediction 
Automated Complex predictive 
sanctioning systems 
8. Adaptive Pre-emptive 
violation 
prediction 
Recommender  
system 
Complex predictive 
recommender systems 
Source: Yeung (2017b). 
o Command and control options. These correspond to standard 
prescriptive policy options, possibly coupled with review clauses that 
could increase the flexibility of the rules over time. Banning specific 
forms of behaviour, for example profiling of end users, requires an 
adequate strategy for monitoring compliance, which in the past has 
been missing. Accordingly, in comparing these prescriptive options 
with more flexible approaches, we will guide policy-makers not only 
on the basis of the design and text of the rules, but also, most notably, 
in the appraisal of the risk of low compliance. A good example is again 
p2p (peer-to-peer) file sharing, where technology has constantly 
outpaced regulation in developing solutions and user-friendly 
opportunities to achieve non-compliant outcomes (Renda 2011). 
- Risk analysis should become far more embedded in the regulatory 
practice of the European Commission. The analysis of the factors that may 
jeopardize the effectiveness of policy solutions, and the identification of 
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possible mitigating strategies, appears inevitable in a future that is likely to 
feature more “code as law” solutions. As Lessig himself observed in 1999, 
and as was confirmed by past experience (e.g. in copyright and DRMs), 
regulation by means of code is often unable to represent the level of 
flexibility and the nuances required for adequate interpretation of specific 
provisions (e.g. copyright exceptions).  
- In the areas of monitoring and evaluation, any alternative policy 
framework should be adaptive and feature a strategy for data collection in 
order to enable monitoring and possible changes over time. In the case of co-
regulatory or monitored self-regulatory schemes, the private sector should 
cooperate with the EU institutions in order to enable seamless monitoring of 
existing policy solutions. In the case of RegTech (Regulatory Technology) 
solutions, such cooperation would be automatic, due to the partial 
replacement of legal rules with computer code (Micheler and Whaley 2018).  
5.2 Reforming liability rules? 
One key aspect of the future policy framework for artificial intelligence is the 
choice of the liability regime for damages caused by AI systems: some member 
states and the European Commission have launched reflections in this domain.78 
This is particularly relevant in case of damages suffered by end users (in B2B 
cases, liability is typically a contractual issue, rather than a tort one). There are 
three main aspects of this issue, which will have to be discussed and decided 
upon in the coming months. The first is related to the scope of the liability; the 
second to the type of remedy, and hence the type of liability rule to adopt; the third 
revolves around problems of attribution or apportionment of liability. Concerning 
the scope, it is essential to discuss whether developers, vendors or distributors of 
AI systems should be liable for damages caused by the selection of the data; for 
the way in which they clean or otherwise curate the data; for failure to adopt 
adequate safeguards when training machines; for damages caused by the design 
of the algorithm; and/or for damages caused irrespectively of the respect of all 
standards of conduct in these phases. It is useful, in this respect, to distinguish 
between input, throughput, output or impact accountability.  
                                                        
78 E.g. the UK government has conducted detailed analysis of the applicable regulatory regime 
and produced a series of reports, including The pathway to driverless cars: a detailed review of 
regulations for automated vehicle technologies, Department for Transport, 2015. The European 
Commission published a Staff Working Document on “Liability for emerging digital 
technologies”, on 25 April 2018. For a review of the issues surrounding new regulating 
technologies, see the report of the RoboLaw Project, Guidelines on Regulating Robotics, 22 
September 2014.  
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Secondly, the type of liability rule to be adopted can take the form of a 
fault-based rule, in which the liability of the alleged tortfeasor is gauged with 
respect to a standard of diligence, which can be well-defined (for example, 
associated with compliance with a specific standard); or more subject to judicial 
interpretation (e.g. the diligence of the layperson, or good pater familias, or the 
diligence and competence of an expert in the field). 
Thirdly, and in a related vein, it is important to clarify the rules that apply 
in case of difficulty to attribute the responsibility to a given AI system. This can 
happen due to any of the following scenarios: i) a system good causes a given 
damage, but the individual contribution of AI to the damage is impossible to 
prove; ii) an AI system did not incur any malfunctioning, but its interaction with 
human behaviour led to damage; iii) an interaction between two or more AI-
enabled algorithms has caused damages to third parties (e.g. so-called “flash 
crashes”); iv) the combination of two or more AI systems, from different 
vendors, within a single product leads to damages, with no easy apportionment 
of liability between the system vendors; or  v) it is difficult to prove who, 
between the AI vendor, the distributor, or the OEM (original equipment 
manufacturer), has caused the damage.  
For example, in the case of the fatal accident that occurred in March 2018 
in Tempe, Arizona, when a Uber-operated Volvo car failed to detect a woman 
who was crossing the street, public authorities took several days and had to 
closely cooperate with Uber to trace back responsibility for what had happened. 
Was it the Lidar sensor, and then its producer should be liable? Was it a 
mechanical failure, and then Volvo should be liable? Was it the camera? Was it 
Uber, who runs the operating system of those cars? The NTSB Preliminary 
Report indicated that Uber had deactivated at least two safety-critical features, 
including the emergency braking. But there were also concerns that the “human 
in the loop” was watching a TV show on her phone rather than being ready to 
step in; but her declarations also raised issues on possible lack of training, which 
would cause liability to shift back to Uber;79 moreover, the victim was reportedly 
under the influence of drugs and alcohol, and it is unclear whether this could 
have affected the predictability of her behaviour, or created issues of 
                                                        
79 The Preliminary Joint Consultation Paper on Automated Vehicles, by the Law Commission 
of England and Wales, and the Scottish Law Commission, examines the issue of negligence 
by a “user-in-charge”. See https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2018/11/6.5066_LC_AV-Consultation-Paper-5-
November_061118_WEB-1.pdf  
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contributory negligence (see below). This suggests how burdensome fact-
finding can be in complex situations in which several factors cause an accident.80  
In this context, the law and economics literature can be of great help. 
Scholars such as Guido Calabresi have shed light on the most efficient choice of 
the liability regime. Key criteria in designing an efficient liability regime are the 
identification of the “cheapest cost avoider”, i.e. the entity that can avoid the 
emergence of system failures at the lowest cost; and /or the “superior insurer”, 
i.e. the entity that can buy insurance most effectively and cheaply, thereby 
offering relief to the damaged party also due to voluntary or mandatory 
insurance (so-called “deep pocket theory”; see Posner and Landes 1980). The 
latter concept also leads to another, very important issue to be included in the 
overall discussion of liability for use of AI: the need to ensure that damaged 
victims are always adequately compensated for damages. This is essential, 
regardless of the fault of the company that designed the AI system, provided 
that the end user has not used it incorrectly. 
As a matter of fact, the acceptability of new disruptive technologies such 
as AI is dependent on the fact that end users damaged by the system find 
appropriate redress. Furthermore, the need to identify a responsible entity for 
damages caused by AI is linked to the introduction of a related principle in the 
Ethics Guidelines, which we discussed in section 4 above: the “human in the 
loop” or the “human in control” requirement should rather be replaced by a 
“human responsible” requirement, to avoid imposing excessively burdensome 
obligations on AI developers, vendors and distributors in circumstances in 
which it is virtually impossible or useless to have a human in the immediate 
control of the system; and at the same time guarantee that end users will be 
compensated for the damage caused, and will therefore be more likely to accept 
and take up the new systems.  
This approach to responsibility inevitably leads to the identification of 
a strict (non-fault-based) liability regime. However, this would not, in and of 
itself, be sufficient for the design of a suitable liability regime. In particular, 
three aspects would need to be defined in detail: whether the regime would be 
absolute or relative; whether there would be one entity in the whole value chain 
that is primarily responsible vis-à-vis the end user; and whether there would be 
joint and several liability in case of joint participation in causing an accident. 
Concerning the extent of the liability regime, strict liability regimes can be 
absolute, or relative. In the former case, there is no possibility to escape liability: 
                                                        
80 Another, less recent example of causative uncertainty is the Bookout/Schwarz litigation 
around unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. In that case, the NHTSA struggled to 
establish the proximate cause of the accident and had to instruct NASA to investigate. After 
10 months, NASA failed to form a definitive view about causation.  
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the mere existence of a damage, and a causal relationship between actions taken 
by an AI system and the damage, triggers liability and then damage 
compensation (or specific performance). A good example of cases of absolute 
strict liability is the employer’s liability for acts of their employees while in the 
execution of their duties. Relative strict liability allows for a broader set of 
exceptions, often related to the foreseeability of damages at the time the product 
was placed on the market; or the fact that the alleged tortfeasor took all 
reasonable measures to avoid the damage, and that the latter resulted from 
events that were beyond the alleged tortfeasor’s sphere of control. A typical case 
of relative strict liability is the current regime for product liability, but also 
liability for damages caused by animals, things under custody or in the exercise 
of so-called “dangerous activities” (including the act of driving).  
With respect to liability vis-à-vis the end user, many legal systems have 
tried to facilitate victims of torts or breach of contract, especially when they are 
consumers, by creating a “one-stop-shop”, i.e. a single entity that is responsible 
for consumer redress. In the case of product liability, it is the producer itself that 
is strictly liable towards consumers. In the case of contractual guarantees in the 
sale of goods, the vendor is liable. In all those cases, the “one-stop-shop” allows 
the first responsible entity to sue other entities in the value chain to obtain 
redress. For example, if an accident is caused by the lidar sensor producer of a 
self-driving car, the car operator (e.g. Waymo, or Uber) would be liable towards 
damaged third parties; but they would then have the chance to seek redress from 
the lidar sensor producer to recover part or all the money paid to compensate 
for damages.  
Moreover, another issue to be discussed is the possibility that the extent 
of the liability would be mitigated by the fact that end users have misused the 
product, or in any way taken insufficient care while using an AI-enabled system. 
As suggested i.a. by Cooter and Ulen (2004), coupling strict liability with 
contributory negligence can provide optimal incentives for both parties 
involved in a dangerous activity. However, end users have to be provided with 
sufficient information and advice on how to handle a given AI product, or 
otherwise the likelihood of unintentional misuse of AI systems would increase, 
often leaving end users without coverage for damages. 
Finally, in the case of a “flash crash”, or all other cases in which damage 
is caused by the interaction between algorithms and the external environment, 
including other algorithms, it may be difficult to apportion liability among two 
or more entities. In these cases, legal systems often have no answer to the 
question “who is responsible, and for how much?” For similar problems, some 
legal systems have foreseen cases of joint and several liability, in which each of 
the parties is responsible for the entire damage caused but can then sue the other 
parties to obtain partial compensation.  
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5.2.1 Objects, animals, slaves or robots? 
The design of a liability regime for AI inevitably boils down to a fundamental 
question: Can AI be considered as an object under the control of a human being, 
or does AI feature some elements of autonomy, which would warrant a different 
set of rules? In the previous section, our discussion referred to actions of human 
beings and the potential defectiveness of objects. In this section, we broaden the 
discussion to a number of possible alternatives.  
First, if AI is considered as an extension of the human being, or a part 
thereof (as could occur in the case of augmented intelligence), then the liability 
rules applicable to humans would also apply to the AI system. Accordingly, a 
fault-based regime will most often apply: in many civil law countries, such rule 
will go back to the Roman lex aquilia, which requires a subjective element 
(negligence, or the intention to cause harm), an unjust damage being caused to 
another party, and a causal connection between the two.  
Second, if AI is considered as equivalent to an object, then the so-called res 
ipsa loquitur (also a common law doctrine) could apply: under this rule, 
negligence can be presumed if one’s property causes harm to a third party. But 
where no negligence is found on the part of the custodian, owner, or user, 
liability can be transferred to the manufacturer of the AI-enabled system. This, 
in turn, will lead to problems of apportionment of liability, as mentioned above, 
and recently reiterated by Giuffrida et al. (2018).81 The alternative approach to 
res ipsa loquitur, as discussed above, would be outright no-fault (strict) liability, 
which is construed by some scholars also as a fault-based system, configuring a 
duty to exercise care in monitoring objects under custody (culpa in vigilando).  
Third, it is reasonable to expect that AI will be used mostly “as a service”, 
especially by SMEs. In that case, it would not be a product but a service that 
causes damages. In those circumstances, an open question is whether the 
resulting responsibility for damage caused by an AI system should be of a 
contractual nature (i.e. provision of a service that does not conform to sufficient 
security requirements), which does not exonerate the purchasing party from 
                                                        
81 Giuffrida et al. (2018) also quote the Florida Statute Fla. Stat. § 316.86 (2016) exempting 
automobile manufacturers from liability when third-party AI is installed: “The original 
manufacturer of a vehicle converted by a third party into an autonomous vehicle is not liable 
in, and shall have a defense to and be dismissed from, any legal action brought against the 
original manufacturer by any person injured due to an alleged vehicle defect caused by the 
conversion of the vehicle, or by equipment installed by the converter, unless the alleged defect 
was present in the vehicle as originally manufactured.”).  
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liability towards damaged parties; or of a non-contractual nature (tort liability), 
which would then have to be extended to services.  
Fourth, an AI system could be considered as similar to an animal, 
especially when it displays a certain degree of autonomy. This option is possibly 
backed by authoritative statements in the AI field, which compare the 
intelligence of most advanced AI systems to that of a small animal, like a frog or 
a cat. This option would also imply that AI systems have no legal personhood, 
and that strict liability applies only in case of damages caused by dangerous 
animals, such as wild animals, if they were not duly kept under custody. A 
similar rule exists both in civil law countries and in the US common law 
system.82  
Fifth, AI could be considered as a “slave”. This interpretation is backed by 
the fact that the word “robot”, in its original Czech word, means “forced labour” 
or “slave”. Soluim (1992) and Hubbard (2011) discuss this option. In Roman law, 
masters were liable for damages caused by their slaves. And in the United States, 
a master was liable for every [slave’s] trespass, whether the act was done when 
in the master’s service, or not, and whether it was done with or without the 
master’s knowledge.  
Sixth, AI could be considered as an employee, and be given legal 
personhood as well as the duty to exercise due care. Strict liability would still be 
attributed to their owners, but the AI system would be given legal personhood 
and could, in principle, be asked to compensate for the damage. This perspective 
appears to be deeply related to the belief that AI systems may display, in the 
future, a significant degree of autonomy with respect to their “owners” 
(developers, trainers, programmers, vendors). Recent breakthroughs in AI, 
mostly due to the use of Deep Learning and Deep Reinforcement Learning 
techniques, are first steps towards distancing the acts of the AI system from the 
will of the programmer. At this stage, however, postulating (like the European 
Parliament did in 2016) smart autonomous robots with rights and duties seems 
to be at least premature and would also lead to a situation in which no certainty 
is given to damaged parties as to who should, and will, compensate the damage. 
The same could be said about an even more extreme scenario depicted by the 
European Parliament: a situation in which AI systems (and in particular, robots) 
are not considered as employees, but as outright legal persons, with no link to 
an “owner” or developer.  
All in all, the choice between these options should be dictated by a 
discussion of the reality of AI, rather than its associated myths; by the need to 
                                                        
82 Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus, Ltd. [1957] 2 QB 1, 11 (Eng.). The acts of wild animals give 
rise to strict liability. Others, especially domestic animals, impose tort liability only if harm is 
foreseeable. 
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ensure that victims of actions carried out or inspired by AI systems obtain 
adequate compensation; by the need to avoid stifling innovation by expanding 
liability to unchartered territories, beyond what is reasonably foreseeable at the 
time of AI development and commercialisation; and by the need to ensure that 
humans remain at the centre of both legal rules and AI development. In all these 
respects, the current EU legal framework appears largely adequate, but may 
need some clarification and interpretive guidance in order to avoid generating 
confusion and a lack of certainty among industry players.  
5.2.2 Current EU law  
The current EU rules on liability for AI systems is mostly related to two pieces 
of legislation: the Product Liability Directive and the Machinery Directive.83 The 
former Directive foresees that if a product causes damage to a person or their 
private property, the producer is liable to pay compensation. A recent evaluation 
showed that the Directive continues to strike a good balance between consumer 
protection and encouraging innovation in the EU.84 The Commission, however, 
has promised to publish interpretative guidance by mid-2019 to facilitate a 
common understanding among EU countries and to further clarify to what 
extent it applies to emerging technologies. The Commission announced that, if 
necessary, it will update certain aspects of the Directive, such as the concepts of 
‘defect’, ‘damage’, ‘product’ and ‘producer’. In this respect, key aspects will have 
to be clarified, including: i) how to interpret the foreseeability of damage; ii) how 
to construe the so-called “state-of-the-art” exception to liability; iii) whether to 
include “as a service” use of AI within the scope of the Directive; as well as to 
(iv) how to ensure that the definition of misuse of an AI product does not place 
too much risk on the side of the end users.  
On the other hand, the Machinery Directive sets general health and safety 
requirements for products, such as robots or 3D printers. This is a good example 
of outcome-based legislation, in line with the “new approach”: the choice of 
technical solutions that should be deployed to meet the high safety level is then 
left to manufacturers. Here again, whether safety levels should be related to the 
performance of the product in real life (e.g. including interaction with humans, 
                                                        
83 Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of 
the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 85/374/EEC, OJ L210, 
07/08/1985, pp. 29-33. And Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and amending Directive 95/16/EC (recast) OJ L 157, 
9.6.2006. 
84 For both evaluation reports, see https://ec.europa.eu/luxembourg/news/commission-
publishes-evaluation-reports-eu-rules-machinery-safety-and-product-liability_fr.  
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or other algorithms) or in a lab, should be subject to clarification. And possibly, 
the Machinery Directive is one of those pieces of legislation for which regulatory 
sandboxes, including virtual sandboxes, could be foreseen in order to ensure 
that the testing of new machinery takes place in a real (or accurately simulated) 
environment, for a sufficient amount of time to allow for testing.85 The European 
Commission has already committed to launch a study to further look into certain 
aspects of emerging technologies, such as issues arising from human-machine 
collaboration, which are not explicitly addressed by the Directive. 
Last, the future EU liability regime will also have to be designed in 
combination with a suitable insurance framework. Assuming that it is always 
possible to trace back a liable entity/person in an automated process, the future 
Ethics Guidelines could require that any company developing, embodying or 
selling AI in their systems checks their financial ability to respond to any 
potential liabilities that could arise from its use. In case that is not possible, users 
should be required to abandon that use or to cover those risks with an insurance 
policy or an equivalent requirement. Should the insurance system end up being 
too burdensome, especially for SMEs, a mandatory, subsidized insurance 
system could be foreseen, in order to combine the benefits of innovation with 
the certainty of compensation for end users.  
5.2.3 Avoiding overlapping regulatory requirements in heavily regulated 
sectors: Towards a “tech REFIT” strategy? 
In the previous sections, we have approached the issue of AI regulation from a 
cross-cutting perspective, looking at various approaches to regulation, as well 
as horizontal pieces of regulation such as the GDPR, the Product Liability 
Directive and the Machinery Directive. At the same time, there are many pieces 
of sectoral regulation that already impose specific behaviour on the side of 
producers and service providers, which should not be cumulated with new 
regulatory obligations, in order to avoid redundancies and overlaps, with 
consequent losses of legal certainty and productivity. 
For example, insurance companies and banks are already subject to 
several information disclosure requirements, which may easily overlap with 
future regulatory obligations of transparency, accountability and non-
discrimination in future AI policy. The Insurance Distribution Directive 
(Directive (EU) 2016/97), implemented as of 1 October 2018, is a good example 
                                                        
85 As defined by the UK Financial Conduct Authority, a virtual sandbox is “an environment 
that enables firms to test their products and services in a virtual space without entering the 
real market (for example, by testing with publicly available data sets, or with data provided 
by other firms through the virtual sandbox)”. See 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf.  
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as it requires i.a. that, prior to the conclusion of a contract, distributors specify 
the needs of customers and provide certain objective information on this basis 
to allow the customer to make an informed decision. Similarly, MiFID II created 
the need to record large amounts of data that are well-defined and structured 
for regulatory review and sharing across counterparties and trading venues, 
paving the way for a large RegTech exercise. Firms will be reporting various pre- 
and post-trading data, but also venue of execution, venue of publications, 
transaction ID code and much more. Other provisions of this sort were 
introduced in other regulated sectors, from healthcare to e-communications, 
energy and transport (see Box 3 below on automated driving). 
While a full analysis of all these overlaps would fall outside the scope of 
this report, it is important to reflect on the need for a thorough review of the 
existing legislation before introducing new obligations across the board. One 
possibility would be to work in the direction of a “tech REFIT”, i.e. an 
expansion of the ex-post evaluation methodology, aimed at introducing 
specific questions as regards the compatibility between existing legislation 
and the possible, future policies on AI transparency and accountability, as well 
as non-discrimination emerging from the Ethics Guidelines. Such a tech REFIT 
methodology would be a relatively straightforward addition to the current 
Better Regulation guidelines, as well as to the work of the REFIT platform set up 
in 2015 by the European Commission.86  
 
Box 3. The new UK law on automated and electric vehicles 
The UK has recently addressed some of the emerging issues in liability for AI 
systems in the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act, adopted in July 2018. The 2018 
Act features a ‘light touch’ approach and is expected to be updated as the technology 
and infrastructure progress. This was the first piece of legislation worldwide to set 
down a formalized legal model for the insurance and liability of automated vehicles. 
Not surprisingly, technological uncertainty weighs heavily on the quality of the 
drafting, and as such should lead EU institutions and other governments to use 
caution in referring to it as a model (Channon et al. 2019). It should also be borne in 
mind that the 2018 Act still requires further secondary legislation to bring it into 
force.87 However, it is interesting to report at least some of the basic feature of this 
law.  
                                                        
86 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-
laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-and-less-costly/refit-platform_en  
87 Meanwhile, the UK government initiated a three-year review of the law on regulating 
Automated Vehicles in 2018. To this end, the Law Commissions of England and Wales, and 
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The Act provides the possibility for insurers to limit their liability under 
section 2(1) to their policyholders and, in certain narrow circumstances, to third 
parties whenever accidents were caused by the failure of an insured person, or with 
the insured person’s knowledge, to install safety critical software updates. Likewise, 
accidents caused by software alterations prohibited under the terms of the vehicle 
insurance policy may also be excluded from the coverage. Nonetheless, insurers will 
still be strictly liable to compensate the majority of third parties injured in accidents 
to which the 2018 Act applies.88 This has significant implications, as it effectively 
gives insurers a role in policing autonomous vehicles’ software. Accordingly, over 
time, insurers will end up putting pressure on AI providers to move towards some 
level of certification, as insurers cannot be expected to maintain a rolling review of 
all autonomous vehicle software (unless some form of automated data sharing and 
monitoring is foreseen). The Act also effectively creates a statutory right of 
subrogation for insurers/owners to recover their losses in full or part from any other 
party responsible for the accident. Thereafter, it is anticipated that insurers will 
pursue the OEMs of the autonomous vehicle for recovery of their outlays under the 
existing Product Liability Regime. This may lead insurers to advance claims under 
contract and in negligence under tort law.  
Concerning complementarity between man and machine, a recent 
Government Code of Practice for testing autonomous vehicles clarified that a test 
driver and/or operator will need to be able to assume control of the vehicle at any 
time.89 The Code also envisages scenarios in which remote operation of an 
autonomous vehicle will be necessary. As such, it appears that an ‘in the loop’ 
connection will still be required in the short to medium term. Such role may even be 
played by insurers, who could provide real-time input/risk assessments into 
autonomous vehicles driving.90 Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether insurers 
will want to be exposed to this level of risk.  
                                                        
Scotland, have produced their first Preliminary Consultation Paper. Further papers will 
follow in due course. The Paper is detailed, extensive and the result of sustained engagement 
with a broad range of stakeholders. It is likely that the Consultation responses will lead to 
significant improvements to the 2018 Act. 
88 This is because the Road Traffic Act 1988 remains in force. The 1988 Act has been amended 
so that insurance policies required under s 145 must also provide for an insurer's obligations 
under s 2(1) of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018. 
89 See UK Department of Transport, Pathways to Driverless Cars: A Code of Practice for 
Testing 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/446316/pathway-driverless-cars.pdf). 
90 See https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611003/one-way-to-get-self-driving-cars-on-
the-road-faster-let-insurers-control-them/ 
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5.3 Boosting data-driven innovation through ad-hoc 
policies? 
Perhaps the area in which the EU institutions should be more proactive in the 
years to come is that of data-driven innovation. As a matter of fact, as was 
remarked in several occasions during the meetings of the CEPS Task Force, most 
often the opportunities and the challenges that are attributed to AI 
development are more easily and appropriately referred to as data and the use 
of large datasets in the emerging technology stack. The lack of data has emerged 
as a key issue for many entrepreneurs, large and small companies, willing to use 
machine-learning techniques. And while it is true that not all AI is as data-
hungry as machine learning, it is important to stress that most of the emerging, 
disruptive uses of AI in several policy fields rely on some variant of machine-
learning techniques. This is also a problem when it comes to international 
competitiveness: many experts are of the opinion that countries like China and 
the United States will be able to rely on greater data availability than Europe, 
also (but not exclusively, and probably not primarily) due to the more restrictive 
privacy laws in force in European countries.  
To be sure, data are more accessible today than in the past: but not all 
players in the market can have access to the same amount of data, and this 
may stifle the competitive dynamics in specific markets or create collective 
action problems in others. So far, however, the academic literature in either 
economics or in industrial organisation has found data to be a stand-alone entry 
barrier for companies wishing to start competing with incumbent players. And 
indeed, imposing data-sharing across the board for all players in the market 
would probably backfire, since incentives to invest in the production and 
analysis of data would be inevitably weakened by the perspective of having to 
share, most often at regulated (FRAND) prices, the whole dataset. Very often, 
proposals that aim at imposing data-sharing obligations are based on the 
assumption that data are a non-rivalrous good, i.e. its value does not change 
according to how widely it is shared. From a dynamic efficiency perspective, 
however, data are rivalrous, since the overall investment in their collection, 
production and elaboration depends on how much the involved players expect 
to profit from the activity. Following Bebchuk (2001), the choice between a 
property and a liability rule appears very different if seen from an ex-ante 
perspective.  
How can the right balance be struck between the need to promote data 
availability, and the need to maintain proper incentives with respect to large 
datasets? The CEPS Task Force has converged over the following 
recommendations: 
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- It is of the utmost importance that governments adopt open data policies, 
by making available to the public large datasets, possibly in formats that 
are interoperable with existing machine-learning software. So far, data 
held by government and data from publicly funded research are still largely 
unavailable to researchers, entrepreneurs and companies willing to engage 
in data-driven innovation. In this respect, following the presentation of the 
European Commission’s Data Package on 25 April 2018, a revision of the 
Public Sector Information Directive has been tabled.91 The PSI Directive first 
came into effect in 2003, and was amended in 2013 to clarify that i) PSI 
should be presumed to be “reusable by default,” ii) museums, archives and 
libraries were subject to the Directive’s provision, iii) acquisition fees were 
limited to marginal costs of reproduction and iv) documents were to be 
made available for reuse using open standards and machine-readable 
formats. The ongoing review could lead to further changes to improve reuse 
of public sector information, with reference to the available data, their 
accessibility through API (application programming interface) and the 
applicable economic conditions.  
- The free flow of data in the Single Market should be further promoted, in 
line with the ambition of the Regulation adopted in November 2018. At the 
same time, the possible exceptions to the free flow, for example, based on 
national security stances, should be narrowly interpreted to avoid 
disproportionate disruptions of data flows. The Regulation prohibits data 
localisation restrictions, thereby permitting organisations to store data 
anywhere in the EU. It allows competent authorities to access data – for 
scrutiny and supervisory control –regardless of where it is stored and/or 
processed in the EU. The Regulation encourages the creation of codes of 
conduct for service providers who process data (for example, cloud service 
providers) in order to facilitate switching between providers in a structured 
and transparent manner. 
- In order to reconcile data availability with the need for data protection, the 
European Commission should fund research, innovation and 
standardisation in the domain of privacy “by design”, as well as privacy-
enhancing technologies. In the case of large datasets, key technologies 
include cryptographic solutions that allow for the use of large datasets 
without infringing privacy laws, such as private practical computation, zero-
                                                        
91 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the 
Regions, "Towards a common European data space" COM/2018/232 final, 25.04.2018. 
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knowledge proofs92 or homomorphic encryption.93 These techniques are 
easily coupled with sectoral, blockchain-based initiatives aimed at sharing 
data among competitors or complementors along the same value chain. 
- Allowing text and data mining for both research and commercial purposes 
would be very important for data-driven innovation in Europe. This topic 
is of course very controversial in Europe, as demonstrated by the recent, 
heated debate on copyright reform. Data mining, however, is essential for 
the future competitiveness of the EU: if subject to ethical guidelines (so-
called “Ethical Data Mining”), it could become an engine of data-driven 
innovation in Europe.94 
- Experimentation is key to keeping Europe relevant in the AI field. 
However, the GDPR’s data minimization principle and the need to have a 
clear purpose for getting user consent can limit the ability to experiment 
with innovative approaches, even when users have given explicit consent to 
access their data. 
- At this stage it seems wise to avoid more strictly regulating access to data, 
in particular outside the rather confined remit of competition law and 
refusals to deal by dominant companies. The recent Communication 
“Towards a Common European Data Space” (EC 2018) argues that in 
general stakeholders do not favour a new data ownership type of right and 
indicate that the crucial question in business-to-business sharing is not so 
much about ownership, but about how access is organised.  
- There is a need for more clarity on the legal framework for machine-
generated data, as had been mentioned in the Commission’s 
Communication on Building a European Data Economy. Current proposals 
in the package on data of April 2018 focus on the review of the PSI Directive 
for data held by the public sector (including public undertakings) and on 
soft law for access to and preservation of scientific information. As for access 
to and re-use of private sector machine-generated data in business-to-
                                                        
92 Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) are advanced cryptographic techniques that allow someone 
to produce proof of a statement without disclosing the data underlying that statement.  
93 Advanced cryptographic methods that allow someone to request distributed computations 
to be performed by private servers. While the underlying data of these computations are 
never revealed or shared on the blockchain, it is theoretically possible to obtain a 
cryptographic proof that the aggregated result of these computations is correct. these 
techniques would be implemented outside of the blockchain network (‘off-chain’) but it could 
potentially be useful to use the blockchain to store these proofs of computation for every 
stakeholder to see. 
94 See Report of the Expert Group chaired by Ian Hargreaves 
(http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/TDM-
report_from_the_expert_group-042014.pdf).   
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business relations, the Communication “Towards a Common European 
Data Space” defines a series of key principles that should be respected in 
contractual agreements in order to ensure fair and competitive markets. 
These principles include: 
i. transparency, i.e. transparent identification of the entities that will have 
access to the data, the type of such data and at which level of detail and 
the purposes for using such data;  
ii. shared value creation, i.e. acknowledgement that where data is 
generated as a by-product of using a product or service, several parties 
have contributed to creating the data;  
iii. respect for each other’s commercial interests and secrets of data holders 
and users;  
iv. undistorted competition when exchanging commercially sensitive data;  
v. minimal data lock-in, i.e. enabling data portability as much as possible. 
Separate key principles are proposed by the Commission for data 
sharing in business-to-government relations, including among others 
proportionality in the use of private sector data and purpose limitation.  
More generally, at this stage it seems wise to avoid regulating access 
to data more strictly, in particular outside the rather confined remit of 
competition law and refusals to deal by dominant companies (Drexl 2017a 
and 2017b).  
- In specific sectors, the issue of data sharing is becoming a reality, and the 
European Commission seems increasingly determined to open some 
markets to competition by forcing incumbent firms to share their data with 
new entrants. This approach is also echoed by scholars who would want to 
see data accumulation as a case of essential facilities, as such potentially 
conducive to compulsory licensing when imposed by a dominant firm, and 
under certain conditions (Graef 2016; Renda 2010). However, in some cases 
these initiatives appear to create even bigger problems than the ones they 
are meant to solve. For example, in the case of the revision of the Payment 
Services Directive (PSD2), imposing the opening up of APIs to incumbent 
banks risks at once favouring start-ups, but also placing all financial services 
providers at a disadvantage compared to larger tech giants, who sit on top 
of large datasets they are not required to share. Similar situations may 
emerge in other sectors, such as energy.  
- One specific set of cases in which data-sharing is increasingly becoming 
an issue for policy-makers is complex, layered value chains in which 
Information Technology, and in particular AI and IoT, are becoming 
increasingly pervasive. In those cases, the choice has to be made as to who 
will own the data that will be produced by the system good. 
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Acknowledgment of the principle of ‘shared value creation’ mentioned in 
the 2018 Communication “Towards a Common European Data Space” 
represents a first step, but its legal and economic consequences are still to be 
specified. For example, in agriculture the policy solution that seems to be 
prevailing is the attribution of data ownership rights to farmers; this, given 
the expected lower bargaining power of farmers vis-à-vis players at higher 
layers of the value chain, may lead to a more balanced distribution of the 
value created by high-tech (precision) agriculture.  
- At the sectoral level, the European Commission is starting to promote data-
sharing arrangements as voluntary platforms aimed at solving collective 
action problems and achieving economies of scale for the whole industry.95 
In this case, the Commission (or another institution, e.g. a sectoral agency) 
could act as orchestrator of so-called “industrial data spaces”.96 This could 
happen in sectors such as healthcare, for example through sharing of 
anonymized data and data on clinical trials; on energy, to enable a smarter 
managing of flows on the grid; on industrial B2B platforms e.g. to optimise 
logistics and facilitate coordination between large and smaller firms.  
- Finally, and almost inevitably, there is a need for skills and competences in 
data science and IT, areas in which Europe seems to be unable to produce 
the needed talent, as well as unwilling to attract it from non-EU countries. 
This aspect will be discussed more in detail in section 5.4 below. 
5.4 Research, innovation, education and society: Towards a 
new strategy? 
As explained above, the EU strategy on AI is composed of two main pillars: the 
definition of ethical guidelines, and the promotion of European competitiveness 
in the field or Artificial Intelligence. However, the rather optimistic tone with 
which the European Commission announced in April 2018 that Europe is very 
                                                        
95 For Intelligent Transport System, EU legislation already contemplates some data sharing 
obligations, See for instance Commission Regulation 2017/1926. The EP has called on the 
Commission to publish a legislative proposal on access to in-vehicle data (EP 2018a). With the 
release of the Third Mobility Package, the Commission announces a Recommendation that 
among other things will deal with "a data governance framework that enables data sharing, 
in line with the initiatives of the 2018 Data Package, and with data protection and privacy 
legislation." 
96 See for Fraunhofer’s White Paper on Industrial Data Spaces and the corresponding reference 
architecture,  https://www.fraunhofer.de/en/research/lighthouse-projects-fraunhofer-
initiatives/industrial-data-space.html  
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well positioned to compete globally in AI is probably an overstatement. Both 
the United States and China dwarf the EU when it comes to research and 
development (R&D) investment in AI and related technologies, as well as in 
terms of uptake of AI-enabled solutions in the market. A study by McKinsey 
found that Europe’s investment in AI totalled around €2.4-3.2 billion in 2016, 
compared with €6.5-9.7 billion in Asia and €12.1-18.6 billion in North America.97 
The US and China are also ahead of the EU in terms of investment in 5G, IoT 
and High-Performance Computing (HPC), with a real race emerging on 
quantum computing and even more (especially for China), on quantum 
cryptography.  
Looking at data from the past decade, Europe seems to be extremely well 
positioned in at least one dimension, namely research publications in the field 
of AI. But this seems to be changing too, as Chinese researchers produce 
increasing amounts of new papers every year and file a remarkable number of 
new patent applications in this domain. A recent report by Elsevier confirmed 
that Europe remains the largest producer of AI-focused research, with 30% 
share of the publication output in AI. However, Europe risks suffering from an 
AI brain drain, losing many of its academic talent in this area, mostly to the 
corporate sector in the United States. The authors of the report also expect that 
China will surpass Europe within four years as the leading AI-research 
geography (Elsevier 2018). 
What then should Europe do? The CEPS Task Force converged on the 
need for Europe to avoid trying to compete with the US, Japan, Korea and 
China on all fronts. Given the size of investment required and the level of 
advancement of these other regions, particularly the US and China, Europe does 
not seem to have any chance of leading on all fronts. Rather, its strategy should 
be more targeted and selective.98 In particular:  
x Europe can try to lead, or at least compete at arm’s length, in specific 
sectors such as manufacturing, healthcare, transportation and finance. 
In those sectors, it should seek to establish standards, create industrial 
policy strategies and work on all aspects of the value chain, from 
infrastructure to data, skills, and applications/services. 
x Europe should play catch-up, for strategic reasons, in other specific 
sectors. These include cybersecurity and defence. Significant resources 
should be devoted to the creation of capacity and resilience in these 
                                                        
97 See McKinsey (2017), 10 imperatives for Europe in the age of AI and automation. 
98 At one of the meetings, John Zysman (UC Berkeley Center for Human-Compatible AI), 
discussed alternative strategies with Task Force members, such as imitating from behind, 
chasing the hype, or the so-called “Blue Ocean”. These would have important consequences 
in terms of research, innovation and industrial policy. 
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domains, as well as in R&D at the pan-European level, in view of a future 
in which sovereignty of defence technologies and data may become 
essential. 
x Europe will inevitably have to “chase the hype” in some sectors, 
mostly B2C ones, in which the US and China dominate the scene with 
very well-established tech giants. EU policy should, of course, continue 
to shape the regulatory framework to which these non-EU products will 
need to conform, if they want to keep operating in the EU: and this 
includes the rules and principles that will be introduced, or better 
explained, in the forthcoming Ethics Guidelines.  
This three-pronged strategy should be accompanied by the right choices 
in terms of overall governance, in addition to regulation; and by important 
initiatives in the fields of research and education, innovation, and investment. 
We explore all of them below.  
5.4.1 Can Europe become attractive for AI research and innovation? 
As mentioned earlier, Europe has demonstrated a remarkable leadership in the 
number of research publications in fields related to AI over the past decade. At 
the same time, the Old Continent is losing positions in global university 
rankings, and Brexit would deprive it of the most vibrant AI research and 
innovation environment among member states. Very often, European 
researchers are forced to move to the US in order to have the chance to pursue a 
top-level career in academia, and when they manage to create start-ups out of 
their research ideas, they end up selling these ideas mostly in the United States.  
The better pay offered by US and Chinese tech giants that are particularly active 
in research (Microsoft, Google, IBM, Huawei) is often too tempting for talented 
researchers to allow them to stay in their universities for long. And even more 
often, once researchers have left academia, it becomes impossible for them to go 
back to a more academic environment. Furthermore, many academic 
environments in Europe are still too confined in silos and are reluctant to 
undertake truly inter-disciplinary research: the defence of one’s own turf 
becomes stronger than the desire to combine different perspectives, and thereby 
cover all relevant aspects of AI. There is still very little coordination in research 
funding between the EU and the national level, and even if one focuses only on 
the EU level, the fragmentation of research and innovation funding is reportedly 
an obstacle to the scaling up of research efforts in Europe. And finally, most 
countries in Europe have shown little openness to talent coming from abroad. 
Researchers very often ring-fence their departments to shield them from 
unwanted competition from the outside world.  
All this would need to change before Europe can become an attractive 
place for researchers in the future, especially in cutting-edge fields such as AI. 
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In the years to come, EU institutions and member states will have to capitalise 
on existing knowledge and initiatives to create a new, flourishing environment 
for AI research in Europe. Policy and ethics can also play a role in this respect: 
as will be discussed in more detail in section 5.5 below, if Europe clearly took 
the leadership on “AI for good”, researchers with a strong motivation to 
develop AI-enabled solutions that address societal challenges would look 
more favourably at Europe, especially if they could find a suitable research 
environment, a well-shaped policy context and enticing procurement and 
innovation markets.  
In particular, besides the policies on data mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, the following actions appear to be important:  
x The issue of digital skills needs to be addressed, both for education 
and for research. This is far from easy, for at least two reasons. First, the 
type of skills that will be needed in the future is by definition uncertain, 
given the fast-changing, often unpredictable direction of innovation in 
AI and related technologies. In particular, the emphasis placed until 
recently on STEM seems to be less justified, or at least not sufficient, for 
the next decade and beyond. Similarly, coding skills may become an 
inevitable addition to school curricula, but they are also unlikely to 
prepare society for the coming developments in AI. In any event, most 
of the coding, in the future, will be done by machines. Thus, it will be so-
called “complementary, soft skills” that will matter the most: from 
humanities and social sciences to entrepreneurial skills, the 
development of our future workforce will have to focus on what makes 
humans really different from machines, and then nurture the human-
machine interface. Second, education typically falls outside EU 
competences, and largely sits with national governments, irrespective of 
any attempt to achieve coordination and convergence from Brussels. It 
is only in the so-called Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs), 
managed by the European Commission’s DG EAC (Directorate-General 
for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture) and in the European Social 
Fund, that the EU has managed to include education in large EU-level 
initiatives. It is therefore unlikely that action at the EU level, if not 
undertaken in a highly innovative way, will be able to fully promote the 
skills needed for the AI age. However, multi-level initiatives could be 
spurred through “agencification” – for example through the creation of 
a European Labour Authority, or the launch of a Mission on the Digital 
Transformation of Industry and Society, run by an agency (see below, 
section 5.4.3).  
x Universities should work on inter-disciplinary curricula, which bridge 
computer science with natural sciences and social sciences, as often done 
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by universities outside the EU (e.g. in the US, many universities are now 
offering Masters degrees in inter-disciplinary data science). This may 
also entail the recruitment of hybrid profiles, with researchers who have 
accumulated experience in the private sector or in government, and in 
more than one field of studies. Creating diverse research and innovation 
teams with complementary, inter-disciplinary skills should not be a self-
defeating choice for universities as it often is today, due to the silo 
approach that tends to favour homogeneous teams with publications in 
specific fields and in specific journals. The ability to experiment by 
mixing and matching academic backgrounds can only strengthen the 
human component of research and the value of its complementarity with 
AI and other data science tools. Similarly, competences in ethics and 
philosophy are poised to become increasingly essential in many fields of 
research, and some fundamental notions of these disciplines should be 
taught even in computer science courses.  
x Basic research should continue to be heavily funded in Europe. Europe 
is currently leading in terms of public R&D funding of research (RISE, 
2017), but severely lags behind private expenditure in R&D. The original 
goal (both in the Lisbon and in the Europe 2020 strategies) to achieve a 
combined level of R&D investment of more than 3% of GDP was never 
attained. Leading countries like Switzerland, Korea and Israel are way 
above the European average level of R&D expenditure. That said, the 
quality and direction of funding are also essential, and in the case of 
Europe the key determinant of funding choices, beyond the excellence 
of applicants, should be the extent to which research has the potential to 
tackle pressing societal challenges. The funding of basic research has 
proven to be of the utmost importance also for future development of 
commercialised products (Mazzucato 2014); and should be coupled with 
efforts to strengthen Europe’s already well-developed AI community, 
and its relationship with civil society. Moreover, EU institutions should 
develop, together with member states, attractive visa programmes for 
non-EU talent: this could be done through the European Research 
Council, in the case of basic and applied research; and through the 
European Innovation Council for promising young entrepreneurs and 
innovators. 
x Researchers should be given a clearer career path and a smarter set of 
evaluation criteria. The creation of spinoffs from university labs, as well 
as other entrepreneurial initiatives by researchers, should be encouraged 
as a sign of success, not of betrayal that distances the researcher from a 
university career. The evaluation of researchers and research teams 
should not be based only or predominantly on indicators such as the 
number of patents filed. And universities should be given significantly 
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greater funds in domains such as AI, so that they can compete with the 
private sector by offering an attractive mix of (greater) intellectual 
freedom and decent (even if slightly lower) salaries. 
x Research funding should focus on all aspects of the ecosystem, and 
explore more sustainable, human-centric, privacy-compatible ways of 
doing AI. In particular, HPC (high-performance computing) funding 
should continue and be increased, with a view to developing alternative 
forms of computing power (e.g. neuromorphic chips), and advances in 
quantum computing (in which, however, the gap with private US and 
Chinese companies appears huge). New technological paradigms such 
as Edge computing and Fog computing should be included in public-
private research and innovation actions, as they bear the potential to 
bridge cloud computing, distributed computing, blockchain and smart 
contracts, the IoT and data protection needs.99  
All these initiatives, as mentioned above, require more than an evolution: 
in terms of its regulatory framework, Europe does not seem to need a drastic 
change, but when it comes to research, innovation and investment policy the 
need for discontinuity appears more evident. In particular, there is a need to 
build bridges “horizontally”, i.e. between disciplines and through optimal 
portfolio management of various research paths; and “vertically”, between the 
EU and Member States, between layers of the new stack; and between research 
and innovation, through knowledge transfer, future-proof policy-making, and 
ultimately sustainable innovation. Taken together, all these needs call for the 
adoption of ambitious, new path-breaking initiatives. These could take various 
complementary forms: a “CERN for AI”; an “AI-rbus”, possibly dedicated to 
specific sectors such as healthcare, transportation and manufacturing; or a 
“Mission” in Horizon Europe, either generic or dedicated to the EU’s most 
strategic sectors, e.g. a Mission on Healthcare, or a mission on Dementia, with a 
very strong AI and robotics component. These alternatives, which can also be 
seen as complementary, are explored in more detail below. 
5.4.2 A “CERN for AI” 
AI-related research and innovation in Europe needs talent, scale and direction. 
This calls for the creation of a catalyst, i.e. an institution or cluster of institutions 
that leads European development in this field. Concerning research, a set of 
initiatives already exists. For example, the Confederation of Labs of Artificial 
Intelligence Research (CLAIRE) and the proposed European Lab for Learning 
                                                        
99 For a non-technical explanation and comparison of edge and fog computing, see 
https://medium.com/@thinkwik/how-edge-and-fog-computing-are-taking-over-
traditional-cloud-computing-b26b7276f1ce.  
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and Intelligent Systems (ELLIS) are attempts to create networks of academic 
excellence in AI research. Both initiatives envisage distributed governance: for 
example, CLAIRE was launched by more than 600 of Europe’s top AI 
researchers, calling for a substantial coordinated push for placing Europe at the 
top globally in AI-based research and innovation. The initiative has since then 
grown to more than 2,000, including 1,300 scientists and AI experts in academia 
and 500 experts from industry. Its structure has been defined as a “CERN for 
AI”, due to its emphasis on national research laboratories connected with a 
strong central hub providing both the overarching infrastructure and a launch 
pad for mission-driven projects.100 CLAIRE adopted a very broad focus on AI, 
rather than concentrating only on machine learning: the emphasis on the whole 
technology stack is extremely promising for Europe, and is based on the idea 
that “China and the USA are pushing two extreme and flawed models for AI”, 
too data-dependent and almost exclusively focused on machine learning. This 
creates an excellent chance for Europe to define a middle way, balancing the 
interests of individuals, society and industry.  
A number of activities in that direction have already been started: The 
“HumanE AI” proposal for an EU flagship project on AI has just progressed to 
the second phase, together with two other proposals in the AI context: robotics 
and language technology.101 At the same time, another large project called 
AI4EU (which responded to a specific Horizon 2020 call) started in January 2019, 
with the goal to build a comprehensive European AI-on-demand platform to 
lower barriers to innovation, to boost technology transfer and catalyse the 
growth of start-ups and SMEs in all sectors through open calls and other actions; 
to act as a broker, developer and one-stop shop providing and showcasing 
services, expertise, algorithms, software frameworks, development tools, 
components, modules, data, computing resources, prototyping functions and 
access to funding; to offer training to enable different user communities 
(engineers, civic leaders, etc.) to obtain skills and certifications; and to establish 
a world reference, built upon and interoperable with existing AI and data 
components and other dedicated platforms. As diagrammed in Figure 10, 
AI4EU will mobilize the whole European AI ecosystem in the 27 member 
countries, including researchers, innovators and related talents, and launching 
pilots and research, together with an Ethical Observatory. 
In section 5.4.3 below, we outline an ambitious proposal to scale up and 
align CLAIRE, HumanE and AI4EU through the establishment of a “Mission 
IT”, nested in Europe’s 2030 Agenda.
                                                        
100 Philip Slusallek, Scientific Director of the DFKI, presentation at CEPS Task Force. 
101 https://claire-ai.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CLAIRE-Vision-Document-2-2.pdf 
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5.4.3 A “Mission IT” on the digital transformation of industry 
Regardless of whether research and industrial policy coordination is achieved at 
the EU level, there will still be important gaps in terms of how to achieve 
stronger scale and coordination in education and skills, as well as in innovation 
policy. This problem is not exclusive to AI: in many fields, the EU has struggled 
to achieve efficient innovation policy coordination, as well as an effective link 
between innovation and the whole policy process. There is also a need for an 
improved framework for private investment and enhanced cooperation between 
European companies to reach the necessary scale to compete with other global 
players. This is why in the future Horizon Europe programme, the European 
Commission is considering the launch of more structured “moonshots”, or 
“moon landing” projects, in which the research, education, innovation and 
industrial policy components related to a single specific problem nested in 
societal challenges (mostly, the SDGs) are tackled through the formulation of 
specific targets and goals; and the appointment of an agency or portfolio 
manager with ample discretion on how to shape the mission. The five proposed 
missions presented in October 2018 to the Council were related to quantum 
computing, cures for childhood cancers, the elimination of plastic waste in rivers 
and seas, the creation of the first carbon-neutral cities with clean air and 
restoring soil health. 
Could AI benefit from a specific “mission” in Horizon Europe? 
Probably not, since there is no single, easily specified set of milestones or 
achievements that can be easily associated with AI development. That said, AI 
can be essential to almost any mission that may be set by the European 
Commission (e.g. fighting dementia or optimizing transportation); and AI could 
feature as an essential component of a future mission, in particular a mission on 
the digital transformation of industry and society, with a strong emphasis on 
reskilling of the workforce and the analysis of the societal implications of the 
increasingly pervasive new technological stack. Milestones could then be 
expressed more easily (e.g. “reskilling 50% of the EU workforce by 2024”, 
creating an immediate impact on European citizens in terms of visibility of the 
EU and its relevance, and added value. The proposed mission would then have 
to be broader than AI (and also broader than quantum computing), embracing 
the whole technology stack, its ethical, societal and environmental impacts, 
and the possible consequences for education and skills. We call it 
provisionally “Mission IT”. 
As part of a new trend, Mission IT would feature an embedded 
accountability dimension. Accountability refers in particular to the targets and 
milestones defined for the specific mission. Accountability, at the same time, 
requires constant feedback and evaluation, i.e. some form of performance 
measurement based on credible indicators. A system that allows for successful 
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mission-oriented policy must then be “intelligent”, in the sense that it should be 
able to learn and adapt over time, reflecting feedback on the changing conditions 
in the external context, as well as data on whether existing actions are producing 
the desired effect. Intelligence, here, thus means also that the system should be 
adaptive and flexible. In addition, an effective, adaptive and flexible system 
should also make room for experimentation. 
Based on the second Memorandum of the “ESIR group”, which provides 
advice related to the economic and social impact of research and innovation 
policy to the European Commission, missions should be asked to follow a cycle 
of road mapping, consultation, planning, experimentation, monitoring, 
evaluation, learning and feedback into the road mapping exercise.102 This should 
be a constant cycle, which spins as fast as the mission allows, and should be fed 
by as many researchers and entrepreneurs as possible. More specifically, 
missions should lead to extensive experimentation of possible solutions to the 
problem identified. This responds both to a logic of risk management (different 
solutions, with different levels of risk and reward, should be tried at the same 
time), and to a logic of more inclusive innovation policy (the whole EU 
community or researchers and innovators should potentially be involved in 
trying to find a solution to the problem). Experimentation could follow two 
tracks: i) experimenting with new technologies/business models/delivery 
modes and blending funding instruments and schemes to run experiments;103 
and ii) experimenting with policy solutions, by engaging in experimental policy-
making and inspiring legislative proposals that would remove obstacles to 
promising solutions. Policy experiments could include instruments such as 
randomized controlled trials, rapid prototyping, landscaping, ideation sprints, 
instant focus groups, scenario testing, virtual and actual sandboxes and 
randomized controlled trials are of utmost importance for the future of 
innovation-friendly policy-making, together with algorithmic approaches to 
regulation (Yeung 2017). The overall idea is to generate experience and data, 
which will later enable counterfactual evaluation of the prospective, possible 
                                                        
102 See ESIR Memorandum (2018), Implementing EU Missions, at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ki0618012enn.pdf 
103 This could happen on a “prize” basis, or on a more top-down selection of possible paths 
(e.g. technology roadmap), or both. For example, the replacement of general practitioners 
with online, constantly available bots could be subject to experimentation with a sample of 
patients, carefully selected. In terms of instruments, the expectation is that missions will be 
able to tap into various sources of funding, including research funds, EIC funds, EIB, 
InvestEU, structural and cohesion funds, national funds made available on a voluntary basis 
by member states and even non-EU countries (in the spirit of “Open to the World”), and 
private funds (partnerships). The ability to blend different forms of funding would be 
considered as essential to the skills and activity of the mission. 
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impact of the new solution. The input to policy-making could take the form of a 
“wish list” that would be submitted to DG RTD and later to the Secretary 
General for inclusion in the Commission yearly work programme.  
A key choice would then be the appointment of a very capable, 
charismatic leader for the Mission IT. Van Atta (2007) describes in this way the 
figure of a manager of a mission-oriented agency like DARPA: “The DARPA 
program manager is, in fact, the key. [S]he is the technical champion who 
conceives and owns the program. [S]he is not told what to do, though [s]he does 
have to have approval from his/her office director, and from the DARPA 
Director. Once [s]he starts that program, it is his/hers, and [s]he makes it 
happen, and [s]he has to make the choices involved in that. So, in essence, they 
are risk-taking, idea-driven entrepreneurs heading up their own practice.”104 
The key issue is to make missions attractive for world class talent, who will be 
interested to become mission leaders. Leaders should help to develop human 
resources, talents and skills. 
In terms of governance, it is still unclear whether future missions under 
Horizon Europe will be run by stand-alone agencies or bodies, or set up as 
independent entities (like JTIs or KICs). Transparency and accountability 
reasons would lead to the conclusion that this should be the case. In the case 
of a “Mission IT”, an agency or a portfolio manager would:  
x Coordinate the research dimension on all layers of the technology stack, 
including HPC, connectivity and 5G, data flows and platforms 
(including blockchain/DLTs), AI and IoT; 
x Explore alternative avenues for research, e.g. less data-hungry AI 
techniques, advanced research on natural language processing, 
alternative chips (including a European chip105), interaction between AI 
and blockchain, cryptographic solutions for privacy-preserving 
algorithms, debiasing techniques, etc.  
x Work to stimulate knowledge transfer between advanced research 
centres (including the possible distributed structure of the CERN for AI) 
and entrepreneurs and SMEs in all member states, like Knowledge and 
Innovation Communities (KICs) have done in the past years; 
                                                        
104 Van Atta, R. H., 2007. Testimony before the Hearing on “Establishing the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E),” Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on 
Science and Technology, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Please 
note that we have rendered his quote gender-neutral 
105 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-tech/european-chip-industry-seeks-more-
eu-help-to-extend-revival-idUSKBN1JN1SD 
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x Producing standards (in cooperation with ETSI), where possible 
replicating international (e.g. IEEE standards), adapted to the EU 
approach to AI; 
x Integrate an education dimension, post-graduate courses and PhDs to be 
integrated in highly vibrant, interactive research teams; 
x Monitor the evolution of technology and provide ethical advice, by 
incorporating the AI HLG and reaching out constantly with the AI 
Alliance. This could then become a way to keep the “live” sections of the 
Ethics Guidelines constantly updated.  
x Create a bridge between the EU and the member state levels of research 
and innovation funding, and policy, by creating synergies and helping 
locate research centres and teams where member states provide co-
funding and express specific strategic interests.  
Finally, and importantly, the Mission IT would be complementary to 
other missions, e.g. a mission on reducing the burden of dementia would profit 
enormously from AI developments, as well as breakthroughs in computing 
capacity, including neuromorphic chips.106 Mission IT could become 
instrumental in optimising future traffic flows, helping with big data and AI to 
predict future epidemics and pandemics outbreaks (Fiorillo et al. 2018). 
5.5 The Commission’s Coordinated Plan – a brief analysis 
The European Commission, in cooperation with EU member states, adopted a 
Coordinated Plan in December 2018, with the aim to “maximise the impact of 
investments at EU and national levels, encourage synergies and cooperation 
across the EU, exchange best practices and collectively define the way forward 
to ensure that the EU as a whole can compete globally”.107 This is a very welcome 
development, especially given the level of fragmentation that national AI 
strategies had exhibited until the launch of the Communication on AI in April 
2018. Today, Europe seems to have taken the AI opportunity seriously, and is 
taking steps to boost investment in research and innovation, to make AI a 
cornerstone of future EU growth.  
The first, resounding commitment in the Coordinated Plan is related to 
investment. The Commission plans to scale up investment to reach the target of 
€20 billion per year over the next decade; and increased investment in AI under 
Horizon 2020 to €1.5 billion in the period 2018-2020, with a view to reaching €20 
                                                        
106 See a non-technical definition of neuromorphic chips at MIT Technology Review, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526506/neuromorphic-chips/ 
107 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/coordinated-plan-artificial-
intelligence.  
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billion for the period 2018-2020 if member states and the private sector make 
similar efforts. The Commission also proposed to invest in AI at least €1 billion 
per year from Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe programmes in the next 
MFF.  
Importantly, without referring to “missions” as this report does, the 
Coordinated Plan mentions the need for a new research and innovation 
partnership on AI, fostering collaboration between academia and industry. The 
Commission also announced that it will bring companies and research 
organisations together to develop such a common strategic research agenda. The 
agenda will build on existing partnerships in robotics and big data, representing 
an investment of €4.4 billion, of which the majority comes from the industry. 
This proposal is coupled with announced tighter networks of European AI 
research excellence centres (which echoes the so-called “CERN for AI” described 
above); support for large-scale pilots and experiments in areas such as smart 
farming, smart cities and connected and autonomous vehicles as part of the 
implementation of the Digitising European Industry strategy; and the 
development of several large-scale reference test sites, using up to €1.5 billion 
from the AI strand of the Digital Europe programme. 
Other announced initiatives include the creation of “common European 
data spaces” in areas such as manufacturing or energy, which are expected to 
become a “major asset for European innovators and businesses”. These data 
spaces are defined as instruments that aggregate data both for public sector and 
for B2B across Europe and make them available to “train AI on a scale that will 
enable the development of new products and services”.108 This will require the 
rapid development and adoption of European rules such as interoperability 
requirements and standards, and the contribution of high-value data sets by 
member states and the Commission (e.g. earth observation data and information 
from the Copernicus programme). In 2020 the Commission will support via 
Horizon 2020 the development of a common database of health images, which 
will be anonymized and will be dedicated to the most common forms of cancer, 
using AI to improve diagnosis and treatment. Other initiatives include joint 
procurement of AI solutions; and initiatives on computing capacity, based in 
particular on the European High-Performance Computing Initiative (EuroHPC), 
the partnership with member states and industry on microelectronic 
components and systems (ECSEL) as well as the European Processor Initiative. 
The CEPS Task Force welcomes the Coordinated Plan and its high level of 
ambition. The suggestions and recommendations included in this report, both 
on the draft ethical guidelines and on the policy and investment side, are aimed 
at contributing to good governance and more granularity in the implementation 
                                                        
108 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-6690_en.htm.  
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of these action items. This includes the “mission IT” idea, which may lead to 
more effective coordination in drawing links between the High-Performance 
Computing side, the AI-related initiatives (both research and ethics) and other 
elements of the ecosystem, including IoT, data spaces, 5G connectivity, etc. It 
would also facilitate the bridging of education, research, innovation and policy 
under the same broad umbrella initiative, with key milestones and targets, 
effective stakeholder involvement and inclusive efforts to create a European IT 
ecosystem.  
The only big element that really seems to be missing in the puzzle of 
actions portrayed by the Coordinated Plan is the link between AI and the 
SDGs. This is regrettable, since – as has  been argued in various sections of this 
report – such a link could become the most distinguishing feature of the EU’s 
approach to AI and would establish Europe in a prominent position on AI policy 
at the global level, including vis-à-vis those countries with which the EU has 
consolidated trade agreements, or is about to engage in deeper trade 
negotiations. The next section comments on Europe as a possible leader in this 
field.  
5.6 Can Europe be the champion of “AI for Good”? 
The previous sections have described possible initiatives that bear the potential 
to realise Europe’s ambition to lead, or at least compete, in certain aspects of 
trustworthy AI, and fully capitalize on its current research excellence in specific 
AI fields. But the domain in which Europe could really fill a gap, and try to 
lead the rest of the world, is the alignment between AI (and all IT) with 
economic, social and environmental goals, such as the SDGs. As Europe has 
already committed in 2016 to mainstreaming SDGs into every aspect of EU 
policy (as observed above), the time is ripe to practice what EU leaders have 
preached and launch a substantial effort in the mapping of how all digital 
technologies can help Europe and the world achieve the ambitious 2030 goals.109 
This effort would also deeply resonate with the EU’s external action: the Global 
Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union sets out the 
strategic direction for the EU's external action and identifies clear links to the 
2030 Agenda. It emphasises the importance of a comprehensive approach in the 
EU’s external actions and the need for an integrated EU approach to increase the 
EU’s impact in responding to and preventing violent conflicts and crises as well 
as of improving coherence between the EU and its member states. The new 
                                                        
109 See the European Commission Reflection Paper, Toward a Sustainable Europe by 2030, at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/factsheets_sustainable_europe_012019_v3.pdf.  
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European Consensus on Development put forward a shared vision and 
framework for action for all EU Institutions and all member states, framed 
around the five key themes of the 2030 Agenda: people, planet, prosperity, peace 
and partnership. It places particular emphasis on cross-cutting drivers of 
development, such as gender equality, youth, sustainable energy and climate 
action, investment, migration and mobility, and seeks to mobilise all means of 
implementation: aid, investments and domestic resources, supported by sound 
policies. 
Despite this bold commitment, as mentioned in section 4 above, there has 
been no real mainstreaming of the SDGs so far (with the exception of a timid 
attempt in the discussion on the MFF); and what is more important for the 
purpose of this report, there has been no real mapping of what digital 
technology can do for SDGs, and in particular of what AI can do to achieve what 
we termed “level 3-compliant” AI. The link between AI and the SDGs features, 
although not prominently, in the JRC Flagship report on AI, but other than this, 
no other EU document has attempted to approach AI as a means to 2030 ends, 
rather than as an end in and of itself. At the global level, the “AI for good” 
initiative remains rather isolated, and a gap exists, which a strong effort at the 
EU level could fill. This would be potentially beneficial, in terms of 
competitiveness, sustainability and also as a new narrative for the EU. 
The ideal governance arrangement for making Europe a champion of “AI 
for good” and “AI for the SDGs” is the one outlined in the previous section, for 
the following reasons. First, future missions will be explicitly nested in the SDGs, 
as mentioned in the two ESIR memoranda, in the Mazzucato report, and 
throughout the Horizon Europe proposal.110 Second, the need to achieve multi-
level coordination and a coordinated, inclusive approach to research, education, 
innovation and industrial policy finds a good compromise in the creation of an 
entity external to the European Commission, able to guarantee a fast rotation of 
guest researchers from all over Europe and beyond. Academic literature (Fuchs 
2010; Sen 2017; Azoulay et al. 2018) has found, based on analyses of mission-
oriented agencies such as ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) in the 
US, that it is possible to organize research and innovation efficiently around 
technology-related missions on the basis of a set of overarching goals. Moreover, 
a mission-oriented approach can be optimal for technological areas where 
technology exists but is relatively unexplored and has great potential for 
                                                        
110 See the Mazzucato Report, Mission-Oriented Research & Innovation in the European 
Union, at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/mazzucato_report_2018.pdf; and the 
Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, 
laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, COM/2018/435 final.  
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improvement. Finally, a mission-oriented approach can help solve friction in 
markets for ideas and technologies in sectors where the path from idea to impact 
is extraordinarily difficult (such as in energy because of numerous obstacles 
such as the large amount of capital required for demonstration and scale-up, 
strong infrastructure inertia, etc.). 
Failure to recognise and publicly promote the role of AI and its related 
technologies for a more sustainable future society would represent an 
enormous missed opportunity for Europe. Of course, AI should not be the only 
means to achieving the SDGs: there should be ad-hoc social and environmental 
policies that cater to the needs of society. That said, until now the debate has 
mostly focused on avoiding potential harm, rather than proactively promoting 
AI’s contribution to a more prosperous society. A perfect example of this 
mismatch is the absence of SDGs in the Draft Ethics Guidelines, as well as in the 
Coordinated Plan adopted in December 2018 by the European Commission. 
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PART III.  
THE WAY FORWARD 
This final part of the report draws on the analysis and findings of the previous 
sections and presents the main recommendations of the CEPS Task Force on AI 
for the future EU Strategy. These are intended as constructive input into the 
ongoing process taking place now between January and March 2019, with the 
aims of refining the EU Draft Ethics Guidelines on Artificial Intelligence and of 
defining the main policy and investment recommendations for the future AI 
strategy before mid-2019. This final contribution is divided into two parts: 
section 6.1 outlines our main general recommendations on the EU Draft Ethics 
Guidelines, and section 6.2 contains our recommendations for future EU policy 
and investment priorities in this field.  
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6. MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.1 Recommendations on the Draft Ethics Guidelines 
The main assumption behind the current EU strategy on AI is that “Europe can 
lead”, which in turn requires three separate, but complementary commitments: 
i) to increase investment up to a level that matches Europe’s economic weight; 
ii) to leave no one behind, in particular when it comes to education and ensuring 
a smooth transition towards the AI age on the workplace; and iii) to base new 
technologies on “values”. In December 2018, Draft Ethics Guidelines produced 
by the High-Level Expert Group on AI were published. We present below the 
main recommendations of the CEPS Task Force on the future guidelines. Such 
recommendations apply under the assumption that the Ethics Guidelines will 
remain a non-binding document. 
1. It is important that the European Commission, backed by the High Level 
Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, does not limit itself to adopting 
simply another list of principles. Instead, it should strive to develop a list 
that truly represents the EU’s approach to AI and offers concrete guidance 
to stakeholders. This guidance should identify which applications or 
business models are potentially problematic and which ones should be 
altogether prohibited as they are incompatible with EU core values and 
legislation. Our report has explored several fundamental questions: What 
are the concrete implications of the forthcoming Guidelines for AI 
development, both overall and for different use cases? How could 
developers ensure that they are adhering to the Guidelines? Will they be 
translated into enforceable policies and if so, who will enforce those policies 
and how? 
2. The future EU Ethics Guidelines on AI should be essentially addressed 
to the “supply side”, including AI developers, vendors, and distributors; 
and also to organisations using or deploying AI; and to public 
administrations, which should decide whether, and how, to use AI in their 
daily activities, and how to procure AI products in a way that is aligned 
with EU values and existing legislation. The Guidelines should not 
contain separate sections for different types of actors. Rather, the 
Guidelines should include a definition of values and principles that 
developers, vendors, distributors of AI, as well as organisations using or 
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deploying AI can adopt as reference when placing AI systems on the market 
(whether B2B or B2C) or using AI systems in-house to improve their 
operations.  
3. This, of course, does not mean that initiatives should not be taken on the 
“demand side”. Those on the receiving end should be able to discern when 
the AI system that is being used does not comply with fundamental 
principles, and those cases in which this would allow them to seek redress 
since the system in use violated their rights as protected by the EU legal 
system (irrespective of whether an ad-hoc system is in place for users to 
seek redress).  
4. The forthcoming EU Ethics Guidelines should include four main 
sections, spelling out the following: i) EU values and principles of 
responsible, accountable and sustainable AI; ii) AI applications and use 
cases that appear to be problematic from the standpoint of the application 
of the identified principles, as well as use cases in which there is no specific 
ethical problem raised by the AI system (but of course the system has to be 
compliant with EU legislation anyway); iii) guidance on possible measures 
that could be adopted by AI developers, vendors, distributors and 
organisations deploying AI to check that their AI-enabled applications and 
systems are aligned with the ethical guidelines; and iv) users’ rights and 
possible enforcement measures and channels for redress in case of 
infringement of those principles outlined in the guidelines that are 
mandatory based on EU law.  
5. The Ethics Guidelines should be available as an online, living document, 
in order to reflect developments in AI applications and technologies, the 
development of best practices and the identification of potential issues. This 
will also require constant support for this activity, which could be provided 
by the Commission, by the High-Level Expert Group or by future 
institutions or agencies such as the one involved in the “Mission IT” 
proposed in this report (see Recommendation no. 43 below); or the “Ethics 
hub” currently being discussed by the EU High Level Expert Group on AI. 
6. In the Ethics Guidelines, the European Commission should identify core 
values and principles at three different levels: 
o Level 1: Fundamental principles (Lawful AI). One first definition of 
those principles is that, being rooted in the EU core values, they are in 
any event mandatory for AI developers, vendors, distributors and 
organisations deploying AI. As a preliminary list, these principles 
should include: the “non-maleficence principle” (“do no harm”); 
protection of human integrity, security and privacy; principle of 
respecting human dignity, including the right not to be discriminated 
against; and protection of agency, freedom and the democratic process.  
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o Level 2: Good practices in AI development (Responsible AI). This set 
would include some of the principles that have been agreed upon by 
AI developers in documents such as the Asilomar principles. As a 
preliminary list, level 2 should include the following principles: 
principle of complementarity with humans (“human-centric AI”); 
responsible and agile governance; monitoring, control and feedback 
practices; principle of AI transparency and explainability.  
o Level 3: Principles of sustainable AI (Sustainable AI). This set of 
principles marks the difference between AI that is allowed to circulate 
and be implemented in the EU space, and AI that is fully aligned with 
EU medium-term policy goals (2030 Agenda). They include, as a 
preliminary list, the following: the “do good” or benevolence principle; 
AI that features limited or zero carbon footprint (SDGs 7 and 13); AI 
that promotes inclusive growth, full and productive employment, and 
decent work for all (SDG 8); AI that promotes quality education (SDG 
4); AI that fosters women empowerment (SDG 5); and AI that 
contributes to industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG 9). In some 
circumstances, the EU may require adherence to this most ambitious 
set of principles: this could be the case, for example, of AI used by 
public administrations; or publicly procured AI.  
7. The second part of the Ethics Guidelines could include a list of use cases 
that are considered to be representative, borderline, or problematic by the 
EU High-Level Expert Group. Such use cases could be divided into two 
sections: i) prohibited use cases, such as Lethal Autonomous Weapons or 
the full delegation of certain “life or death” decisions to algorithms; and ii) 
“problematic” or “borderline” use cases, to be collected i.a. through the AI 
alliance, including predictive policing, social credit scoring, non-targeted 
use of facial and body recognition, etc. This second group could then 
become a candidate for future pilot tests, or regulatory sandboxes.  
8. The third section of the Ethics Guidelines could point at possible 
arrangements that would significantly mitigate the risks posed by a 
specific use of AI. There is reason to believe that the first strongholds 
against bias creeping in corporate algorithms come with embedding good 
practice into companies’ daily risk management activities. Guidance could 
also be offered to developers, vendors and SMEs as to when techniques 
such as unsupervised deep learning and reinforcement learning are 
appropriate, and what consequences occur in terms of explainability of AI. 
Finally, guidance could also be offered with respect to making algorithms 
GDPR-proof by using specific cryptographic techniques.  
9. The fourth and last section of the Ethics Guidelines could include 
guidance for the end users, integrated with existing and new tools to 
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educate them about their rights and what to expect when dealing with AI-
enabled systems. This section, too, could be usefully fed by the 
contributions from end users and other stakeholders (e.g. SMEs, 
developers) through the AI Alliance.  
10. Based on the work of the CEPS Task Force, it is argued that the current list 
of core values and principles in the Draft Ethics Guidelines lacks 
hierarchy between principles and values that should always be adhered 
to as they reflect constitutional values and principles of the EU; and those 
that correspond to good practices in AI development, or are aligned with 
EU medium-term policy goals. This differentiation would add 
considerable value to the Guidelines, which otherwise would end up re-
proposing the same structure of the rather general list of principles listed 
by the EGE group, and also by many other governmental and non-
governmental documents over the past years. It would also, at least partly, 
remedy the fact that the current assessment list appears too long and is in 
strong need of a reformulation. 
11. The principle of non-maleficence is currently defined in the Draft Ethics 
Guidelines in a way that is hardly actionable for policy-makers. More 
clarity would be needed for all those borderline cases in which an AI system 
ends up in a “life or death” or even more in a “death or death” type of 
dilemma (as in the trolley problem). The same principle (“do no harm”) – 
although it is environmentally-friendly, it approaches sustainability only 
from an environmental dimension, with no reference to social and economic 
aspects. Moreover, the inclusion of environmental sustainability under the 
non-maleficence principle does not necessarily imply that these principles 
will be fully enforced in practice.  
12. The Draft Ethics Guidelines contain provisions that are difficult to 
translate into concrete policy. If the principles (for example, those on 
human agency and self-determination) as they stand are effectively 
enforced, this would lead to massive over-regulation. Conversely, if they 
are not made enforceable, they might remain pure “wishful thinking” just 
as many other declarations of principles and values. The CEPS Task Force 
proposes to establish a hierarchy of principles that allow EU institutions to 
tailor their policy approach in a proportionate way, based on the specific 
use case, as well as on the organization or institution deploying AI systems.  
13. The idea that all AI systems should be gauged against fairness standards 
should be accompanied by extensive explanations on key aspects of AI 
development and commercialization, such as what is acceptable bias and 
when does bias become unacceptable; what is a fair outcome taking into 
account the context and use case; and which corporate practices are deemed 
to appropriately tackle the problem of bias.  
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14. Accountability mechanisms are briefly presented, mostly in the form of 
legal liability. They should be expanded to cover all forms of accountability 
throughout the process of AI development. Also, the legal liability part, 
which is more developed, could be significantly improved. For example, the 
treatment of compensation of moral damages is absent, and is briefly 
replaced by a statement according to which “in a case of discrimination, 
however, an explanation and apology might be at least as important”. Even 
more importantly, the availability of redress for individuals should be 
addressed more in detail and be linked to the principles of accountability 
and explainability.  
15. The Ethics Guidelines should not require AI to always be designed for 
all. This provision appears to be disproportionate at best, and likely to 
impose unnecessary costs to all developers of professional AI systems, or 
even hamper AI design aimed at augmenting humans in specific 
professions. That said, there may be specific cases in which design for all 
could be required, as in the case of public services.  
16. The Draft Ethics Guidelines, while correctly mentioning both intentional 
and unintentional discrimination, do not explain what constitutes 
acceptable discrimination, and what forms of discrimination are 
unacceptable. Clarifying those aspects is exactly what the Draft Ethics 
Guidelines should do to increase the level of certainty and trust in the way 
AI interacts with society and the economy. 
17. The future Ethics Guidelines should clarify in detail when 
personalisation services through, e.g. recommender systems, search 
engines, navigation systems, virtual coaches and personal assistants are to 
be considered disproportionate or excessively harmful to human 
autonomy: currently, the exact definition of user well-being and the cases 
in which the system excessively nudges the user are not clear. 
18. The Draft Ethics Guidelines seem to imply that robust, trustworthy AI 
provides for the replicability of results, since “lack of reproducibility can 
lead to unintended discrimination in AI decisions”. However, it is not clear 
how far-reaching is this requirement; and to what extent it is being linked 
(as should be the case) with explainability. The same applies to the 
references to “accuracy” and to the need for a “fall-back plan”: more detail 
will be needed in order to make these principles actionable. Given that 
trade-offs may emerge between, e.g. explainability and effectiveness of AI, 
guidance on how to strike the right balance in given use cases would be 
essential.  
19. The finalisation phase of the Ethics Guidelines should feature an in-
depth discussion on how to deepen guidance and discussion on the “ten 
requirements” of trustworthy AI proposed by the HLEG, as well as on 
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what happens if the requirements are not met. The current list of 
requirements appears difficult to implement, and the ten requirements 
appear to overlap in many respects. Once the Guidelines are finalised, there 
should be a mechanism for stakeholders to test them and eventually decide 
whether to adhere to them. The Guidelines could also usefully translate into 
a standardisation process at the EU level, as well as into a code of practice.  
20. The structure proposed for the Guidelines by the CEPS Task Force (see 
Recommendation no 5 above) offers advantages compared to the current 
draft. These are mostly related to features such as scalability, flexibility, and 
modularity; to legal certainty; and also to the greater level of detail, easier 
translation into endorsement or enforcement mechanisms, and a strong link 
with sustainability. With a clear distinction between legal, responsible and 
sustainable AI principles, the High-Level Expert Group could also suggest 
a more tailor-made policy for specific use cases. For example, sustainable 
AI (which also incorporates, in our scheme, “Lawful AI” and “Responsible 
AI”) could be mandated only for AI implemented or procured by public 
administrations; or in specific sectors such as healthcare services; whereas 
for most other uses, “legal AI” would suffice. Clarifying which level of care 
is expected for different use cases would also improve clarity in shaping the 
legal framework for liability.  
21. While the “AI as the new GDPR” vision is interesting, it is not necessarily 
compelling. After all, it is too early to conclude that the GDPR has become 
a global standard, and it is also too early to reach conclusions on the impact 
of GDPR on Europe’s competitiveness in the digital sphere. A proportionate 
approach is needed, aimed at steering AI towards the common good when 
needed, but also taking care not to overburden innovators and 
entrepreneurs with procedural requirements and compliance costs. 
Already providing guidance to AI developers, vendors and distributors on 
how to ensure that AI is compatible with the GDPR would be a major step 
forward. In this respect, rather than AI as the new GDPR, it would be 
important that AI and GDPR go hand in hand in Europe. 
22. The CEPS Task Force did not find sufficient grounds to suggest the 
adoption of public certification, or even mandatory standards on AI in 
Europe. The main reasons are that a number of organisations, including 
IEEE and ISO, are developing their own standards; organisations or 
academic associations have developed principles (e.g. Partnership on AI, 
the Asilomar principles); and the market seems to be generating self-
certification frameworks and packages, with companies that are developing 
step-by-step guidance and solutions for firms that adopt AI-enabled 
systems as well adopting their own principles for how they develop and 
use AI. Moreover, one could expect the forthcoming EU Ethics Guidelines 
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to represent an additional benchmark for corporations and intermediaries, 
who could then signal to their customers the alignment of their product 
with most or all of the principles included therein. Finally, it is still too early 
to anticipate with reasonable certainty how the AI market will develop over 
time, and in various domains and sectors: one possibility is that IT firms 
and consultancies will end up supplying most of the AI solutions in the 
form of pre-trained algorithms, for use by SMEs, which would lift the 
burden of value alignment of AI systems for SMEs.  
23. So-called “monitored self-regulation” is the preferred option for the 
CEPS Task Force, when it comes to the promotion of the Ethics Guidelines. 
The European Commission should first evaluate the situation of the services 
offered today to EU citizens, and its likely evolution over time. Only if it 
emerges that those services are unlikely to comply with the Guidelines 
should the Commission consider additional policy actions. This does not 
mean, however, that the EU should not take any policy measures, for 
example, to clarify the issue of liability for damages caused by AI systems 
or to encourage data-sharing in specific sectors.  
24. The preferred solution at this stage is to require different levels of ethical 
alignment, depending on the use case: “level 3” alignment or 
“Sustainable AI” should be required only in very specific contexts, such 
as the AI-on-demand platform, public procurement of AI solutions for 
public administrations and the delivery of public services; and the use of 
AI solutions in research, innovation and investment policy. This very 
ambitious set of ethical standards could also be required in specific sectors, 
such as healthcare, subject to a careful impact assessment. The European 
Commission should also promote the Ethics Guidelines by mobilizing the 
AI alliance, coordinating with member states and raising the awareness of 
the end users through examples and use cases that explain the importance 
of ethically aligned AI. The Commission should also monitor the market to 
ascertain whether the Guidelines are having the expected impact, and if it 
determines that the measures are insufficient to steer the market towards 
accountable and sustainable uses of AI, it should then consider alternative 
measures such as co-regulation.  
25. The Commission should foresee adequate room for experimentation, in 
the form of “regulatory sandboxes” or randomized controlled trials, to 
ensure that AI-enabled solutions that potentially pose ethical concerns 
prove their value in terms of user protection before being admitted to the 
market. These measures, however, are not directly related to the Guidelines 
and accordingly are dealt with in the next section of this report. 
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6.2 Recommendations for future EU policy and investment 
priorities 
The second deliverable of the EU High Level Expert Group on AI will be 
dedicated to the formulation of recommendations for future EU policy and 
investment priorities. This final section briefly looks at policy changes that will 
be needed in order to promote and implement the EU’s approach to AI, starting 
from general considerations about the EU’s Better Regulation agenda and then 
digging more deeply into the issue of reforming legislation and reflecting on 
governance issues.  
26. The CEPS Task Force did not find strong evidence that would favour a 
massive revision of existing horizontal regulations in fields such as 
product liability and machinery. Accordingly, there seems to be a need for 
an evolution, rather than a revolution. However, it must be recognised that 
technology is also bringing important changes in the way governments 
approach regulation, and this will affect the way in which AI policy is likely 
to evolve over time.  
27. The EU’s Better Regulation tools should be adjusted to reflect the 
specificities of AI. This applies at all levels of the EU policy cycle. In 
particular:  
o The problem definition phase should be increasingly based on 
foresight and risk analysis.  
o The Commission should remain open to a new form of “innovation 
deals”, in which AI developers challenge existing regulation by 
showing that they can achieve significant benefits and high levels of 
user protection with alternative business models than the ones on 
which the original regulation was based. 
o An experimental phase should be foreseen, in which new co-
regulatory solutions and/or new business models are tested in a 
secure space such as a sandbox, before they are admitted to the 
market.  
o The Commission should analyse possible changes in the AI-related 
policy framework avoiding exclusive reliance on cost-benefit analysis 
and relying more on multi-criteria analysis: regulatory options 
should lead to a high level of protection of basic and fundamental 
rights, as well as additional policy objectives such as user 
empowerment and 2030 Agenda sustainability goals.  
o It is very important that the Commission respects the so-called 
“Treaty-based principle of proportionality”, which dictates that any 
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proposed means of intervention be proportionate to the stated goals, 
and thus avoids being overly prescriptive or invasive.  
o Risk analysis should become way more deeply embedded in the 
regulatory practice of the European Commission, or of a dedicated 
new agency. 
o Policy frameworks should be adaptive and feature a strategy for data 
collection in order to enable monitoring and possible changes over 
time. In the case of co-regulatory or monitored self-regulatory 
schemes (including RegTech or SupTech), the private sector should 
cooperate with EU institutions in order to enable seamless 
monitoring of existing policy solutions.  
28. The liability regime for AI products and services should not be based on 
fault, but rather on relative strict liability, in particular for B2C use cases. 
However, the Commission should clarify under what circumstances 
tortfeasors will be exempted from liability; when liability exposure will be 
mitigated by contributory negligence; whether there should be single 
entities (e.g. AI vendors, or producers, or vendors of AI-enabled system 
goods such as self-driving cars) responsible for compensating end users; and 
also what happens in case of damage caused by the interaction between AI 
systems (so-called “flash crashes”). 
29. The design of a liability regime for AI inevitably boils down to a 
fundamental question: Should AI be treated, from a legal perspective, as 
an extension of the human being, or as a part thereof; as equivalent to a 
product or a service; as equivalent to an animal; equivalent to a slave; or 
tantamount to an employee, with legal personhood? The current EU legal 
framework appears largely adequate, but it may need some clarification and 
interpretive guidance in order to avoid causing confusion and uncertainty 
among industry players.  
30. The future EU liability regime will also have to be designed in 
combination with a suitable insurance framework. The future Ethics 
Guidelines could advise any company developing, embodying or selling AI 
in their systems to verify their financial ability to respond to potential 
liabilities that could arise from its use. If that is not possible, users should be 
required to abandon that use or to cover those risks with an insurance or an 
equivalent requirement. And if the insurance system ends up being too 
burdensome, especially for SMEs, a mandatory, subsidized insurance 
system should be foreseen, in order to combine the benefits of innovation 
with the certainty of compensation for end users.  
31. The Commission should avoid introducing new regulatory requirements 
that are additional and inconsistent with existing sectoral rules on 
transparency, accountability and non-discrimination in regulated sectors 
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such as banking, insurance, healthcare, etc. One possibility would be to work 
in the direction of a “tech REFIT”, i.e. an expansion of the ex-post evaluation 
methodology, aimed at introducing specific questions regarding the 
compatibility between existing legislation and the present and likely future 
developments of AI. Such tech REFIT could be added to the current better 
regulation guidelines, as well as to the work of the REFIT platform.  
32. It is of the utmost importance that governments adopt open data policies, 
by making large datasets available to the public, possibly in formats that 
are interoperable with existing machine-learning software. So far, data 
held by government and data from publicly funded research are still largely 
unavailable for researchers, entrepreneurs and companies willing to engage 
in data-driven innovation.  
33. The free flow of data in the Single Market should be further promoted, in 
line with the ambition of the Regulation adopted in November 2018. At the 
same time, the possible exceptions to the free flow, for example based on 
national security stances, should be narrowly interpreted to avoid 
disproportionate disruptions of data flows.  
34. In order to reconcile data availability with the need for data protection, the 
European Commission should fund research, innovation and 
standardisation in the domain of privacy “by design”, as well as privacy-
enhancing technologies. In the case of large datasets, key technologies 
include cryptographic solutions that allow for the use of large datasets 
without infringing privacy laws, such as private practical computation, zero-
knowledge proofs, homomorphic encryption. 
35. Allowing text and data mining for both research and commercial purposes 
would be very important for data-driven innovation in Europe. Data 
mining is essential for the future competitiveness of the EU: if subject to 
ethical guidelines (so-called “Ethical Data Mining”), it could become an 
engine of data-driven innovation in Europe. 
36. Experimentation is key to keeping Europe relevant in the AI field. 
However, the GDPR’s data minimization principle and the need to have a 
clear purpose for obtaining user consent can limit the ability to experiment 
with innovative approaches, even when users have given explicit consent to 
access their data. 
37. At this stage it seems wise to avoid more strictly regulating access to data, 
in particular outside the rather confined remit of competition law and 
refusals to deal by dominant companies. The recent Communication 
Towards a common European data space (EC 2018) argues that in general 
stakeholders do not favour a new data ownership type of right and indicate 
that the crucial question in B2B sharing is not so much about ownership, but 
about how access is organised. In any event, there seems to be a need for 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: ETHICS, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY CHALLENGES | 123 
more clarity on the legal framework for machine-generated data: the third 
Data Package adopted by the European Commission in April 2018 focuses 
on the review of the Public Service Information (PSI) Directive for data held 
by the public sector and on soft law for access to and preservation of 
scientific information; as to access and re-use of private sector machine-
generated data in B2B relations, the Commission has defined a series of key 
principles that should be respected in contractual agreements in order to 
ensure fair and competitive markets, and separate key principles for data 
sharing in business-government relations.  
38. The issue of data sharing is becoming a reality, especially in complex, 
layered value chains in which Information Technology (IT), and in 
particular AI and IoT, are becoming increasingly pervasive. At the sectoral 
level, the European Commission is starting to promote data-sharing 
arrangements as voluntary platforms aimed at solving collective action 
problems and achieving economies of scale for the whole industry. In this 
case, the Commission (or another institution, e.g. a sectoral agency; or an ad 
hoc body along the lines of the UK Open Data Institute) could act as 
orchestrator of so-called “industrial data spaces”.  
39. Europe should avoid trying to compete with US, Japan, Korea and China 
on all fronts. Rather, the strategy should be more targeted and selective. In 
particular:  
o Europe can try to lead, or at least compete at arm’s length, in specific 
sectors such as manufacturing, healthcare, transportation and 
finance. In those areas, it should seek to establish standards, create 
industrial policy strategies, and work on all aspects of the value chain, 
from infrastructure to data, skills, and applications/services. 
o Europe should play catch-up, for strategic reasons, in other specific 
sectors, including cybersecurity and defence.  
o Europe will inevitably have to “chase the hype” in some sectors, 
mostly B2C ones, in which US and China dominate the scene with 
very well-established tech giants.  
40. Europe features a remarkable leadership on AI research, but is losing 
ground in global university rankings, and the prospect of Brexit will deprive 
it of the most vibrant AI research and innovation environment among 
member states. EU institutions and member states must capitalise on 
existing knowledge and initiatives to create a new, flourishing environment 
for AI research in Europe. If Europe clearly took the leadership on “AI for 
good”, researchers with a strong motivation to develop AI-enabled 
solutions that address societal challenges may look with more favour at 
Europe, especially if they could find a suitable research environment, a well-
shaped policy context, and enticing procurement and innovation markets.  
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41. The issue of digital skills needs to be addressed, starting with 
fundamental digital literacy skills, both in education and for research. At 
a basic level, digital literacy needs to be taught in schools to enable full 
participation in a digital society and to achieve the objectives of accessibility 
for all, agency and human autonomy outlined in the Ethics Guidelines. Inter-
disciplinary curricula should be developed for all levels of education, 
bridging computer science with natural sciences and social sciences to equip 
people with the skills required in an AI-enabled workforce. Basic and 
applied research should continue to be heavily supported with public funds, 
coupled with efforts to strengthen Europe’s already well-developed AI 
community, and its relationship with civil society. Funding should focus on 
all aspects of the ecosystem, and explore more sustainable, human-centric, 
privacy-compatible ways of developing AI. This applies in particular to 
HPC funding, which should continue and advance on quantum computing, 
Edge computing and Fog computing; and also to blockchain and smart 
contracts, as well as the IoT.  
42. Researchers should be given a clearer career path and a smarter set of 
evaluation criteria. The creation of spin-offs from university labs, as well as 
other entrepreneurial initiatives by researchers, should be encouraged as a 
sign of success. The evaluation of researchers and research teams should not 
be based only or predominantly on indicators such as the number of patents 
filed. And universities should be given significantly greater funds in 
domains such as AI, so that they can compete with the private sector by 
offering an attractive mix of (greater) intellectual freedom and decent (even 
if slightly lower) salaries. As an additional element, EU institutions should 
develop, together with member states, attractive visa programmes for non-
EU talent.  
43. A “Mission IT”: the CEPS Task Force calls for the creation of a catalyst, i.e. 
an institution or cluster of institutions that leads the European development 
in this field. A number of activities in that direction have already been 
started, including CLAIRE, ELLIS, the “HumanE AI” proposed Flagship 
project and the AI4EU. AI could be featured as an essential component of a 
future mission to be launched under Horizon Europe. The proposed mission 
would then have to be broader than AI, embracing the whole technology 
stack, its ethical, societal and environmental impacts, and the possible 
consequences for education and skills. In this report, we have provisionally 
called it “Mission IT”.  
44. The CEPS Task Force welcomes the Coordinated Plan and its high level 
of ambition. The only big element that really seems to be missing is the 
link between AI and the SDGs. This is regrettable, since such a link could 
become the most distinguishing feature of the EU approach to AI and would 
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establish Europe as a prominent player on AI policy at the global level, 
including vis-à-vis those countries with which the EU has consolidated trade 
agreements, or is about to engage in deeper trade negotiations. Taking a 
clear stance on AI “for good” would also position Europe as a privileged 
interlocutor of all those private standardisation bodies such as IEEE or ISO, 
which are extensively working on shaping the development and evolution 
of AI at the global level; and as an advocate of treating AI for what it is: a 
means to a more prosperous future, and not a goal in itself.  
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Despite still being in its infancy, artificial intelligence (AI) has already shown enormous potential to advance humanity towards new frontiers of prosperity 
and growth. Due to its powerful force, however, AI can also pose significant risks, 
which should be handled with the utmost care, but not with fear. The world’s 
top political leaders have understood AI’s disruptive potential and are rushing 
to secure a competitive advantage in this crucial emerging domain, even at the 
price of reviving old-fashioned industrial policy. At the same time, academia 
and civil society are calling for widely shared ethical principles to avoid negative 
repercussions. In this fast-changing context, Europe is struggling to keep pace 
with superpowers like the United States and China. 
This report summarises the work of the CEPS Task Force on Artificial Intelligence, 
which met throughout 2018. Arguing that the EU and its member states 
are uniquely positioned to lead the global community towards responsible, 
sustainable AI development, its members call upon European leaders to focus 
on leveraging AI’s potential to foster sustainable development, in line with the 
future 2030 Agenda. The report puts forward 44 recommendations on how 
to design and promote lawful, responsible and sustainable AI and how to 
approach future policy and investment decisions with the aim of positioning 
Europe in the driver’s seat to address the most disruptive technology transition 
of our times.
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